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This dissertation focuses on the aspects of grace in the theologies ofKarl Barth
and Paul Tillich. Following the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion, the threads of
both the iconic and the idolic will be investigated as to their influence in Barth's
exposition of the doctrine of the Covenant and Tillich's development of the Gestalt
of grace. A chronological approach will be taken, showing both the similarities and
differences between Barth and Tillich and the theological developments in their lives.
The phenomenological analysis of the given, will show that Barth and Tillich were
nearer in concepts of grace then is often accounted, but it will also be demonstrated
that they were not compatible on that which manifests itself as the iconic. The
covenant, as espoused by Barth, will be seen not to have a sufficient iconic presence
in comparison with Tillich's Gestalt of grace symbolized by the cross. However, it
will also be shown that Marion's eucharistic symbology is not completely adequate
as a corrective to either Barth or Tillich.
The introductory chapter will state Marion's thought on the "giveness" of the
phenomenon of grace, both as concept and icon. Chapter 2 will focus on the
theological and philosophical backgrounds of Barth and Tillich. In Chapter 3 and 4,
the early careers ofBarth and Tillich will be narrated and their early meetings
recounted. In Chapter 5, Barth's developing theology will be discussed, especially his
shift from dialectical thought to an analogy of faith following his study ofAnselm.
Tillich's career as a philosopher will be analyzed with special emphasis on his
theological essays. Chapter 7 will focus on Barth's early dogmatic thought leading up
to his doctrine of election and the covenant. Tillich's mature theology in his systematic
writings of the fifties will be the topic of Chapter 8. The final notions ofBarth's
doctrine of the covenant in the last two volumes of his dogmatics will reveal his
theology of the cross, and his understandings of the secular parables of grace. The
conclusion will summarize and critique Barth and Tillich's ideas on the divine
initiative of grace and Marion's icon of grace in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.
This study uses an approach not done before which will illuminate various
understandings ofBarth and Tillich's theology and seeks to provide a fresh reading of
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"Tillich trat hier auf."x Paul Tillich came to visit Karl Barth in Gottingen at
the end ofMarch in 1922, beginning a lifelong friendship that in spite of intense
theological differences would continue more than forty years. What had transpired
in their lives to bring them to this meeting? What theological affinities and prior
assumptions did they bring to the table; and why at this time did they believe there
was agreement only to go their separate ways in the future? In 1964, toward the end
of both their theological careers, Barth contributed an "Introductory Report" to
Alexander McKelway's book on Tillich stating that the "biblical sense of
'covenant'" was an "application . . . unknown in Tillich."2 He would later write
these striking words to McKelway's wife:
I like to hear, that Paul Tillich is satisfied about the manner your
husband treated him. This is exactly what I wished: that that
necessary attack on Tillich's abominable theology should be made
in the indirect way of an absolutely fair representation of its trend
Karl Barth to Eduard Thurnevsen, 2 April 1922, in KarlBarth-Eduard Thurneysen: Briefweschel Band
2, 1921-1930 (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1974) 64. (Hereafter cited as BT).
Karl Barth, "An Introductory Report" in Alexander J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology ofPaul
Tillich: A Review andAnalysis (London: Lutterworth Press, 1964) 13.
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and particularities.3
Barth seemed to be overstating his position concerning Tillich's
"abominable theology"; but what of his concern over the possibility of the sense
ofbiblical covenant as a corrective to Tillich's correlational theology? Was Barth
correct in assuming that Tillich had not applied the basic concepts of this doctrine
in either explicit or implicit fashion? Exactly how important is the doctrine of the
biblical Covenant to a proper understanding of the notion of grace? The basic
aporia between Tillich and Barth may be found in their particular theological
traditions, Lutheran and Reformed respectively. Yet, there may be more
similarities between their theologies of grace then has been acknowledged
in the secondary literature. There is also a striking difference in their expositions
of grace and covenant. This dissimilarity is found in their symbolic and iconic
interpretations of the cross of Jesus Christ. What I propose to undertake is an
investigation into both Barth's doctrine of the covenant and its relation to his
theologia crucis, in comparison with Tillich's Gestalt of grace and his
symbolic interpretation of the cross. A phenomenological approach will be
taken which will illuminate in new ways both the similarities of their doctrines
of grace and the disjunction in their understandings of the import of the symbol
of the cross in their respective theologies.
The validity of such an approach has been implied in the important work of
" Karl Barth, Letters 1961-1968, ed. J. Fangmeier & H. Stoevesandt, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh:
T. &T. Clark, 1981) 123.
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Simon Fisher on Barth's writings before World War One. Fisher finds elements
of the phenomenology of the "given" (geben) and "giveness" (gegebenheit) in
Barth's early work. "The whole process of giving and receiving could be termed
'revelation', which was responsible for establishing the Christian consciousness
and its unique kind of faith -knowledge."4 Barth established a form of "revela-
-tory positivism" in Fisher's estimation, an Offenbarungspositivismus that
came from his theological and phenomenological background in Marburg. Yet
as time would tell, Barth would refute his philosophical legacy from Marburg
as well as his preoccupation with Schleiermacher. This led to the confrontation
with Paul Tillich whose method of "correlation" owed much to the dialectic of
Schleiermacher. For Tillich, in nuce, the given could manifest itself in both sacred
and profane culture, for Barth this manifestation could only occur in the inner life
of the elect Christian and be exhibited in the ethics of the believer. Icon and idol,
exhibition and dispostion, lie in the diastasis between the two theologians, close
in notions of grace but disparate in regards to cultural and religious manifestation.
To elucidate this diastatic problem, the phenomenological work of the theologian
Jean-Luc Marion will be utilized as a heuristic approach to their theologies and
an understanding of that which is iconic in Barth and Tillich's theologies.
Marion describes that notion which he names the iconic.
The only concept that can serve as an intelligible medium for the
icon is one that lets itself be measured by the excessiveness ofthe
4
Simon Fisher, Revelatory Positivism?: Barth's Earliest Theology And The Marburg School (Oxford
University Press, 1988) 333.
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invisible that enters into visibility through infinite depth, hence
that itself speaks or promises to speak this infinite depth, where
the visible and the invisible become acquainted.5
An adequate symbol for the iconic is what Marion seeks to find, a conceptual
"intention" that is the product of a hermeneutical process which reflects a
notion ofdistance; for, as he explains, a "valid icon"
is the concept or group of concepts that reinforces the distinction of
the visible and the invisible as well as their union . . . Every pretension
to absolute knowledge therefore becomes the domain of the idol.6
As a theological concept, the idea of grace (as a result of a divine initiative) would
be such a "valid icon." Any claim to absoluteness with such a concept might be
deemed an idolatry, a false icon (or idol) that would not reflect the gaze of infinity
back to the viewer, but only, as Marion avers, consigning the "divine to the
measure of a human gaze."7 The idol is limited to that which the human aspiration
brings to it;8 a self-reflection of the gazer, a finitely bounded phenomenon that
cannot allow progress to the invisible9 What is being sought is an iconically valid
concept that reflects the divine, a phenomena that is "saturated." Marion contends:'
The saturated phenomenon will be described as invisable according to
quantity, unbearable according to quality, absolute according to relation,
Jean Luc-Marion, God WithoutBeing: Hors-Texte, trans. T. A. Carlson (The University of Chicago Press,
1991) 23. My italics added for emphasis, (Hereafter abbreviated as GWB).
Ibid.
Ibid., 14.
For Marion, "Feuerbach's judgement stands: 'it is man who is the originalmodel of his idol.' Ibid., 16,
author's italics.
Ibid., 26. My italics.
irregardable according to modality.10
Following Husserl, Marion continues down the path of phenomenology by asking
if there is a possibility that the phenomenon might carry an excess of intuition, a
'giveness' that would "give more, indeed immeasurably more, than the intention
would ever have aimed at or foreseen?"11 This excess, or surplus of meaning is
reflected in the Cartesian notion of "amazement" as its "coming forward precedes
our apprehension, rather than resulting from it."12 Such is the character of grace
described by Karl Barth as:
the distinctive mode of God's being in so far as it seeks and creates
fellowship by its own free inclination and favour, unconditioned
by any merit or claim in the beloved, but also unhindered by any
unworthiness or opposition in the latter. It is in this distinctive
characteristic that we recognize the divinity of God's love.13
Exactly what is in the symbolic that gives an adequate representation of this
concept of grace as "saturated phenomenon"? For Marion, the process of a
"reduction" of the phenomenon, in the format of Husserl, will disclose the
intentionality and quality of "giveness" that reveals the character of the infinite,
in the gaze of the icon which "regards us—[for] it concerns us, in that it allows the
intention of the invisible to occur visibly." This consideration, that which Tillich
10
Jean Luc-Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology ofGiveness, trans. J. L. Kosky (Stanford
University Press, 2002) 199, (Hereafter cited as BG).
11
Ibid., 197, author's italics.
12
Ibid., 201.
13 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. II, Part One: The Doctrine OfGod, trans. T. H. L. Parker et al
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957) 353, (Hereafter abbreviated as CD).
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called our "ultimate concern", manifests itself:
in a face, where man's sight envisages nothing, but goes back infinitely
from the visible to the invisible by the grace of the visible itself: instead
of the invisible mirror, which sent the human gaze back to itself alone
and censured the invisable, the icon opens in a face that gazes at our
gazes in order to summon them to its depth.14
Therefore, any symbolic icon of grace, divine initiative, election or predestination,
must exhibit itself in terms of its giving that which is invisable; any theological
system that is derived from the premise of free, or unmerited grace, must also
reflect this sense of infinite concernpro nobis. It might well be wagered that both
Tillich and Barth accomplished such descriptions of the given in their respective
theologies. If so, then why such disputes between them over their religious
beliefs? Are Barth's suspicions about Tillich founded when he censures the
method of correlation that starts with the philosophical questions regarding
human meaning and existence and applies Christian answers to them? "Will
these theological answers allow themselves to be pressed into this scheme
without suffering harm to what in any case is their biblical content?"15 By the
same token was Tillich justified in his criticizing Barth for the:
mistake ... to start his Prolegomena with what, so to speak, are the
Postlegomena, the doctrine of the Trinity. It could be said that in his
system this doctrine falls from heaven, the heaven of an unmediated
biblical and ecclesiastical authority.16
14
GWB, 19, Author's italics.
15
Barth, "Introductory Report", 13.
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Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol III: Life andSpirit, History and the Kingdom ofGod (The
University ofChicago Press, 1963) 285, (Hereafter abbreviated as ST).
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This reflected Tillich's concern with Barth's theology from the early days of
their involvement with the 'dialectical theology' movement of the twenties.
Tillich acknowledged Barth's "protest" and fears that "any kind of divine-human
correlation makes God partly dependent on man." However, God in "his abysmal
nature"17 is not contingent on that which is human and finite, "God in his self-
manifestation to man is dependent on the way man receives his manifestation."
This, for example, allows the doctrine of predestination to be seen as correlative
in a sense, "namely that this way is foreordained by God and entirely independent
of human freedom." Correlation takes on a cognitive aspect for "[symbolically
speaking, God answers man's questions, and under the impact ofGod's answers
man asks them." This is Tillich's refutation to Barth's accusations of the questions
coming from the philosophical realm only:
Theology formulates the questions implied in human existence, and
theology formulates the answers implied in divine self-manifestation
under the guidance of the questions implied in human existence.18
The answer to this problem ofmisunderstanding may lie in Tillich's use of the
word "implied." He is well aware that his theological task will show that:
The biblical and ecclesiastical character of the solutions to theological
problems presented in this volume will not be difficult to recognize,
although it is more implicit than explicit.19
It seems obvious that Barth found the implicit nature ofTillich's use of
17




Ibid., vii. My italics.
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dogmatic and biblical concepts to be less than recognizable. And herein lies
the query of this paper; can Marion's use of phenomenological procedures
regarding 'giveness' and the 'gaze of the icon' be applied to Tillich and Barth's
understanding of grace and election to clarify whether they adequately reflect
the invisablel Put in another way, does the concept of Barth's explicit doctrine
of the Covenant and the more implicit notion of Tillich's Gestalt ofGrace,
provide the sufficient horizon of gift and gifted-ness, icon over idol, as asserted
by Marion?
Jean-Luc Marion's Theology ofDonation
Marion's theological statements have a strong phenomenological background
connected to them. His research in Descartes, Nietzsche, Heidegger and other
philosophers have informed his understanding of the nature of God and the iconic
and the pervasive character of idolatry in human reflection. Before we are to
proceed to the thought ofBarth and Tillich, Marion's methodology must be
explicated to establish the parameters of grace that will be used in any comparison
between the two. The reductive procedure of the Austrian philosopher Edmund
Husserl has provided the most impetus to Marion's determination of the giveness
of religious phenomena. How was this notion ofGegebenheit postulated in
Husserl's thought?
Husserl believed that philosophy had erred in asserting that "cognition is a
thing apart from its object" and had introduced a false sense of transcendence and
8
therefore immanence as well.20 Therefore, philosophy needed to lie "in a
wholly new dimension" that would distinguish itself from any "natural science."21
Husserl proposed an entirely new method which required an epoche, a "bracketing"
or more literally an "abstention."22 Husserl adumbrated:
At the outset of the critique of cognition the entire world of nature,
physical and psychological, as well as one's own human self together
with all the sciences which have to do with these objective matters,
areput into question 2i
This procedure allows the "things-in-themselves" to be perceived, not as
psychological processes, but "in terms of their essential natures as meaning
intentions24 and their interconnected meaning-fulfillments,25 essential structures
involved in all understanding."26 Phenomena were to be dealt with only as given,
as the ding-an-sich, in the sense of their appearance to consciousness in the
manifestation (Wie) that it appears. What remains is aphilosophical residuum
after the act of reduction as "pure consciousness" alone "but not as another region
of being but rather as the absolute ground of all positing ofbeing."27 That which is
20
Richard Cobb-Stevens, "The beginnings of phenomenology: Husserl and his predecessors" in Richard
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transcendent is important for it is "given to consciousness" and thereby is,
in Husserl's words from his Ideas /:
an object for phenomenological investigation not only with
respect to the consciousness of it. . . but also, though this
essentially involved with the former, as what is given and
accepted in the modes of giveness.28
What is 'given' reveals itself as an apriori, for consciousness becomes aware,
through the act of reduction, that any object or concept has aspects not instantly
apprehended. "The notion of grasping the essence is to grasp something which
has transcendence in immanence."29 It is to this transcendent noumenon that
Marion is acutely concerned with in his understanding of that which is etant donne.
Gift and Giveness as Grace
Grace as a transcendent noumenon can be analyzed (or reduced) under the
rubrics of gift {don) and its phenomenological matrix, giveness {donation). Marion
does not make an analogical equation between the gift and grace, as he prefers the
concept of charite as love. He does, however, open up the possibility of new
phenomenological understandings to occur because of the existence of divine love.
Marion, following Pascal, sees love as providing "a way beyond metaphysics."30
Love serves as a "hermeneutic principle that opens onto a new world" and allows
for a "new phenomena [to] appear among the things of this world to an eye that is
28 • • •
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initiated in charity."31 Mutatis mutandis grace itself stands in the category of gift
to be reduced in the phenomenological process of epoche, and epistemically
evaluated in terms of the categories of icon and idol. Still to be considered is
Marion's understanding of the phenomena of gift and its function as a conceptual
icon. The sacramental event of the Eucharist becomes, for Marion, like an
"obligatory site where every somewhat consistent theological attempt must come
in the end to be tested."32 This attempt can be formulated in the question:
can the eucharistic presence of Christ as consecrated bread and
wine determine, starting from itself and itself alone, the conditions
of its reality, the dimensions of its temporality and the dispositions
of its approach?33
The Eucharistic present must first be understood "as a gift that is given." So
also, the event of grace, as a necessary site, can be apprehended as a theological
doctrine of the "gift that is given." Tillich's summary of "Divine Love as Grace
and Predestination" is instructive here as it manifests this phenomenological
determination in the manner of the "paradox of grace" for "it gives fulfillment
to that which is separated from the source of fulfillment, and it accepts that which
is unacceptable."34 In its separation {distance) and in its modal impossibility
{invisible), grace seeks to define itself in the conditions of the reality ofChrist,
31
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its abiding presence in the sacraments and the common faith of the Church and
in its disposition of freedom though the efficacy of divine initiative. But these
conclusions are discovered only after the phenomena of gift is reduced.
Marion's procedure of reduction to the 'gift as given' not only derives
from Husserl's methodology but also from Martin Heidegger's extension of it.
Postmodern dialogues are taken into account as well, especially the approach of
Jacques Derrida regarding the gift in its un-reduced economic and reciprocal
character.35 Horner summarizes the controversy in this way:
For Derrida, there cannot be a phenomenology of the gift because
for him phenomenology attempts to reduce to presence, and a present
gift, losing its essential characteristic of freedom, would no longer be
a gift.36
Marion attempts to remove the notion of gift from the causal scheme of this
metaphysical reciprocity as it takes its saturated form not from the nexus of
relational commodity, but from the character ofgiveness, "that is to say, from
itself, without depending on any extrinsic relation . . .The gift gives 'itself
intrinsically in its .se/f-giving."37 A phenomenological outline of such 'self-giving'
is proposed by Marion and will serve as the methodological schema in the
examination ofBarth and Tillich later in this essay; i.e., "the anamorphosis,
35




Jean-Luc Marion, "Sketch of a Phenomenological Concept of Gift", from M. Westphal, ed., Postmodern
Philosophy and Christian Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999) 137.
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the unpredictable landing, the fait accompli, the incidence and eventness."38
"Autant de reduction, autant de donation" (As much reduction, as much
giveness)39 provides the phenomenological impetus for Marion and his
description of gift. Husserl had asserted that "Absolute giveness is an ultimate
term"40 leading Marion to question the lack of a phenomenological approach in
theology (with the exception ofHans Urs von Balthasar) and, instead, to privilege
the "ontic, historic, or semiotic" hermeneutic. A second question is posed to
phenomenologists themselves; "what does to be given ultimately signify"?
Put more exactly:
Why has phenomenology always practiced giveness as if it were
self-evident and always studied the reduction as problematic, when
it could be that giveness, being more essential, might also remain
the most enigmatic?41
The spontaneous character of intrinsic phenomena have been, by Marion,
thematized in the following pattern:
(a) They cannot be repeated identically and reveal themselves in this way
precisely identical to themselves alone: unrepeatabilty, thus irreversibility.
(b) They cannot be accorded [se voir assigner] a unique cause or exhaustive
explanation, but demand an indefinite number of them, enlarged to
the measure of the hermeneutic of historians, sociologists, economists,
and so on, being able to develop for their purposes: surplus of effects and
38
Horner, Marion, 120. This outline is the basic schema used by Marion in Being Given, ibid. Book HI.
39
Robyn Homer & Vincent Berraud, "Translator's Introduction" in Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of
SaturatedPhenomena (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002) x.
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offait accompli over every system of causes.
(c) They cannot be foreseen, since their partial causes not only remain
insufficient but are only discovered once the fact of their effect has been
accomplished. Whence it follows that their possibility, not being able to
be anticipated, remains, strictly speaking, an impossibility with regard to
the system of anteriorly indexed causes.
Marion continues:
Now ~a decisive point-these three features of the event do not concern
only collective phenomena but also characterize certain private or
intersubjective phenomena.42
Compare this with Barth's description of the "experience" of grace:
This is the crux of the matter, for grace, breaking through both
mysticism and morality, transforms the indicative into an imperative,
and we encounter the absolute demand that the impossible shall
become possible.43
The phenomenological non sequitur aspect of grace reconstructs the I by its excess
and by its intentionality for "Grace is the freedom of God by which men are seized."
However, this seizure does not lie in the realm of the 'natural' or deductively
metaphysical, Barth continues:
Within the sphere of psycho-physical experience this seizure is, however,
nothing but a vacuum and void and blankness. The seizure , therefore,
lies on the other side of the abyss.44
Grace is never far from Marion's conception of the 'given' and its corresponding
event, for this event:
42
Ibid., 36-37.
43 Karl Barth, The Epistle To The Romans, trans, from the sixth edition by E. C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford




can take the figure of the miracle, the given becomes election and
promise, the resistance of I 'adonne is deepened in conversion of
the witness, the transmutation from the self-giving into ,ve//-showing
requires theological virtues, its progressiveness is prolonged in
eschatological return of the eternal beginning, and so on.45
The enigmatic phenomenon of the event of grace is included in this "so on." This
"so on" manifests no Gestalt and in this way can reveal itself only in the excess of
giveness, for as Tillich noted, "Grace is always a paradox; it breaks through the
immediate form but has no form of its own."46 Marion seeks to overcome this
problem in his notion of icon and idol as the models of phenomenological giveness
as will be seen. How exactly, does the reduction of gift to the horizon of donation
illicit a premise for the "saturated phenomena" in non-metaphysical terms?
Marion makes no claim that Husserlian phenomenology is non-metaphysical.
as Horner has pointed out, there is an "ambiguity" that allows for "giveness" as the
reductive horizon. Noting that the Cartesian method "eventually shows itself
incapable of self-constitution" leads to conclusion that:
The exception of the 1 from being and its incapacity to constitute
itself suggest to Marion that objective presence for a constituting
intention need not be the ultimate horizon of phenomenology.
That horizon instead, he claims, is properly giveness.47
Asserting the phenomenological principle "So Much Reduction, So Much
45
Marion, In Excess, 53.
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Giveness"48, permits Marion to observe that:
The reduction separates what appears from what does not appear,
from what renders its apparition deceptive and mimics appearing
by fraudulently attaching a fundamental obscurity to it—in short,
for what brings into phenomenality that which remains foreign to it-
unregulated objectification, 'absurd theories.'49
To facilitate a proper reductive explication of the "given" in accordance with
the five categories already listed,50 Marion engages in a conversation, a
"determination" by "assigning the gift the immanent and intrinsic characteristic
of giveness."51 To avoid objectifying the phenomena as exchange and a human
instrument, reduction must start from "elsewhere" that "betrays no transcendence,
but rather attests the irreducible makeup of the selfofwhat shows itself in that it
gives itself"52 The crossing of this distance from "elsewhere" is the anamorphosis.
Anamorphosis
This term represents the phenomenon's journey from the 'out there', its
surrender to the gifted (/'adonne), and in its self-abandonment its movement to
'somewhere', which appears to the Vadonne as a present, a 'now here'.
"Ana-morphosis indicates that the phenomenon takesform starting from itself."53
48 ,












This resembles Tillich's "affirmation of the presence of the Unconditioned-
Beyond, the 'speaking' or 'expression' of a form (Gestalt) of grace", as
summarized by James Luther Adams.54 Any concept of grace as solely contingent
on divine initiative would seem to be a description of its anamorphic character
"from elsewhere", however. This leads, of course, to a basic concern in any iconic
depiction of grace itself, whether it be sacramental (Marion), convenantal (Barth)
or prophetic principle as Gestalt (Tillich). A formulation must occur for an
anamorphosis to be recognized, as Marion states:
The phenomenon therefore succeeds in appearing only by passing
from a first form~unformed~to a second form, which informs it as
such because it fixes a figure of apparition for it.55
Contingency
Marion characterizes this term as a determination of the "unpredictable
landing" (arrivage) of the phenomena "according to discontinuous rhythms, in
fits and starts, unexpectedly, by surprise, detached from the other, in bursts,
aleatory."56 The phenomenological horizon of giveness is unfolded in the
spontaneity of the "unpredictable landing" by "delivering the ineluctabilty of
the arising and, inseparably, its unforeseeable and unproducible initiative."57
Barth's recognition of the unpredictability and non-contingent nature of grace
54









is exemplified in his statement that, regarding the graciousness of God:
His inclination, good will and favour which He turns toward His
partner in this act of condescension is a sheer gift which something
necessarily called forth by it can neither precede nor follow, for,
whatever follows it has its ground in this prevenient cause. It is thus
a gift in this strictest sense of the term.58
The spontaneous quality of the phenomenon of grace, and its irruption into our
phenomenological realm has a personal dimension about it as Marion observes:
for us, extrinsic or not, the contingency of what touches me remains
necessary with an essential necessity, for us, every phenomenon appears
as if the contingency of its appearing characterized it intrinsically.59
Tillich recognized this in his elucidation of the center ofProtestant doctrine;
faith as a "divine structure of reality." He wrote, "Faith is the faith ofman. It
does not come from man, but is effective in man. And in so far as faith is in a
community or personality, they are embodiments of grace." The "Word" creates
faith, and this Word is "said from beyond us, to us."60 The uniqueness of grace
carries its own apriori of contingent and modal possibility as Tillich wrote:
The reality of grace is the prius of all speaking and hearing about it;
being moved by the Spirit is the prius of faith, not the reverse.
But to be moved by the Spirit or to be grasped by the unconditional
means to be drawn into the reality and the life of a Gestalt of grace.61
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being "grasped" by grace. The "unpredictable landing" of grace has both an
existential and ethical character about it, for it destabilizes the receiving self, or
"transcendental I" with its own reality, and by its Gestalt reorientates (or recreates)
that same self with that which is given "as election and promise." Analogically
compared to human birth, "pure phenomenological necessity" gives itself in the
"event" already given, "from a done deal (une donne revolue)", in a manifestation
of "the selfofwhat gives itself."62 Therefore, the phenomenon of grace creates its
own paradigm derived from its inner necessity to be known and received.
The Fait Accompli-- "The Factum par Excellence"
More problematical for a theological assertion of grace as 'saturated
phenomenon' resides in Marion's use of the category of thefait accompli. He
quotes Schelling's reference to Revelation as thefactum, as the irrefutable event
that "cannot be revived any more than rendered a nonhappening."63 Can the
doctrine of grace be ever perceived as such an irrefutable fact? Tillich realized
that grace "was not tangible", but a "possible object of 'imaginative intuition'."
This is demonstrated in the New Testament Bild of Jesus as the Christ which
is "open to nonsensuous intuition." This Christological opaqueness is the
"transparent" Gestalt. The symbol or Bild is the phenomenonpar excellence,
62
Marion, In Excess, 44.
63
BG, 141. Original quote in Schelling's Philosophic de la mythologie, modified by Marion.
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for "[s]omething shines through it which is more than it."64 Intuition validates
the reality of grace in the very act of its grasping the receiver in the moment of
apperception. By contrast, Marion contends that the character of divine agape
manifests itself as that beyond being, as pure gift, seen in and as the corporeally
visible elements of the Eucharistic sacrament. Its fait accompli assaults the
security of the self-centered 'I', for the Eucharist "requires ofwhoever approaches
it a radical conceptual self-critique and charges him with renewing his norms
of thought."65 Autonomy is therefore superseded by thefait accompli of theonomy,
a paradigmatic concept for Tillich as he stated in 1925:
Theonomy itself uncovers and identifies the paradoxical character
of the Eloly and of ecstasy, the inner transcending character, the
quality of breaking though immediate forms and of interpreting
them symbolically. Grace is always a paradox; it breaks through
the immediate form but has no form of its own.66
This paradox comes to full expression in the symbol of the "divine mediator."
As an iconic representation (Bild) it can be found even in the finite (or "idolic")67
as the purveyor of the Unconditioned and "for whose sake it surrenders itself (in
the notion of "abandon") as the finite, in the vision of the figure of the incarnate,
lowly and dying God" which is the religious "mysterium"6S Jesus the Christ,
54
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symbolized in his appearance as the New Being, is the appropriate symbol of
the religious mysterium for Tillich as will be seen in his later writings.
The Incident and the Event
Marion proceeds to define the aspects of the incident as that which "comes
upon me in such a way that it consists of nothing other than this first and last
coming upon, without existing or making itself visible prior to this." Therefore,
the incident "resides entirely in the fact of its initiating accomplishment, without
any background, foresight, or forewarning reduced to its fact."69 The phenomenon
also has in its own self-giveness as incident without precedent an implication of
its unique selfas "marked in its determination as event."70 This determination may
be seen in terms of a metaphysical excess which defies causal definitions. Marion
notes that the character of God gives an example of:
uncausabilty by excess, infinite essence, who is excepted
from every univocal relation with his always finite effects,
a fortiori with the least antecedent, unrepeatabilty of the
unique, unavailability of the unforeseeable because the invisible,
incomprehensibility by surplus, even of qualifications,
therefore of evidence.71
To retreat to such transcendental magnification does not provide a satisfactory
answer to the selfof the phenomenon. This answer, for Marion, is adumbrated in








phenomenon as originally projected. This hypothesis is explicated in more detail
in his notion of the "saturated phenomenon."
The Saturated Phenomenon
Marion describes this category in terms given by Immanuel Kant. However,
his notion of the saturated phenomenon "exceeds these categories (as well as
principles), since in it intuition passes beyond the concept."72 What is brought to
light in this procedure is the sense of horizon and the transcendental sense of the I.
This occurs because Kant's initial order of the categories of understanding is
reversed by Marion. The saturated phenomenon cannot be predicted as to its
quantity, for it exceeds the sum of its finite parts. Quality, measured in terms of
intensity, cannot be conceptually perceived for it "bedazzles" the recipient with
its magnitude.73 It stands absolute in relationality for it is "disconnected from all
analogy with any object of experience whatsoever."74 In fact, for Marion the lack
of intuition in regard to the phenomenon itself, and in its superfluity provides the
paradoxical tenet that, in its constitution there is encountered "an intuitive giveness
that cannot be granted a univocal sense in return."75 As the "symbol gives rise to
thought" (Ricoeur) so the saturated phenomenon gives rise to an "endless
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phenomenon" appear or ever be apperceived?
Marion provides the answer in the relational consequence of the phenomenon
on its recipient. "What I see of them, if I see anything of them that is, does not
result from the constitution that I would assign them in the visible, but from the
effect that they produce on me."76 What remains is the proper depiction of that
effectual experience of the infinite horizon of the saturated phenomenon. By
taking the experience of grace as such an event, any representation must reflect
the character of this horizon to avoid becoming an idol of finite offing, as opposed
to an icon capable of infinite interpretation, infinite distance.
The Icon: Finding the Proper De-Piction of the Concept of Grace
"Name your idol, and you will know who you are."77 The inverse might also
apply, "Find your icon and you will know who God is."78 This brings us to the
thesis of this paper; do Paul Tillich and Karl Barth have adequate conceptual icons
for the doctrine of grace? Such an investigation would lead to three possible
clarifications for an understanding of their respective theologies: 1. a clarification
over terminology, i.e., in what referential ways do Tillich and Barth differ in their
writings about grace, and; 2. are their differences (if any) constitutive of their
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definitions of the depictions of grace?
This essay will follow a chronological path in the main for both Barth and
Tillich's theological concepts were greatly influenced by their contexts and the
flow of history as it developed in Germany. However, in chapter 2 we will trace
the philosophical and theological influences of both Barth and Tillich apart
from a chronological narrative. In chapter 3 Barth's early career as pastor, his
commentary on Romans, and his career involvement in the Socialist movement
will be investigated. Chapter 4 will focus on Tillich's military chaplaincy and
his Weimar republic teaching experiences. Chapter 5 will concentrate on Barth's
early teaching career at Gottingen and his deliberations on Church doctrine. In
chapter 6 Tillich's Frankfurt years and his leaving Germany will be covered.
Chapter 7 will examine Barth's early Church Dogmatics and various other
writings as his doctrine ofCovenant reaches its zenith. In chapter 8 the focus
will be on Tillich's writings after his emigration to America, most especially his
three-volume Systematics. Chapter 9 will explore Barth's later Dogmatics and the
concluding chapter will bring together the three threads of the iconic valuation of
grace in the final summaries ofMarion's eucharistic emphasis, Barth's covenantal
explication of elective grace, and Tillich's picture of the New Being as symbolized
in the cross of Jesus Christ.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL AND
THEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON BARTH AND
TILLICH'S THOUGHT
The intellectual backgrounds ofTillich and Barth show many similarities
and not a few differences. To be reviewed in this chapter are not only the
theological influences on their early theologies, but philosophical ones as
well. This will help set the stage for their development as theologians and what
effect, if any, the phenomenological method of Husserl had on their concepts.
And, as will be seen, the differing theological backgrounds and appropriation
ofEnlightenment philosophy will definitively influence their understanding of
that which is iconic as opposed to expressions ofhuman idolatry and the religious
manifestations of these concepts. This iteration of their philosophical and
theological education is important for, to understand Barth, one must understand
what he was to come to reject later in his theological development. For Tillich,
a different appropriation of his intellectual tradition would lead to an eclectic and
tendentious combination of philosophical and theological strands.
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Karl Barth's Early Years
Both Barth and Tillich's biographical details are well known from both their
autobiographical statements as well as secondary biographical information. Barth
was born May 10, 1886, in Basel, Switzerland. His father Johann Friedrich ('Fritz',
who died in 1912) was a Professor ofNew Testament studies and Early Church
History at the university in Bern, the city where Karl grew up. Barth remembered
his father's influence fondly as:
The man who without question laid the foundation for my later
involvement in theology ... By virtue of the quiet seriousness
with which he studied Christianity, whether as scholar or teacher,
he became and remained my model.1
Karl's brothers Peter and Heinrich made their marks in academic work as well as
an editor ofCalvin's works and a professor of philosophy, respectively. After a
normal (if somewhat bellicose) childhood in which he began a life-long love of
Mozart, Barth became a confirmand in the Nydegg church at the age of 16. He
wrote later:
On the eve of the day ofmy confirmation (March 23,1902) I
made the bold resolve to become a theologian: not with preaching
and pastoral care and so on in mind, but the hope that through such
a course of study I might reach a proper understanding of the creed
in place of the rather hazy ideas that I had at that time.2
As a young student of theology Barth went off to study in Bern "with my
father's kind but earnest advice"3 and then to Germany in Berlin, Tubingen and
Marburg where he stayed for three semesters. While in Bern young Karl attended
1
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Fritz's lectures in New Testament studies and, though respecting his father's
scholarship, "I could not adopt what was then called his (moderately) 'positive' ...
theological attitude and tendency."4 Fritz was concerned about his son's theological
influences in these various universities, approving ofTubingen (which Karl disliked)
and only reluctantly allowing him to attend Marburg, (which Karl referred to as 'my
Zion').5 There Barth fell under the influence ofWilhelm Herrmann who was "the
theological teacher ofmy student years."6 Herrmann aroused Barth's interest in the
writings of Friedrich Schleiermacher which initially guided him into deeper
theological reflection and also whom he eventually felt compelled to repudiate.7
This repudiation was a long way in off in Barth's future for in his early years he
grappled seriously with the claims of the current philosophies in vogue at that time.
These philosophies and educational challenges were quite similar to those ofPaul
Tillich, as we shall see, but would ultimately be appropriated in quite different ways.
The Early Years of Paul Tillich
Paul Tillich was born in the village of Starzeddel in the Brandenburg region,
now part ofmodern day Poland, on August 20, 1886. His father Johannes was the
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nearly died which lead his biographer to write, "In this first experience of
his existence, Paul Tillich's lifelong dread of death-this melancholy
preoccupation-may have had its beginning."8 Both the sad death of his
mother and Tillich's experiences during the First World War contributed
to his ongoing question of existence, "Why is there something rather than
nothing?" When a child the young Paulus moved to the hamlet of Schonfliess
where its rustic beauty and simplicity of life contributed to his well being as
a growing youth. Like most German boys of that time Tillich was imbued
with a loyal patriotism to the Kaiser with whom his father was chosen to
travel to Palestine for the consecration of an evangelical church in Gethsemane.
A piece of olive wood that his father brought back always stayed on Tillich's
desk.9
In 1898 the entire Tillich household moved to Berlin as his father had been
appointed minister and superintendent of the Bethlehemgemeinde to examine
ministerial candidates in the field of philosophy. As an adolescent growing up in
the big city Tillich longed for the lure of the country and his visits to the sea
became formative for him. "The sea was a significant inspiration for him, for he
found in its contemplation the suggestion of the infinite bordering on the finite."10
For Tillich the sea breaking in on the beach was as "the Eternal breaking in on
the Temporal." This borderline or boundary imagery he later said provided a
o
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"true propitious place for acquiring knowledge."11 John Heywood Thomas
surmises:
Ideas such as his theory of the 'dynamic mass' and the Absolute
as the ground and abyss of dynamic truth were conceived under
the influence of the constantly moving sea.12
Undoubtedly all Tillich's life experiences contributed to his mystical
relation to nature. Tillich himself has related that his romantic notions were
accentuated by his love of poetry and literature (especially Hamlet) and his
Lutheran background. His love of the natural world led to "the tremendous
emotional impact that Schelling's philosophy of nature made upon me" and
his religious sensitivities led Tillich into the conflict between the Lutheran
and Reformed doctrine of the Extra Calvinisticum. The dispute over this
doctrine resided in the notion ofwhether the finite was capable of the
infinite {nan capax infiniti) in the Reformed position as opposed to the
Infra Lutheranum which espoused the view that the finite is capable of the
infinite and "consequently that in Christ there is a mutual indwelling of the
two natures."13 This dogmatic difference would fuel much of the
disagreement between Barth and Tillich in the future.
As a young student Tillich studied philosophy "privately" becoming
acquainted with Kant, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Hegel and especially Schelling.14
11
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Both Tillich's doctoral dissertation from the University ofBreslau and his thesis
for his Licentiat of Theology from the Berlin Cathedral Seminary concentrated
on Schelling's philosophy of religion.15 After his graduation in 1908 Tillich
became an assistant pastor in the village ofLichtenrade where he taught the
confirmation class and preached occasionally. The next year he returned to
Berlin and entered the Berliner Domstift to complete his seminary training.
His ordination brought Tillich to serve as a vicar to the church district of
Nauen, a suburb ofBerlin, as well as Moabit in the workers' section of the
city.16 However, by 1912 Tillich had decided to become a professor although
he remained in parish work. At this time he also married his first wife Grethi
just before the outbreak of the war. Like the war itself, the marriage was
doomed and both would bring Tillich some considerable heartache.
Barth and Tillich's Philosophical and Theological Backgrounds
The academic world in which both Barth and Tillich were immersed was
based on theological interpretations of the German idealist philosophers, especially
Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel and their followers. In this next section, a
comparison of these philosophical and theological influences will be described.
15
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"Sapere audel Have the courage to make use ofyour own understanding "17
for Kant was the "watchword" of the Enlightenment, but Barth never accepted
this as an adequate starting point for the true knowledge of God. While studying
in Berne Barth read Kant's Critique ofPractical Reason and later, in Berlin, the
Critique ofPure Reason. Kant's influence on the current climate in Berne was
profound as Barth later related, "in my Berne semester I was earnestly told, and
I learnt. . . that all God's ways begin with Kant, and if possible, must also end
there."18 Barth's suspicion ofKant lay in the problem of Subject-Object relationships,
for an empirically verifiable God, intuitable to human thought, would become an
Object-God inculcated in human categories. How can God remain wholly other in
essence, and yet apprehensible in and by mere human cognition? God, in Christ, has
spoken in human history to be sure, yet the initiative of this salvic historical event is
grounded in theprior determination of God understood in the biblical doctrine of
election. For Barth, metaphorical change was needed in Kant's epistemology, for the
Unintuitable (das Unanschauliche) must become that which is Anschauliche, the
Intuitable, without substantial change in the Unintuitable.19 Kant's metaphysics could
not postulate a doctrine of grace resting solely in the initiative ofGod but only a
"vulgar Pelagian doctrine ofjustification" reminiscent of the teachings of the Roman
17
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Catholic Church.20 This epistemology would then be an idolatry and worship of
the human intellect, with its innate possibility ofperceiving the divine within its
own reference.
In spite of his misgivings about Kantian categories, Barth continued to
engage with "Father Kant, who had provided the initial spark for me once before,
also spoke in a remarkably new and direct way to me" as he wrote later in 1924.21
Barth was to continue to promulgate Kant's ethical doctrines especially in the
second edition ofDer Romerbrief, in which he stated, "Pure ethics require~and
here we are in complete agreement with Kant-that there should be no mixing of
heaven and earth in the sphere ofmorals."22 Barth, of course, did not uncritically
appropriate Kant's philosophical ethics in totus, as Nigel Biggar explains:
Christian ethics cannot share Kant's concept ofmoral autonomy
[in] that it contradicts the phenomenon ofmoral obligation, that is,
ofbeing absolutely subject to the imperative, and he [Barth] contends
that an adequate concept ofobligation must see it as something which
is immediately (though not ultimately) heteronomous, something which
confronts our will with an absolute authority that is not our own.23
The true 'categorical imperative' Barth later wrote, was "revealed and grounded
in the person and work and lordship of Jesus Christ" not merely "in name, but in
fact."24 Ethics are grounded in the response of God's love revealed in the Covenant
ofGrace that defines the highest good in the antecedent primal decision of God, not












which carries with it a categorical imperative: it is the call the command, the
order, which cannot be disobeyed."25 This places grace within the divine initiative
alone, ethics can never be a way to grace, only a covenantal response as Barth
would later discern. Therefore, Barth adjudged Kant's ethical doctrines "to be
anthropology and nothing but anthropology" and as such were autonomous, and
the idea of God merely a thought in the mind of rational human endeavour. This
"Absolute Man", generated by the 'Copernican revolution' particularly of the
Cartesian ego-subject in the Enlightenment, was to be eventually recast in Barth's
thinking by the 'Absolute God-Man', Jesus Christ. This "God-Man" is more than
a moral exemplar for he is the ultimate paradigm of authentic humanity. "The reality
of the human being ('real man') is likewise known in the humanity ofChrist."26 Yet
Barth, in many ways, remained a Kantian as "All of his efforts in theology may be
considered ... as an attempt to overcome Kant by means ofKant, not retreating
behind him and seeking to go around him, but going through him."27
In the same mariner Paul Tillich once remarked, "Of course I am a Kantian-
scratch any German and you will find a Kantian"28 for both Kant and Hegel were
the "driving force"29 behind his theology. Tillich had started his study ofKant in
the last ofhis Gymnasium training by purchasing The Critique ofPure Reason for
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Theory ofSciences™ It became a wiy piece of gossip in his Gymnasium that he
had actually read The Critique, and one of his young acquaintances, Ernst Rhein,
whose most vivid recollection of Tillich was his carrying the Kant editions around
with him.31 Indeed, Tillich's first public lecture was delivered to the Kant-
Gesellschaft in 1919 where he introduced the concept of theonomy along Kantian
principles. Later in 1936 he remarked: "I nurtured German Idealism, and I do not
believe that I can ever unlearn what I learned there. Above all I am indebted to
Kantian criticism."32
Tillich's lectures on Christian thought in the fifties explicated his understanding
ofKant and his immense status as the Protestant philosopher. He underscored Kant's
criticism of "a philosophy which assumes that the religious ideals ofGod, freedom,
and immortality can be established by rational arguments."33 However, the essential
finitude ofhumanity was overlooked which made it impossible for the finite to
apprehend the infinite. There was no theologian or philosopher, in Tillich's view,
who did not accept this as a basic presupposition. "Even a man like Karl Barth who
is so firmly rooted in the classical tradition has fully accepted the Kantian criticism
of natural theology." The categorical structure of the human mind can only produce
understandings of finite entities and one cannot make God a "first cause or a
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accept yet: "The only point at which the prison of finitude is open is the realm of
moral experience, because in it something unconditional breaks into the whole
of temporal and causal conditions."35 But this point is where Kant fails, in Tillich's
estimation, and can only produce "an unconditional command, a mere awareness of
the depth of reason." This 'Unconditioned' is vital in Tillich's thought for it cannot
be attached to any object and is connected to what he calls 'the ground of our being'.
The question that Tillich sought to answer is how the Unconditioned manifests itself
to humanity in an identifiable way. Tillich would go farther than Kant in asserting that
an essential ontology of finitude is possible. Barth would argue that there is no finite
point of the Unconditioned save that of Jesus Christ whereas, Tillich sought to
prove that the Unconditioned could be found in religious and cultural expressions
of autonomous life. This was expressed in the new 'religious socialist movement',
the "imminent formation of a new theonomous unity of cultural beliefs and values."36
These differences over Kantian ideals would lead to Barth and Tillich parting ways
in 1923. Tillich sought a way out of the Kantian impasse with his invocation of the
'Protestant Principle' in "that we can come to God only through God, that only grace
can overcome guilt, sin, and our estrangement from God, and not we ourselves, and
no good works can help us, this idea can be extended also to the realm of thought."37
In this Barth and Tillich were in agreement as both were seeking to understand Kant
by transcending him, but differing in the value of philosophy providing for both
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theology and any possible cultural or ecclesial manifestation of the icon of grace.
G.W.F. Hegel
Tillich was often asked if he was an existentialist theologian as opposed to
being an essentialist and he always replied that he was "fifty-fifty". Tillich noted:
This means for me that essentialism and existentialism belong together.
It is impossible to be a pure essentialist if one is personally in the
human situation and not sitting on the throne of God as Hegel implied
he was doing when he constructed world history as coming to an end
in principle in his philosophy. This is the metaphysical arrogance ofpure
essentialism. For the world is still open to the future, and we are not on
the throne ofGod, as Karl Barth has said in his famous statement: 'God
is in heaven and man is on earth.'38
Tillich was both attracted to and repelled by Hegel's philosophy. He saw
a real danger in Hegel's system in that it "attempted to interpret the arbitrary acts
of human self-determination as the bearers of an all-embracing meaningful
necessity."39 This is the tragic flaw in Hegel's system that sought to combine the
concept of an 'Absolute Spirit' in the historical existence of humanity. Tillich,
however, believed that modern humanity had been deprived of'spirit' by modern
science leading to a "mutilation of the doctrine ofman .... making almost
impossible a sound doctrine ofman."40 If a spirit anthropology is re-introduced into
the philosophical dialogue it must be defined as "the unity ofmind and power, the
unity of creativity-which makes human culture possible-and vitality-which is the
life-power ofman. Spirit is a dynamic concept." In Tillich's description ofHegel
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finite spirit."41 A point of contact exists between God and humankind "insofar as
God comes to self-consciousness in man, and insofar as man in his essential
nature is contained together with everything in the inner life ofGod as potentiality.'*12
For Hegel the essential nature ofman as being lies in the dialectic of 'Logic',
i.e. the notions of being, nothing and becoming. These are indeterminate concepts
that only have reality "in the synthesis of becoming."43 This triad can also be stated
with another form; essence-appearance-actuality. This character of being as essential
potentiality and its concomitant nothingness allows Tillich to combine the existential
with the essential in his anthropology. Essence and ousia are perceived as
potentiality, a structure of existence that is both open to growth and its existential
limitation of nothingness in death. Existential thought cannot synthesize these
concepts of essence and nothingness as humans are estranged from their ousia and
can only be restored to wholeness by an act of reconciliation. Both Hegel and Tillich
acknowledged the innate inability ofhuman attempts at reconciliation, for only God
could effect it in an act of self-negation. In what way then, do Tillich and Hegel differ
on the place of Jesus in this synthetic act of negation and reconciliation? Tillich, in his
description of Anselm, asserted that he followed him and deviated from Hegel.44 The
Incarnation, "the Logos becoming flesh", is more than "dialectical reason" but a
mystery, a paradox. In Hegel's Jena lectures we find important statements of his






Adrian Thatcher, The OntologyOfPaul Tillich (Oxford University Press, 1978) 101.
44
Tillich, Christian Thought, 160.
37
(as an act of Triune differentiation) of the Logos into history:
In this way Christ became the founder of a religion, because he
uttered the suffering of his whole world from the inmost depths,
he raised the force of the divinity of the spirit above it, the absolute
certainty of reconciliation, which he bore in himself: and by his
confidence he awoke the confidence of others.45
Tillich adjudged Hegel to have reduced Christ to a "personified ideal."46
In an early sketch of a dogmatic system in 1913, Tillich stressed that Jesus
ofNazareth is the theological paradox, the "unity of the Absolute and the Relative
in the sphere (Boden) of the Relative, in an actuality of a single essence (in einem
Einzelwesen verwirkhcht)"41 The Incarnation must be seen as paradoxical and
cannot be distilled into an all-embracing dialectical system as in the formula of
Hegel. And, unlike Hegel's conquered Christ, Tillich believed that the "basic
Christian assertion [is] that Essential God-Manhood has appeared within existence
and subjected itself to the conditions of existence without being conquered by
them."4* The being of Jesus as the Christ is not one of unrealized potentiality, but
of completed power over the reality of alienation and death. "If there were no
personal life in which existential estrangement had been overcome, the New Being
(in Jesus as the Christ) would have remained a quest and an expectation and would
not be a reality in space and time." Therefore, in the crucifixion of Christ, existence
has been conquered in reality and in power, a power of sacrificial love that breaks
the bonds of estrangement and guilt. The cross of Jesus Christ becomes, for Tillich,
45
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the iconic point of grace and reconciliation, a saturated symbol based on the
historical event ofGolgotha.
Hegel's dialectic (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) was echoed by Tillich, "the
trinitarian symbols are dialectical; they reflect the dialectics of life, namely the
movement of separation and reunion."49 This is a description of the "inner
movement of divine life as an eternal separation from itself and return to itself."50
Although Tillich was often critical of Hegel's dialectical system, he seems to use
it often himself though not with such intellectual rigor. But, as Thatcher has pointed
out, "Tillich has fallen into the error ofconfusing the triadic structure ofdialectical
thinking with the triadic structure ofTrinitarian thinking."51 This would run counter
to any Trinitarian assertion in Barthian thinking, for to ascribe a trinitarian ontological
structure (even in the mode ofAugustine) would distort the mystery of God to a
human construct.52 Barth showed a distaste for triune analogies, for they might end
up as in Hegel's thought as replacements of the traditional doctrine "by a logical
and metaphysical Trinity and by the relegation of the Christian Trinity to the sphere
of naive, symbolical, and inadequate conceptions."53 This would lead to cultural
reductionism in Barth's opinion and in the future Tillich would be accused of this








Karl Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics'. Instruction in the Christian Religion, trans. G. W. Bomiley
(Grand Rapids, Mich: William B. Eerdmans, 1991) 104. "Then Hegel discovered the Trinity of the
subjective, objective, and Absolute Spirit, in itself, for itself, and in and for itself. This was simply a




notion of the symbol of the New Being, that is Jesus the Christ. Ian Thompson
draws this succinct conclusion, "To Barth's either-or, Tillich offers an Hegelian
both-and."54 Barth, on the other hand, expressed little of a direct literary dependence
on Hegel. It has been estimated that he only had read about two hundred pages of
Hegel's Philosophy ofReligion.55 Even so, Barth admitted having a "certain
weakness for Hegel and am always fond of doing a bit of 'Hegeling'."56 However
his respect for the depth of Hegel's thought did not allay his theological criticisms.
Translation and transformation ofHegel's ideas was the task of a respectful and
serious theological reflection on his concepts. Barth therefore translated Hegel's
"living God" as actually "the living man."57 He also surmised that Hegel's trinitarian
dialectic revealed "the basic principle of Hegelian anthropology." This anthropology
was summed up this statement, "God is this: to distinguish oneself from oneself, to
be object to oneself, but to be completely identical with oneself in this distinction."58
Barth saw this as a statement not about God but actually about man, a thinking man
to be sure, but one who would also think up a god and "stand as before an idol, or as
before a nothing."59 Barth lamented:
A divine God in this sense would lead to an apotheosis ofman, Hegel
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explains that the divine likeness in man means that the genuine being
ofman in himself, the idea ofman in his truth, is an element of God
Himself in His eternal being, so that the nature ofman is divine.60
This principle of Hegelian philosophy violated the basic principle of Barth's
theology that God was God and man was man, a supremely qualified distinction.
Hegel's dialectical principle, the Aufhebung, was appropriated by Barth especially
in his later Epistle to the Romans in the 'No' and 'Yes' ofGod that finds its
synthesis in Jesus Christ.61 However, Barth was seeking to establish a dialectic of
grace:
Hegel, in making the dialectical method of logic the essential nature
ofGod, made impossible the knowledge of the actual dialectic of grace,
which has its foundation in the freedom ofGod.62
Barth went on to explicate that Hegel had failed to recognize the freedom as "the
failure to recognize double predestination." The Covenant ofGod was grounded
in the sovereignty of God, not the self-confidence of human rational thought as
espoused by Hegel. Sin has not been considered in the existential reality ofman.
But dialectical thought, ifnot pressed too far, can still be of use in Barth's notion.
So what was the exact nature of the dialectic that Barth employed?
Barth had demonstrated a Kierkegaardian dialectic in Der Romerbrief but
his dialectic took on a threefold character in the trinitarian deliberations in his
Church Dogmatics. Unlike Hegel, (and arguably Tillich), Barth's dialectical (or
trilectical) thinking about God never proposed a synthesis at the human level.
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Even in this anthropological dialectic the human relationship and reality is
totally defined by God, who, in turn, is never defined in toto by the necessity of
a relationship with us.
This emphasis on God's freedom and priority means that all
statements about the relationship between God and man are
based by Barth in God rather that in a reciprocal relationship
in which neither side would have priority. Man had his being
only in union with God, he becomes a subject only in the act in
which God reconciles himselfwith him. That is the constitutive
moment in Barth's anthropology.63
Kierkegaard's "infinite qualitative distinction" would govern every dialectical model
that Barth would choose to use for "God is in heaven, and thou art on earth."64 To
proceed from any other starting point would be an idolatrous move.
Friedrich Schleiermacher
During his studies in Berlin Barth had decided to emulate Schleiermacher's
theology "blindly all along the line."65 Although Barth was to later sever his
dependence on Schleiermacher, both were seeking to establish an anthropology
based on a theology of encounter. Schleiermacher had developed a piety which
was "neither knowledge nor action but a determination offeeling or of direct
self- consciousness.This assertion Barth took to be a reduction of the role of
theology to the field ofphilosophical psychology, a dangerous move to solipsistic
anthropology. Barth was also suspicious that Schleiermacher's "chiefmotivation
63
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was to be a defender ofmodern Western European civilization."67 Though Barth
never believed that Schleiermacher would have gone down the road of acquiescence
to the Kaiser at the onset ofWorld War One, the seeds had been sown of an en-
-cultured Christianity that had "unmasked itself in that manifesto and everything
which followed after it (even in the Christliche Welt) was grounded, determined,
and influenced decisively by him."68 Eventually Barth believed that the Barmen
Declaration itselfwas a protest against Schleiermacher, Ritschl and the "basic
tendencies" of the Enlightenment.69 He discerned that the great weakness of
Schleiermacher's understanding ofhumanity lay in his deficient Christology. The
"composite life" an "ellipse with two foci" as opposed to "the form of a circle with
one centre" in Schleiermacher's thought provided a "fundamentally self-sufficient"
anthropology in which Jesus plays a small role as an "archetypal image"70 Barth
asserted that he had changed faith into mere knowledge:
Schleiermacher's representation of faith certainly rests, however,
upon the basis of a highest knowledge of human feeling or immediate
self- awareness in its correlation to God, upon the basis of a highest
knowledge of the nature and value of faith and the diversity ofways
ofbelieving together.71
This attitude is in direct opposition to Barth's developing theology of encounter,
a covenantal establishment of a real humanity residing in the initiative ofGod, not in













Under redemption, Schleiermacher in the last analysis understood
only an empowering, and under Redeemer only a strong helper or
helping power. Therefore there could not be any word of afounding
of communion in the strict sense, but only of confirming it and
continuing the fulfillment of an already existing communion.72
Barth felt that the emphasis on 'personal feeling', even 'utter dependence'
and a paradigmatic but still deficient Christology, had relegated Schleiermacher's
anthropology to a place where "man is not poor and miserable and naked and
empty" but instead "we are led to the pinnacles of humanity."73 In his opinion this
led to Schleiermacher's notions being misappropriated by the later Existentialist
theologians (especially Bultmann and Tillich) who believed that theology had to
begin with anthropological questions to have any mediatory validity to the modern
consciousness. Barth quoted Martin Redeker in this regard, who wrote in 1961 in
an introduction to a reissue of Schleiermacher's Der christliche Glaube:
The feeling of absolute dependance thus means being engaged by the
transcendent as something infinite and unconditioned. If one wanted to
interpret the concept of feeling and of immediate self-consciousness in
contemporary terms as to rule out psychologistic misunderstandings,
then perhaps this primal act of human existence could be characterized
through modern existentialist philosophy in terms of care for being, for
the foundation and meaningfulness of existence, as Tillich has already
suggested in his dogmatics. The theology of the experience of faith thus
means connecting all theological utterances to these basic questions of
human existence.74
Yet, in spite of all his theological misgivings about Schleiermacher, Barth always
maintained a great respect for his piety and the rigor of his thought, however different.
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Tillich always believed himself to be in the line of Schleiermacher, and wrote
an essay in 1915 on the philosopher's concepts ofnaturalism and supernaturalism75
He also, of course, acknowledged the great insights and theology of Schleiermacher,
with his combination ofpiety and philosophical thought. Tillich was quick to point
out the misuse of Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence" as more than
a psychological function, "Rather, it is the impact of the universe upon us in the
depths of our being which transcends subject and object."76 This could be thought
of as an "intuition of the universe", an immediate awareness of the divine. He
focused on Schleiermacher's expression 'feeling of imconditional dependence'77
as more then a mere subjective feeling, but a transcending of the emotive realm.
Tillich elucidated:
'Dependence' in Schleiermacher's definition was, on the Christian
level,'teleologicaT dependence— a dependence which has moral
character, which includes freedom and excludes a pantheistic and
deterministic interpretation of the experience of the unconditional.
Schleiermacher's 'feeling of absolute dependence' was rather near
to what is called in the present system 'ultimate concern about the
ground and meaning of our being'.78
Tillich also criticized Schleiermacher's derivation of all the contents of the Christian
faith from "religious consciousness", and "[experience is not the source from which
the contents of systematic theology are taken but the medium through which they are
existentially received." However, Tillich's corrective phrase "ultimate concern" seems
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to leave an openness to that concern which might not be God; while Schleiermacher's
'dependence' is always focused on the divine. As John Clayton remarks, "It is a
phenomenological description in the sense that 'ultimate concern' is purely formal
and tells us nothing about the content or the object of the concern."79 This allowed
Tillich to assert that culture is the bearer of religious truth in that it reveals the
concern ofhumanity toward the Unconditional even amidst the Conditioned.
He also admitted that some of the "traits" ofhis Christology are similar to
Schleiermacher's as both have a "doctrine of a divine-human relation." But the
term Urbild ('essential man') is surpassed by Tillich's 'New Being' who is "new
not only over against existence but also over against essence, in so far as essence
remains mere potentiality." There was also a similarity of systematic approach
between the two for Tillich recognized that:
The methodologically decisive thing is that theological propositions
about God or the world or man are derived from man's existential
participation in the ultimate, that is, from man's religious consciousness.80
Tillich would form his theology around the idea of'correlation", which starts from
the questions of existence and the symbolic answers of the Christian faith.
Barth and Feuerbach
An important philosopher who elicited a negative response in Barth was
Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach's view of religion was that it was "something man is








he projects his own nature into transcendent dimensions."82 In his Das Wesen
des Christentums of 1841, Feuerbach's philosophy of'illusion' or 'projection'83
was developed with the notion of the human species as the "epistemological,
ontological, and ethical substitute for the absolute role that was previously played
by the notion ofGod as traditionally understood."84 Feuerbach stated "Man has
his highest being, his God, in himself; not in himself as an individual, but in his
essential nature, his species."85 Barth believed that Feuerbach's philosophy could
only be critically evaluated from this point as it reduced theology to an inadequate
anthropology, a point that Feuerbach had conceded in principle:
Although I do bring down theology to anthropology, it is much more
true that I am raising anthropology to theology. And the latter is true
ofChristianity; while it brought God down to man, it made man God.86
Barth had suspicions about Feuerbach in his writings but by no means ever
dismissed him as inconsequential. Barth thought that Feuerbach "the anti-theologian
was more theological than that ofmany theologians"87 and in 1922, during a lecture
at a minister's gathering, he asked whether it might be better for them to cease
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example, and to read him without trying continually to escape from his snares?"88
These snares lay in Feuerbach's neither denying God or theology, but "In denying
the existence of an abstract divine Being, divorced from nature and man, he is merely
affirming God's nature as man's true nature."89 Feuerbach's affirmation of the human
bordered on an apotheosis of humanity in the qualities of the species which appear in
human history. Lutheran theology, in Barth's estimation, had fallen into this trap with
its doctrine of the commnnicatio idiomatum in genere majestatico, in which "the pre¬
dicates of the divine glory, omnipotence, omnipresence, eternity, etc., are to be
attributed to the humanity of Jesus", a viewpoint that would allow the status ofGod
and humanity to be reversed.90 Barth's covenantal theology would assert just the
opposite; there could be no idiomatic communication of the attributes of divinity
into the nature ofmankind, as the nature ofhumanity can only be expressed and
understood in the humanity of Christ as the predicate.
Feuerbach's anthropology has been described as a solipsism, a doctrine "that
nothing exists outside my own mind and its contents"91 but still had elements of a
relational character about it. The being ofman "is achieved only in community, in
the union ofman with man—a unity which depends on the reality of the difference
between I and Thou. Man with man, the unity ofI and Thou, is God."92 Not only
would Barth object to the definition ofGod in such anthropomorphic terms; but the
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stress on the existence ofman for others alone he found to be totally inadequate.
Later Barth was to write this with regard to Feuerbach's position:
It was an exaggeration to think of human existence as 'man that comes
from man.' We do not exist for our fellow-man, we exist for God. Nor
is our existence for God dependent on our existence for man.93
Barth agreed that the primaiy character ofhumanity is dialogical but it is predicated
on the dialogue between God and man revealed in the event of Christ. The trinitarian
revelation of God disclosed the character of God as dialogical, a social ontology.
Ultimately Barth found it sad that Feuerbach did not see the great freedom in human
existence orientated towards God and "thus seems to have interpreted the glory of
God merely as the self-glorification ofman, and the light of the life of Jesus Christ
merely as the shining of a light supposedly immanent in man himself."94 Feuerbach's
theology resembles that which is idolic for Barth, for the gaze of the believer
receives only a finite human gaze in return. No gaze of the infinite can be found in
the "self-glorification ofman."
William Herrmann and the Theology of Marburg
When a young theological student Barth was enraptured by Herrmann's
theological ideas. He later stated, "I soaked Herrmann in through all my pores."95
Not only did Herrmann introduce Kant and Schleiermacher into the burgeoning
ideas ofBarth, he was also in critical dialogue with the current philosophers








library.96 But it was Herrmann's christology that proved to be the most instructive
for him. In the then-current debates ofRitschl and von Harnack over theories of
history and Christianity, Herrmann focused on the inner life of Jesus as an act
of surrender and devotion to the will ofGod, as the historical fact of faith.97
"For our most important experience, which is the real basis of our inner life, is
for us the fact that we have met the Person of Jesus".98 He disagreed with the
Neo-Kantian attempts to reduce religious knowledge to a branch of scientific
knowledge with his "way to religion" that might "only be understood by the
man who himself lives in it." This entailed a "moral obligation", a covenantal
commitment that unifies one's personality:
A man only comes to inward unity when he sets his heart upon a
cause which he serves; in other words, he must be a man who really
works; therefore religion also is attained only by the burden-bearers
ofmankind~by those, that is to say, who work for others.99
This led Herrmann to have suspicions concerning the cosmological proof
and natural theology for, in his view, only those who had experienced revelation
in their souls could see traces ofGod in nature.100 His critique of Schleiermacher's
feeling of absolute dependence argued that this feeling was not "the God of
religious faith, it was rather the world and its life-forces on which our biological
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lives are dependent.'"01 Faith was self-authenticating, as it "firmly maintains
that God performs such miracles for the faithful; for it can justify this conception
to itself.'"02 The trust of faith however was a volitional act that was experienced
"as the work of one stronger than ourselves who inwardly compels us.'"03 This
near synergistic concept of faith was balanced by the character of its miraculous
nature as gift, an "overcoming of the world by the faith created by God." In the
same manner as Schleiermacher, Herrmann believed that this Verkehr (relation)
was established by a "yearning" for one's own inner life; and then a perception
and understanding of the inner life of Jesus "breaks through all the veils of the
story.'"04 The seeking ofGod is a "longing" for such a reality and in this
encounter God is revealed. This bi-polar character ofHerrmann's anthropology
described as an "experience (erleben) of revelation leading to an "innere
Sammlung or Selbstbehauptung" is what Barth came to reject as the sovereignty
ofman over and against God.
Earth's Response to Herrmann
Barth has recently been described as a "critical realist".105 Although he
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fundamentally (or critically) disagreed with the starting point of Idealistic
thought, that is, the presupposition of the human subject. This would ultimately
affect his appropriation ofHerrmann's theology and his later rejection of
Existentialism as espoused by Bultmann and Tillich. Yet, by 1925, with the
writing ofBarth's essay on the dogmatics ofHerrmann, his teacher's influence
on his theology had definitely waned. Herrmann's use of the term 'self in his
thought seemed to be for Barth a significant word on which his theology rested:
[Herrmann's] theology stands or falls with the assertions (Artikeln)
that man must 'himself will, yet cannot; and then must 'himself
experience or receive the revelation.106
Herrmann seemed to call for a different sort of'submission' (Unterwerfung)
with respect to the mystery of God. For Barth, dogmatics must begin with the
Deus dixit and not human subjective apprehension. Therefore, God could never
be an "assumption of our consciousness." The noetic must follow the ontic as
Barth stated emphatically:
It is God setting himself over against our consciousness and
its assumptions and now become known in that height, fixed
and unchangeable by any manipulation of the circle of human
knowledge ... he is God giving himself to be known through
his Word.107
This concentration on the human apprehension of the inner working of
Jesus as the datum of revelation led to a monophysite understanding of Christ.
"Herrmann's Christology, as it stands, is the hopeless attempt to raise a stagnant
106
Karl Barth, "The Principles OfDogmatics According To Wilhelm Herrmann", Theology and Church,





pool to that same height by means of a hand pump, nothing can be accomplished
with it."108 By rejecting Herrmann's theology Barth was basically rejecting the last
vestiges of his nineteenth-century intellectual upbringing. Herrmann had tried to
"fill in the hole" of the modern predicament with the experience of the inner life
of Jesus with insufficient respect to orthodox Christology; what Barth wanted was
an "open space" to be filled in by the Word ofGod. A "diastic dilemma" still
remained for "how can divinity and humanity be considered, without reducing
God to a foundation in human experience or rendering God absent from the human
horizon altogether?"109 In other words, how can the iconic be manifested in the
realm of the human horizon without a solipsistic reduction?
Tillich and Schelling
Tillich was, in his early theological career, most influenced by Friedrich
Joseph von Schelling (a philosopher Barth thought could be "bypassed" along
with Fichte).110 Early in his university life, Tillich purchased Schelling's Collected
Works.lu Schelling's philosophy became an ideefixe for him and Tillich not only
wrote two dissertations on his work and but was also known as an expert on his
writings and his influence on the existentialist movement. Tillich's self-stated
acknowledgment of the philosopher's thought as "being determinative" of his
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over-estimate his dependence on Schelling.112 Ian Thompson speculates that to
assume "both the form and content ofTillich's thought are determined by the
early influence of Schelling is simplistic."113 Tillich summarized in 1936:
I thought that, fundamentally, I had found the union of theology
and philosophy in the philosophical explanation of the Christian
doctrine through the older Schelling, in his founding of a Christian
philosophy of existence in contrast to Hegel's humanistic philosophy
of essence and in his interpretation of history as the History of
Salvation. I must confess, that even today, I find more 'theonomous
philosophy' in Schelling than in any of the other idealists. But to be
sure, not even Schelling was able to bring about a unity of theology
and philosophy.114
Schelling had asked, "Why is there anything at all, why is there not nothing?"115
The possibility of non-being is an existential 'shock', a "sudden, externally
produced, instantaneous experience."116 Tillich's summarized:
There is no answer here except that the immediate certainty that
something exists. If primordial being is prior to every concept,
then even the concept of God cannot be applied to it... It is the
prius of divinity, that which can be God.117
In Tillich's view, this demonstrates the qualities of a true correlational philosophy
which is worthy of emulation for Schelling "not only asks existentialist questions;
he also tries to give religious answers to them."118 This methodology is a constant
112
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feature ofTillich's "Correlative Theology. Tillich posits the concept of the
Unbedingt (Unconditioned) as the description of the form of existence, "which
is presupposed in any meaningful order of thought or being."119 This resembles
Schelling's Unvordenkliche, as "it is that which all thinking and all being must
presuppose and it is also ultimately inaccessible to thought." The 'Unconditioned'
therefore can only find its representation in symbols. "Indeed, any attempt to
speak unsymbolically of the Unconditioned is an attempt to erect a Tower of
Babel to reach the infinite."120 This 'infinite', termed Das unvordenkliche Sein
by Schelling, described God as the Urgrund or Das absolute Indifferenze.
There are three potencies of God in his schema, der bewufitlose Wille, des
besonnene Wille, and die Einheit beider. Schelling posits a trinitarian outline:
The Father is the absolute possibility of overcoming das
unvordenkliche Sein; the Son as the overcoming power;
and the Spirit as the fulfillment of the power to overcome
the irrational.121
In this manner Schelling takes the postulation of "non-being and the irrational
into divinity itself." As Kenan Osborne points out, Tillich has taken this "basic
dialectic" and incorporated it in the God-human relationship. "Essential Manhood
is precisely this dialectical relationship of the finite to the infinite within essence."
His iconic concept of the New Being "becomes totally transparent" to the divine.
The divine is a "process working within man's very essence and within his very
119
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history," not apart from it as in the synthesis ofHegel.
Tillich thought that Schelling had not gone far enough with his embryonic
existentialism. Schelling, in Tillich's view, had returned to "Kant's critical
position: God as God is an object of faith, and there is no rational realization
of the idea of God."122 Schelling it seems had tried to approach "the God of
revelation" in a type of 'metaphysical empiricism', a "speculative urge in his
mind that conquered the Existential restriction and humility he had himself
postulated." What Tillich ultimately conceived was a God without being, a
"God above (or beyond) God," which is "the content of absolute faith"123 In
spite of any misgivings that he may have had about Schelling's philosophy;
Tillich always thought highly of him in his corrective ofHegel, his influence
on Kierkegaard and his theology which Tillich described as:
very much a doctrine of grace, stressing the given divine reality
before our merits and before our moral acts. So natural philosophy
was a way of rediscovering grace over against the moralism of the
Enlightenment.124
The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl
Given Barth's aversion to any philosophical foundations for a dogmatic
theology, it is not surprising that Husserl is barely mentioned in Barth's writings.
Yet, as far back as 1930, R. Birch Hoyle purported that Barth's neo-Kantianism
was an attempt to "stem the new doctrines of Husserl and Heidegger." Birch
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believed that Barth's Die christliche Dogmatik of 1927, utilized a form of
the "bracketing" procedure of Husserl and "kept scrupulously to the method."125
However, this method seemed to be inadequate in dealing with "abstract themes,
Christian discourse and preaching" for "they are not within any man's co-
-nsciousness as 'immanent' objects.'"26 Barth felt that this problem should lead
to a movement from phenomenological thinking to existential thought to even
an ethical form.127 His later theology would ultimately manifest its iconic and
sacramental significance in the ethical realm as will be demonstrated. George
Hunsinger summarizes with this statement, "As far as knowing or loving God
is concerned, any phenomenological description of the event would only bring
results that are theologically uninformative."128 To proceed from an existential
or Husserlian phenomenological methodology would be an idolic movement away
from the efficacy of the witness ofScripture and the direct mediation of the Spirit
in the faith of the elect. To start from any human phenomenology would be to
follow false gods. Tillich gave more credence to Husserlian phenomenology than
Barth. He counseled:
Theology must apply the phenomenological approach to all its
basic concepts, forcing its critics first of all to see what the criticized
concepts mean and also forcing itself to make careful descriptions of
125





Karl Barth, Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf (Munich. Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1927) 49.
128
George Hunsinger, How To ReadKarl Barth: The Shape ofHis Theology (Oxford University Press,
1991)219.
57
its concepts and use them with logical constituency ... 129
However, Tillich took issue with the phenomenologist's taking such an event
and seeing it as a vehicle to convey the "universal meaning of revelation."
There were too many contradictory examples of revelation that had been
encountered by "phenomenological intuition." Husserlian phenomenology,
was "competent in the realm of logical meanings", but inadequate in the
"realm of spiritual realities like religion."130 What Tillich proposed was to
add an "existential-critical element" to the "intuitive-descriptive" elements
of phenomenology. The "reception of Jesus as the Christ by Peter" was to be
the universal criterion used by Tillich, however imperfect and distorted the
revelatory event actually may be."131 This means that both the iconic and the
idolic (or "demonic" in Tillich's future parlance) could be found in temporal
cultural expressions and depictions as well as in the sacred realm of Church and
Word. The symbolic language of the Church and its icons, the Cross and the
Resurrection, could be compared to ontological symbols representing fmitude
and estrangement. Tillich's "metalogical"132 phenomenology would become
more explicit in his theology of the cross in his later work.
129 gy, ^ §ee ajso "The PhilosophyOfReligion" (1925) in Paul Tillich, What Is Religion?,
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Both Barth and Tillich started their pastoral and academic careers as
what has been termed 'mediating theologians'. Following the path of Idealist
philosophy and the resultant theological trends thereto, they both sought to relate
their notions of Christian proclamation with the philosophical claims and counter¬
claims of their surrounding European culture. For both Barth and Tillich the
Enlightenment critique lay at the root of their search for theological truth. Barth
expanded Kant's moral categories by postulating the irreducible need for grace
(divinely initiated) as the proper catalyst for moral reason, while Tillich believed
that the "essence ofman plays an important role," for it is human finitude,
"analyzed critically and dialectically, that expresses the categorical imperative."133
Tillich augmented Kant's moral ethic with his notion of 'ultimate concern', as
an absolute of the ontological possibility of being or non-being, an expression of
the essential character of human existence. Like Barth, the paradigm comes from
the beyond; "In Christ, the essential Man, one discovers the material norm of the
'what-should-be'. "134
Hegel's dialectic appeared in various guises in both their theologies. Tillich
observed that Hegel's dialectical system had tried to do too much in its attempt to
embrace all reality. In addition, he thought that Hegel had made essence non-
dialectical. "Man's essence and every other finite essence remains in a state of
133




dynamic and dialectic relation to God, who is the Urgrund of all finite being."135
Yet Tillich uses a dialectic method himself in his "root-dialectic: the union
between the finite and the infinite.'"36 Barth's later theology in his Epistle to
the Romans, will reflect dialectical characteristics resembling Hegel's but
avoided the closure of a synthesis; "but on the contrary, attacks the syntheses
forged by man, out of a proper respect for the synthesis which God in his grace
throws over all our contradictions in order to bind us to himself.'"37 God is God,
and man is man, and only Christ can be the synthetic bridge between the two.
Barth, although he would later remove himself from the theological lineage
of Schleiermacher, always held this theology in the highest regard. What Barth
did was to turn Schleiermacher's theology around; "Instead of analyzing human
existence, in order to inquire after Christ's contribution to its religious aspect,
he analyzes Christ's existence, in order then to inquire after our religion's place
therein.'"38 Yet, in can be shown that with regard to the expression and depiction
of the iconic Barth never strayed too far from Schleiermacher's notions of the
inner subjectivity of divine revelation. Tillich, on the other hand, started from
the premise of his concept of 'ultimate concern' but still left open the possibility
of the Christ-event as the 'given' as opposed to Schleiermacher's 'feeling of
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having a Christological apriori, but only a coded anthropology that allowed too
much cultural relativity in the theological scheme. If, for Barth, Schleiermacher
only speaks ofGod 'by speaking ofman in a loud voice'139, so also Tillich. A
new mediation was to be in order for both Tillich and Barth. Initially the garb
ofHegelian dialectic and Enlightenment epistemology would be prevalent in
their respective theologies, but the catastrophe of the war and its attendant
cultural and religious malaise would reshape their initial commitments to these
concepts. Theologically speaking, a new 'Copernican revolution' was in the
making and both Barth and Tillich would be its champions. The 'Absolute Man"
was to be superseded by the 'Absolute God'. "Theological Cartesianism" as
Barth had dubbed it, was the anthropocentric false step of the Liberal notions of
his teachers.140 Their response to the crisis of 1914 only reinforced Barth's
suspicious of the inadequacy of their premises. Barth's own developing
theological positivism would lead him to replace the anthropocentric with the
christocentric, the known God in human thought, to the hidden God revealed
in existence but maintaining unrevealedness in a dialectic tension.
Tillich was also critical of Idealism in its most absolute forms referring to
it deprecatingly as the biirgerlicher Idealismus.141 However his usage of the
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essence, existence and essentialization, show his marked affinity with his
Idealistic heritage. His mature christology would be derived from his basic
Lutheran and philosophical gleanings, yet his rhetorical style would lead him
to express his theology in unique terms that would confound Barth and produce
a fair amount ofmisunderstanding in the future.
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CHAPTER 3
KARL BARTH: PASTOR AND PROFESSOR
In this chapter we will trace Barth's early career, from his pastorate to
his early teaching positions. It will be shown that he changed radically through
the years of the first World War and during his growth as a Reformed theologian
in Gottingen. The horrors of the German war initiatives and Barth's attempts to
distinguish between the icon and the idol (especially in his commentary on
Romans) will show his concerns not only with the dangers of anthropological
and philosophic presuppositions as foundations for theology, but the reality of
even religious thought falling into the same snares of idolatry. The icon of the
covenant of grace, exemplified in the doctrine ofpredestination which will later
become dominant in Barth's mature thought, will also be delineated from its
origins in his theological development and his encounter with the importance of
the Bible as the rule of faith and witness.
In 1908 Barth left his academic studies upon his graduation from Marburg
and took up the post of editorial assistant for the journal Christliche Welt,
edited by Martin Rade. He continued his reading ofKant and Schleiermacher,
met Rudolf Bultmann and established his life long friendship with Eduard
Thurneysen. Later in that same year Barth began a two year term as an assistant
pastor in Geneva where he began to preach on a regular basis. Here Barth studied
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Calvin's Institutes and continued his study of Schleiermacher and composed a
lecture, "The Christian Faith and History"1 in 1910. Here, Barth stressed that faith
cannot be something "presupposed hi the essence ofhumanity" for "the Christ
intended by faith is a Christ who is utterly beyond us."2 Yet the "passive-active
experience ofGod is somehow historically conditioned and determined through the
personality ofJesus which is present in human society."3 Barth would go so far as
to claim that "Christ's righteousness becomes my righteousness. Christ's piety
becomes my piety. He becomes I."4 Christ is mediated in culture and in the inner
feeling of the believer, a possibility that Barth would later renounce as being an
anthropological starting point for a theology of self that could lead to idolatry.
In 1911 Barth moved to Safenwil where he commenced his duties as a solo
pastor to a predominately agricultural and industrial community congregation. Here
Barth became aware "of the full scope of the task of a Reformed preacher, teacher
and pastor."5 The mantle of liberal theology was still present as he admitted "while
in this pastoral work I was still very much under the influence of Schleiermacher."6
The social and economic plight ofBarth's congregants led him to become involved
in the Socialist movement in the community. Barth was no stranger to the political
movement as he had been involved in the "Zofingia" student association giving a
1
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lecture in 1906 on the social issues of capitalism, mammonism, poverty and the
growing gap between the rich and the poor.7 In Safenwil, Barth took on the workers'
grievances and began to educate himself in economics and trade union affairs. He
stated, "I regard socialist demands as an important part of the application of the
gospel, though I also believe that they cannot be realized without the Gospel."8
Later he became disenchanted with the Socialist movement itself, and its staunchest
allies Ragaz and Kutter for supporting the war effort in Germany.
Barth's involvement with Socialist political ideas exemplified his notion
of the call of the transformed (by grace through faith) Christian to an ethical
expression in the midst of one's personal history. In concert with Herrmann's
emphasis on the inner-life of Jesus knowable in faith, Barth sought to create "a
theology ultimately christomorphic in character, with the symbol, image or Bild of
Christ receiving the status of a cipher or conceptual stimulater, origin and goal of
a personal Gotteserlebnis."9 This 'christo-morphic' paradigm was not only to be
experienced in the individual sphere but also to have a prophetic expression in the
socio-political arena as well. As George Hunsinger has argued, Barth wanted to
"work out a viable solution to the problem of theory and praxis-including political
praxis."10 The iconic point of the 'christo-morphic paradigm' would need a visible
point of reference which Barth would later explicate as an 'inner-outer' ethical
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Dogmatics. Barth reiterated his Socialist leanings and its iconic manifestation in a
lecture "Jesus Christ and the Social Movement" later published in the socialist daily
Free Aargau.n Here he asserted that "Jesus is the social movement, and the social
movement is Jesus in the present", and he also qualified the tacit identification of
God's will with the Utopian dreams of Socialism not their actual practice.12 Barth
was speaking to both Christians (who perhaps thought that Barth would "paint the
Saviour red") and to the Socialists whom he wished would "enter into a personal,
inner relation with this man."13 He made the distinction between what Socialism was
currently doing and what the desire of the movement actually was. The Gospel and
the Socialist movement in his thinking had much in common because "Jesus by word
and deed opposed that material miseiy which ought not to he."14 True humanity exists
when one "decides to become a comrade."15 In the end neither side was happy with
Barth's presentation but he remained undeterred in his commitment to the Socialist
movement for the immediate future.
Barth sought to relate the concepts "personality" and "absoluteness" to the
nature ofGod in a speech delivered to the Aargau Pastors Association in May of
1913.16 This speech also shows Barth's early predilection for dialectical thinking.
11 Karl Barth, " Jesus Christus und die soziale Bewegung" in Vortrage 1909-1914, ibid., 380-408.
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Religious experience encompassed both the "personal nature of the encounter and
the experience of the Other as the Power over all things,"17 which establishes the
concepts of'personality' and 'absoluteness". These ideas cannot be forced into a
unified concept but must be left to "stand alongside each other in open contradiction,
each bearing valid witness to the truth." No analogy for God can start from the
premise of human personality (as stated by Ludwig Feuerbach) but can only be found
in a concrete religious encounter. Barth wrote:
A concept ofGod which results from projecting human self-awareness
into the realm of the transcendent cannot reach the reality ofGod, let
alone describe it exhaustively. The concept ofGod proper to religion
cannot be something projected from out of ourselves but rather only a
reflection of the fact which has been created in us. This fact is the life
from Godwhich is given to us through our connection with history.
This experience of being inwardly conditioned by history is religious
experience. In it we have God and on the basis of it we can speak of
God.18
God is to be the first principle of all knowledge and reality and to question the
"foundation" (Grundlegung) of reality was to "affirm" (Abrede) it at the same
moment:
The 'unfounded' (Ungrundlegung) becomes the ground for the foundation
ofwhat it thought and willed, the pure deduction (Abgezogenheit) to pure
origin. It is the truth and validity which rests in itself—the truth and validity
of the a priori—that manifests itself here as the positive component of the
concept ofGod.
This was in direct contrast to "The concept of the Absolute [which] arose as an
expression of despairing humility in the depths of the human spirit at the self-
induced irony of human reason."19 The rationale of critical idealism is now open
Ibid., 105.
Ibid., 106. German text from Karl Barth, Vortrage undKleinereArbeilen 1909-1914 (Zurich:
Theologischer Verlag, 1993) 547-548.
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to the Augustinian question of faith and longing inquietum est cor nostrum, donee
requiescat in te. "In Te speaks of the immediate religious perception and hereby
places the Sublime as a Thou before the I." Human personality finds its meaning
in its relatedness to the Other, a construal of community reflecting the inner
community of the Trinity in Barth's later thought. 'God in us' will later become
'God for us' in encounter and relation in his mature doctrine of the Covenant.
By November Barth was in trouble at his church as five of his session members
resigned in a protest over his "Sozipredigtenin their opinion his socialist preaching
had gone too far.20 Although Barth weathered the stonn his overbearing emphasis on
Socialist themes receded in his sermons of the following year. Bruce McCormack's
reading of the sermons of 1913 reveals a Barth giving "prominence of the theme of
the judgement and wrath of God."21 This placed Barth in opposition to Ritschl and
Herrmann who thought that God was not in the business ofjudgment as that is an
"anthropopathism" and a sinner's experience of personal self-condemnation. A
covenantal theme appeared in the sermon ofApril 27:
Where God's love is at work, there righteousness too must have its
place, either in that one exercises it or in that one experiences it himself
to his harm. God's love cannot engender anything else but righteousness,
either as gift or punishment.... Amos showed powerfully what it means
to have fellowship with God, to stand in a covenantal relationship with
Him . .. The relationship ofGod to His own is a legal relationship. It
does not rest on whim and inclination, but rather on truth.22
Barth sought to urge his congregants to "declare war" on the "relationships" which
Ibid., 92.
Ibid., 93.
Barth, Sermon ofApril 27, 1913, as quoted in CRDT, 94.
governed their social, political, and economic lives.23 The qualitative difference of
God also appeared as sermonic theme compared to human piety and self-sufficiency.
"God is still wholly other and the true life is still wholly other than you now imagine
for yourself!"24 Religious human endeavour is only transitory and a mere "parable of
the Kingdom."25 Yet, God can still work through human effort (even Socialist) and a
"revolution" could yet happen, "The world must slowly grow into this transformation.
And God Himself it is who completes this transformation. He wants to lead humanity
through the defective and perish to the perfect and eternal."26 Even the "storms " of
revolution and "catastrophe" could be used by God as a means of grace. However,
such optimism in human possibility (qualified as it was) was soon to change.
Theology with Weapons: The Outbreak of the World War One
In 1960, Barth recalled that "One day in early August 1914 stands out in my
personal memory as a black day."27 On that day ninety-three German intellectuals
(including Barth's teachers Harnack and Herrmann), "issued a ringing manifesto of
support for the German war policy."28 Harnack had even written the speech that
KaiserWilhelm II used to call the nation to war. The intellectuals declared that,
"We believe that for European culture on the whole salvation rests on the victory
which German 'militarism', namely manly discipline, the faithfulness, the courage to
23
Barth, Sermon of June 22, 1913, ibid., 98.
24
Barth, Sermon ofMay 25, 1913, ibid., 100.
25
Barth, Sermon ofDecember 28, 1913, ibid., 101.
26
Barth, Sermon ofMarch 2, 1913, ibid., 102.
27
Karl Barth, The Humanity ofGod (John Knox Press, 1960) 14.
28
Dorrien, Barthian Revolt, 37.
69
sacrifice, of the united and free German nation will achieve."29 Barth was astounded
and totally dismayed at his teachers as he wrote to his friend Martin Rade (who had
not sided with the intellectuals); "Something of the deep respect which I felt within
myself for the German character is forever destroyed."30 Not only did this have an
effect on Barth's nationalism but also further catalyzed his break with the German
liberal theological tradition and the Enlightenment thought of Schleiermacher. Barth
lamented:
Of a just cause on either side there can honestly be no talk . . All of
these things are completely alien to the innermost being ofGod. And
if they nevertheless take place, then there is only one explanation for
it:the innermost being ofGod is also completely alien to humankind.31
If Barth needed any more proof of the "infinite qualitative distinction "32
between God and humanity the outbreak of the war and the conduct of the German
theological community was decisive. He saw that the hostilities were the judgment
ofGod on the countries ofEurope. "This is a Gottesziet as never before. A time of
judgment without equal."33 Yet that judgment carried tire implication of an act of grace
which provided him an optimism "born of a deeply personal, existential conviction
that God is in control of the events which take place in this world."34 Barth never gave
up on the human race although he felt its progress was portrayed in "catastrophes and
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Barth's disappointment with the German Socialist party led him to join the
Social Democratic Party of Switzerland in 1915. He wrote Thnrneysen "that faith
in the Greatest does not exclude but rather includes within in it work and suffering
in the realm of the imperfect." Amidst this movement Barth became interested in the
preaching of Christoph Blumhardt and resolved to "open himself to God's 'Wholly
Other reality"35 as well as the New Testament dimension of hope. This was a
departure from the liberal school of theology (as espoused by Ritschl) for Barth
"regarded God as a Reality which is complete and whole in itself apart from and
prior to the knowing activity of human individuals."36 This diastasis came to be
expressed as the "World remains World. But God is God."37
Nineteenth-century theology had originated in a 'turn to the subject' but
Barth's course now clearly gave evidence of a 'turn to theological objectivism'.38
The diastasis between God and humanity not only precluded any synthesis but also
led Barth to become:
engaged in the (seemingly impossible) attempt to think from a standpoint
lying in God Himself (ein Denken von Gott aus) and therefore, from a
standpoint lying beyond this world, history, and human possibilities.39
Barth was beginning to turn away from the constraints of idealistic thinking and its
cultural expression in the near Kriegszeit ofGerman theology, perceiving that the
Cartesian 'turn to the subject' had divinized humanity and its 'pietistic' endeavours.
A new actuality was to be presented, as the 'real' for Barth was not the world known
35










empirically. The truly 'real' is the wholly otherness of the Self-revealing God in
comparison with whom the empirical world is mere shadow and appearance."40
The implications of this change in direction would be profound; for Barth needed
a new source of truth and reality, as well as an iconic point of reference--and the
Bible itself seemed to be the answer.
This new found approach led Barth into a crisis of Socialist commitment
as well as a crisis in the task of preaching. In a lecture given in 1916 entitled "The
Righteousness ofGod" Barth asserted that the "surest fact of life" given us by
"the voice of conscience" is the "righteousness ofGod."41 This is a transcendent
consciousness, not a human one that can only reinforce and validate mere human
striving. In misunderstanding the true origin of righteousness from God alone,
humanity creates a Tower of Babel situation that gives a false sense of significance.
"Our answer to the call of conscience is one great makeshift (,Surrogat), extending
over the whole of life, a single gigantic 'as if {als 06)!"42 A catastrophe has
occurred, for humanity has created a false god, an idol that cannot speak or influence
the detritus of human endeavor. "The strange new world of the bible" that Barth
spoke of reveals the disturbance that arises in the judgment of God and in the crisis
of conscience that reveals the "wholly otherness" ofGod. Herein lay the seeds for
Barth's dialectic between the 'No' and 'Yes" of revelation that appeared in Barth's
commentary on Paul's letter to the Romans, Der Romerbrief. The idol of human
philosophical and theological solipsism was to be evaluated by a new phenomenology
40
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whose criteria was that of the biblical Word of God.
Barth's intense concentration on Romans led to a breakdown in his health in
early 1917. After a break from his pastoral duties he delivered a lecture in February
based on his ongoing biblical research entitled "Die neue Welt in der Bibel". Here
Barth discoursed about the "strange new world" to be discovered in the Bible for it
"tells us not how we should talk with God but what he says to us; not how we find
the way to him, but how he has sought and found the way to us."43 In this address
Barth pressed the matter of the divine-human contingency in its most stringent form
and articulated an early description of his understanding of the Covenant:
It is not the right human thoughts about God which form the content
of the Bible, but the right divine thoughts about men. The Bible tells
us not how we should talk with God but what he says to us; not how
we find the way to him, but how he has sought and found the way to
us; not the right relation in which we place ourselves to him, but the
covenant (Bund) which he has made with all who are sealed once and
for all in Jesus Christ.44
This covenantal theme would later become the cornerstone ofBarth's theology
based on the doctrine of election, but its iconic possibilities were beginning to
manifest themselves in his thinking at this early date.
Work progressed on his commentary even as Barth continued to busy himself in
the Socialist activities of Safenwil. He continued to stand for the trade unions against
the factory owners, "in the background, sometimes openly, and sometimes even a bit
from the pulpit."45 As he described it later, Barth had a 'hands-on' approach to the






Socialist issues but was "only marginally interested in socialist principle and
ideology."46 One of the local factory owners was derisive and referred to Barth as
the "worst enemy" he had ever encountered.47 This worker involvement precipitated
another crisis in the church as attendance fell; but the workers began to trust Barth
and even attended worship. "The socialists were the keenest audience for my
sermons~not because I preached socialism but because they know that I was the man
who tried to help them."48 By the end of the year however, Barth began to distance
himself from the Religious Socialists and resigned from the committee to reorganize
the movement.
The final year of the war found Barth suffering in the great influenza epidemic
as well as a general destabilization of Europe's economy including Switzerland. Barth
continued to struggle with his commentary stating "Does the good God really want this
piece ofwriting?"49 By August it was finished and a publisher found, the war ending
as he finished reading the final proofs. Barth was as convinced as ever that returning to
scripture was the only way:
If only we had turned to the Bible earlier, we should now have firm
ground under our feet. Now people brood alternately over the news-
-paper and the New Testament and really see dreadfully little of the
organic connection between the two worlds, about which one should
now be able to give a clear and powerful witness.50
The first edition ofDer Romerbriefwas published the following year. Traces of












theory of forms were apparent in its argument, plus an 'expressionist' criticism of
accepted reality in an attempt to uncover the 'true reality' that lay below the surface.51
Gary Dorrien has observed, that Barth "embraced the expressionist thesis that true
reality can be glimpsed only by disrupting or breaking up the world of appearances
that conventional historiography and other disciplines treat as 'real'."52 Barth's turn
from liberal theology in Romans "emphasized that the Word breaks into history not
so much to transform the world as to shake it and throw it into crisis."53 The
manifestation of this crisis Barth explained in the opposition of eternity and time,
a Durchbruch:
With the breakthrough: Immanuel! God with us! which has taken place
in current-time {Jetztzeit), in the messianic present, in the decisive turn
of the aeons in heaven, a life process is also started on earth, on the
historical-psychological side of our existence. We are no longer the
same. We have been placed into the process which reaches from beyond
(Jenseits) into this side (Diesseits).54
This distanciation "from the beyond" informs Barth's anthropology throughout
his commentary. From that beyond comes the "dawning of a new world" in Christ,
the end of all human times and the beginning ofGod's time.55 The "eternal Now"
has replaced human time as we know it with an jenseitigen event- "an inner
movement (Bewegung) in the life ofGod."56 The 'Old Adam' has been superseded
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of the 'Fall' is critical here, for he uses the notion of the "Ursprung" both as a
reference to God and also to the primal relationship between humanity and God.
Thus there can be no ontological conjoining of God and humanity no "continuum
ofbeing". The 'immediacy' (Unmittelbarkeit) of the relation between God and
humanity has been broken by Adam's desire for independence57 Ultimately, the
seeking of autonomy leads to a form of heteronomy, from which follows sin and
death.58 The ethics of autonomy and heteronomy stand in contradistinction to the
reality of grace.The existential question 'What shall I do?' is made irrelevant as
Barth says, "Stop asking that question! Every word of it is ambiguous and
confused. "59 The realm of grace instills the Christian not with a system of ethics,
but with the notion of shared exhortation , "an expression of the whole community
on the move."60 This was described by Barth as the 'organic' character of the
Kingdom, the "Organismus gegen Monadenwesen."61 Therefore, we are more than
a collection of discreet individuals for we "stand in a living connection with each
other."62 This is the horizontal or immanental aspect of the Covenant on which Barth
was later to explicate. Apart from Christ, Christian exhortation makes little sense for
its ethical injunctions can only be derived from the "new being in Christ (rather than














moral and "concrete ethical situation."63 In the same manner, this "New Being in
Christ" was also to become a formal component ofTillich's theology in the future.
Although an explicit doctrine of the Covenant was not explicated in Der
Romerbriefin any detail, one passage bears noting. In a comparison ofMoses and
Pharaoh being the "messenger" (Verkiindiger) and "representative (Vertreter) of
God's Covenant ofGrace" (even in dialectical and historical opposition), the relation
between God and them was based, not on mechanistic fate (Verhdngnisses) but by
virtue of the will ofGod through which existence and life are established.64 This
relationship between God and humanity then, is established on God's initiative
modeled in the perfect humanity of Jesus Christ. There is no ethical determination
for the gift of grace, it is given only in the activity of God. Therefore, a true freedom
exists in the world, a freedom of exhortation to be witnesses to the love of God in
the reahn ofmoral behavior, and be responsible in work and praise to die gift of grace
itself. This freedom of response is the basis ofBarth's covenantal ethics and also the
measure of any sacramental efficacy as he was to propound in the future. However, at
this time, the various reviews of his commentary led Barth to believe that he had
not stated the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between God and humanity in bold
enough terms and so he decided to publish a new edition. This second rewriting of
Der Romerbrief was to become the edition that Karl Adam exclaimed "fell like a
bomb on the playground of the theologians.".65
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Tambach Conference for German religious socialists in 1919. A late substitute for
Ragaz, Barth (who had not intended to attend) created a sensation when he declared
that:
We must win again the mighty sense of reality in which Paul is one with
Plato and the prophets. Christ is the absolutely new from above; the way,
the truth, and the life ofGod among men; the Son ofMan, in whom
humanity becomes aware of its immediacy to God.66
The 'immediacy' of God's presence in the world obviates the possibility of dual
kingdom theology. Contra Friedrich Nauman's statement, "Jesus has nothing to say
about the arms race", Barth proclaimed that the religious and secular could not be
safely separated.67
The Wholly Other in God~itself resisting all secularization, all mere
being put to use and hyphenated-drives us with compelling power to
look for a basic, ultimate, original correlation between our life and
that wholly other life.68
The correlation with the "wholly other life" takes on a Christomorphic character for
"The Christian is that within us which is not ourself but Christ in us."69 The manifest
history ofGod "lives in us and about us"70, an anthropological and undefined
phenomenological assertion that is disclosed in the activity of the Kingdom of God.
Barth's lecture presented a new revolution, a dynamic power, a 'movement' that
joins the revolution of the 'inbreaking' Kingdom ofGod.71
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By 1920 Barth was busy rewriting his Romans commentary and continuing
to speak against the German liberal theological tradition, most especially
Schleiermacher. This was demonstrated in his lecture "Biblical Questions,
Insights and Vistas" in which the phrase the "Wholly Other" as a reference to the
mystery ofGod first made its appearance.72 Barth's theology was also being
influenced by the posthumous writings ofFranz Overbeck who had promulgated
a new and radical eschatology of the early church.73 Overbeck's impact on Barth
and the new edition ofRomans is not to be underestimated.74 Also highly
influential ofwas Soren Kierkegaard's theology of paradox ( highly important
for Tillich as well), which Barth acknowledged as the only possible 'system' in
his theology. Kierkegaard had resisted the "Hegelian notion that all contradictions
can be resolved in a higher synthesis, the dialectic process moving forward in
smooth and unbroken continuity from one point to the next."75 He proposed his
own unique concept of the "qualitative dialectic" that emphasized "the naturally
occurring distance between God and humanity apart from the incarnation."76
Barth's understanding of the incarnation as God's being-in-act led him to
seek the point of contact between God and humanity veiled and unintuitable by
72
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reason but revealed in the event of the cross. "In faith, 'the death [of Christ]
becomes the only (the only!) parable of the Kingdom ofGod'."77 The
correspondence between ourselves and Christ is a shared existence in tribulation,
an analogy ofHis death, "Our intuitable kinship with Him (which becomes
knowable to us in the mirror ofHis death on the cross as such)... is in itself
identical with the fact of the incurable problem of human existence generally."78
This Christomorphic anthropology is made clear in Barth's thought once and for
all in the miracle of the incarnation:
GOD SENDS HIM . . .to announce the resurrection of the flesh; to
proclaim the new man who recognizes himself in God, for he is made
in His image (Ebenbild), and in whom God recognizes Himself, for He
is his pattern (Urbild); to proclaim the new world where God requires
no victory, for there He is already Victor, and where He is not a thing
in the midst of other things, for there He is All in All; and to proclaim
the New Creation, where Creator and creature are not two, but one.79
Barth had seen that theme of the Bible and the essence of philosophy resided
in the "KRISIS of human perception—the Prime Cause: the Bible beholds at the
same cross-roads~the figure of Jesus Christ."80 Note McCormack's distinction:
the medium of revelation is not the revelation. Jesus ofNazareth,
a historical figure, standing on the plane of history, is not the
revelation. He is the medium of revelation.81
This begs the phenomenological question, for in what way does this medium allow












"lift the veil" that allows the Unintuitable to become Intuitable?
The Dialectical Turn: KRISIS and Paradox
The effect of the new edition ofRomans on the religious community was
one of the great theological events of the twentieth century. In Torrance's
estimation:
it is an all-out attack upon immanentism and relativism, arrogant
scepticism and idolatry, it takes the most radical of all roads,
for it places all human undertakings and formulations, theological
and ecclesiastical as well, under the total judgement of grace, under
the /crisis of the Spirit of Christ. . ,82
Barth was seeking to deal with the theological and epistemological problem of
God making Himself known to human beings "without ceasing to be the Subject
of revelation."83 The incorrectness of liberal thought had often reduced God to a
projection of human desires but for Barth the KRISIS ofGod's own revelation
shows the idolatry of such intentions. "Here again is that contempt and
presumption which fails to perceive the distance between God and man, which
inevitably exalts and enthrones the no-God of this world."84 The theological
difficulty lay in God remaining God after the inbreaking of revelation and not
becoming a mere subject to be manipulated by fallen humanity. This was to
speak of a presence ofGod in history in such a way as to make it clear that these
realities are not o/history. Revelation expressed in culture was not ofculture and
in this Barth fundamentally disagreed with Tillich as will be seen. Furthermore,
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a close reading ofBarth's second edition ofDer Romerbriefwith regard to
anthropological and covenantal concepts leads to two lines of thought, his
regard of these two concepts in relation to the notions icon and idol, and his
description of theological ethics.
Barth summarized the intent ofRomans for it "moves around the theme
that in Christ Jesus the Deus absconditus is as such the Deus revelatus." A
legitimate epistemology is based only in the event of divine initiative as Barth
asserted:
This means that the theme of the Epistle to the Romans-Theology,
the Word of God-can be uttered by human lips only when it is
apprehended that the predicate, Deus revelatus, has as its subject
Deus absconditus.85
Human utterances and endeavours can never come first; revelation occurs at the
precise "Moment, when God not man, speaks and acts, [which] is the Moment of
Miracle."86 Yet humanity cannot apperceive such an event for even when saying
"God" one is still saying "Miracle." Barth argues:
We are incompetent (Nicht-Schauen) to see what is invisible
(Unanschaulichen) and to comprehend (Nicht-Begreifen) what is
incomprehensible (Unbegreiflichen). We have no sensible organ
wherewith to perceive the miracle. Human experience (Erfahren)
and human perception (Verstehen) end where God begins.87
Therefore, the only adequate and iconic response to this phenomenological
occurrence is the one of John the Baptist, a mode ofwonderment and witness.
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where John is pointing to the crucified Jesus.88 To point elsewhere would be
an idolatry. Barth quotes Kierkegaard:
'Now, Spirit is the denial of direct immediacy. IfChrist be
very God, He must be unknown, for to be known directly is
the characteristic mark of an idol ,'89
This terse phrase would continue to have its impact on Barth's refutation of any
iconic depiction of Christ and his ultimate repudiation of sacramental efficacy.
Idolatry is to be found in the the human "falsehoods" (Liigen), which Barth
describes as a "No-God" (Nicht-Gott).90 This is what humanity fashions for
itself when it is in rebellion (Widerstand) and declares itself to be God making
the "appearance of the idol (Abgott).. . inevitable."91
Even if the image of Jesus Christ cannot be represented by any conceptual
or visible icon, he still is the iconic moment in some manner. Barth is reluctant
to give more than this to avoid the obvious false step of idolatry. It is the
atonement of Jesus, by his sacrifice and faithfulness to the God who sent him,
which is the iconic moment. The scandal ofChrist's death on the cross, that
which is the paradox of Messiahship, is that event in which, "By His blood,. . .
Jesus is proved to be the Christ, the first and last word to men of the faithfulness
ofGod."92 Barth quotes Fr. Hiller, "In the picture of the Redeemer the dominant
88
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colour is blood." However, the blood is not an icon in and of itself, it only
signifies the KRISIS ofjudgement that is the "shade" of the cross.93 Yet, a
phenomenology of the cross is still to be found in Barth's exposition, an
understanding of the human "conformity to Christ in the likeness ofHis death."
The gaze of the believer reveals, not the eternal, but the finite reality of human
selfhood in bondage to sin. Barth underscored, "With my eyes fixed upon Christ,
in this judgement and surrender and dissolution (Aufhebung) and contradiction
(■Gegensdtzlicheit) I recognize myself."94 Later, however, Barth seems to
contradict himselfby stating that
It is the road—which is the shadow cast by the Cross upon all
'healthy' human life: which is the place where the tenacity of
men is invisibly, yet most effectually, disturbed and shattered
and dissolved; the place where the possibility (Moglichkeit) of
God, of the Spirit, of Eternity, can enter within our horizon.95
There follows the claim that, "in so far as in His death the invisible God becomes
for us visible", yet even with this Barth would not allow a possible iconic
depiction, not even in the art ofGrunewald. The human construct of such an icon
would not disclose the gaze of the infinite, it would remain, therefore, an idol.
Only the divine initiative of grace can provide this "possibility", for it can not
be apprehended by any human cognition or vision. The initiative ofGod is the
summation of any phenomenology for Barth as McCormack observes:
Where the veil is lifted—or better, made to be transparent, for
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where this occurs, there God is known.96
In a similar mode, Marion allows for a similar understanding of:
how Christ Jesus offers not only a visible image of the Father who
remains invisible but even (visible) face of the invisible itself (the
Father), a visible image of the invisible as invisible.91
What is given by Christ is the "trace ofGod" derived from the "kenosis of the
image."98 For Barth also, it is only in the suffering of Christ that the glory of
God is manifested as a saturated phenomenon:
it is for His sake that we are bound to gaze upon it, to see in it the
step, the movement, the turning point from death to life, and to
apprehend it as the place where Christ is to be seen. To overlook
suffering is to overlook Christ.99
For Marion this kenotic phenomenon is manifested in the liturgy at the moment
of the Eucharist.100 For Barth in Romans it is in the participation of the suffering
of Jesus, that the believer, as disciple and witness, discloses the reality of the Son
ofGod in sacramental form. Christ's death "is the occasion (Anlafi) by which men
are able to apprehend (verstehen) themselves in God, that is to say, they apprehend
His increase (Wachsium) in their decrease (Abnehmen).,,m This apprehension can
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Ingrid Spieckermann has detected that Barth was postulating an "analogy
of the cross" (Kreuzesanalogie) as the the Urgestalt in the Wendung of Barth's
theology that later led to his analogia fidei.103 McCormack considers her
observation a major discovery in the understanding of Barth's theology and
also notes that, for Barth, "the analogy of the cross has in view a highly negative
content.'"04 The cross itself is a sign of God's judgment on sin and evil, not an
icon to be venerated in any revelatory manner. The actuality of grace calls for a
less static response in this regard, a reaction of gratitude and moral obedience;
an ethics of grace.
The Ethics of Grace
Barth referred to the subject of ethics as "The Great Disturbance" (Die grosse
Storung).105 But grace is spoken in stronger terms yet, as a forceful "downright
conc\usiori',(schlichten Feststellung).106 Grace establishes the possibility of
human response to its assertion, a reminder of "that primal Origin by which my
existence is affirmed, and that I perceive that I—and yet not 1—AM."107 This too
is a "disturbance" for it calls one to war—not only against others but more
emphatically-against oneself. This marginalizes all human achievement and
human strivings to the realm of death (as Barth later wrote in 1922):
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The problem of ethics contains the secret that man as we know him
in this life is an impossibility. This man, in God's sight, can only
perish.108
Therefore, no "positive" or "interim" ethic can be established for it remains under
the influence of the sinful (erotic) character of the world. "How, indeed, can it be
otherwise? for human endeavor must inevitably be disturbed by the thought of
God."109 Only grace can quell the disturbance for it "means also the possibility,
not of a 'good'(!) conscience, but of a consoled conscience. "uo Grace is God's act
ofmercy that thus "provides the positive answer to the ambiguity of the human"111,
but still continues to precipitate a sense of contradiction in the sphere of human
ethics. Barth discerned that:
Grace is the unobservable truth ofmen: it is their impossibility,
which constitutes the veritable possibility of their acting or not
acting (Nicht-Tuns); it is their veritable existence, which can be
defined only as non-existence.112
Robert Willis describes this process (or actuality) ofGrace as "an absolute
translation of the human."112 A new ontological status is now achieved; one that
is governed by the "indicative of divine truth" and the "imperative of divine
reality" as exemplified according to the will of God.114 Ethical exhortation now
leads humanity to repentance, a "rethinking" about the divine initiative of God
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and worship, which allows the penitent to make themselves present as sacrifices
to the will of God. Only in this manner and in this order can true Christian ethics
become efficacious.
Once the priority of grace is established, Christian ethics proceeds on a basis
of the imperative of "existential belonging to God."115 Barth describes ethics in the
primary level of "sacrifice" (Opfer) characterized by worship and in a secondary
level as a mode of behavior that "stands under the Telos of life."116 Sacrifice is
"not a human action" (Gemeinschaft), but also an "encountering of the OTHER in
the full existentiality of his utter OTHERNESS."117 Human encounter is to mirror
the divine encounter in Jesus Christ, the ultimate "Individual, The One, The New
Man." This divine-human pattern Barth later explicated in his concept of the
analogia relationis, or even an analogia electionis:
AGAPE is the answer of the man who under grace is directed towards
the unsearchable God. AGAPE is the concrete analogue of election
(Erwahlung). And further, as the love ofmen towards men, AGAPE
demonstrates the existential existence ofmy neighbour who
is unobservable.118
The ethical behaviour of the Christian in summary, is a life of love, first in
the acceptance of the paradoxical love of God (as wholly other yet present in
Christ) and the manifestation of election in the love of others (as wholly other yet
present to us in Christ). This is the basis of an implied Covenant in Romans which










with two distinct dimensions, that of'disturbance', and the other of'conclusion'.
The Covenant ofGrace
The Reformed doctrine of the Covenant is not found in Romans in any
specificity. Early in the book Barth alludes to it as a condescension from God:
In all this mist (.Nebel) the prime factor {Kern) is provided by the
illusion (Wahn) that it is possible for men to hold communication
with God or, at least, to enter into a covenant relationship
{Bundnisfcihigkeit) with Him without miracle—vertical from
above ... 119
The miracle from above is the Gestalt ofGrace; "It is the invisible relationship
{Relation) in which all things stand; and the knowledge of it remains always a
dialectical knowledge."120 Grace is a manifestation of the KRISIS that "cuts
through every particular human status" and acts as an agent of "dissolution"
{Aufhebung) to the pretense of human affairs.121 Grace is revelation and divine
possibility for humanity for it is "the relating of the visible man to his invisible
personality which is grounded in God."122 The structure of Grace (as Covenant)
has the vertical origin in the initiative of God but also an immanental disclosure
in an ontological restructuring of the Gestalt of human existence as well. This
ontological restructuring will find a similarity with Tillich's concept of the 'New
Being" in the future.










Barth iterated, "Grace is the power of obedience; it is theory and practice,
conception and birth; it is the indicative which carries with it a categorical
imperative."123 In discovering oneself through the efficacious power ofGrace,
comes a freedom to be concerned with Other, the arena for the correct practice
of Christian ethics, not to obtain grace, but to practice true agape in response to
that which has already been given. This agape is "the concrete analogue of
election."124 Election and Predestination play a significant role in Barth's
understanding of the implied Covenant ofDer Romerbriefas well.
The "analogue of election" leads to a numinous awe of the Wholly Otherness
of God. The act of submission to the Presence of God is completed when "He
who has been chosen (erwalt) by God cannot say He has chosen God."125 This is
the paradox, the impossibility of the human made possible by the action of God,
yet unspeakable and unable to be possessed. For Barth, Predestination to
"blessedness" (Seligkeit) has been distorted by Augustine and the Reformers in a
mythological form "as though it were scheme of cause (Ursache) and effect
(Wirkung), thereby robbing it of its significance (Tragweite)."126 This is a
tendentious reading of the tradition perhaps, exacerbated by the arrogance of
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Barth continues:
Predestination means the recognition that love towards God is an
occurrence, a being and having and doing ofmen, which takes place
in no moment of time, which is beyond time, which has its origin at
every moment in God Himself, and which must therefore be sought
and found only in Him.128
The concept of predestination remains paradoxical and is not to raise questions
of who and who are not the elect but to concentrate "attention upon the eternal
foreordination of temporal men, by reminding them of the decision of him that
calleth, and by insisting that God is veritably God."129 Barth also admonishes the
Church "not to dissolve the secret ofPredestination by imposing upon it some
human 'way of salvation'."130 The Church is in the sway of the destiny ofEsau
and therefore can only point to the way of Jacob. So also individual Christians
live in the tension between sin and election but the irruptive power of Grace leads
to the practice of true agape towards God and neighbor. It would not be until
Barth's engagement with the Reformed doctrine of the Covenant in his teaching at
Gottingen that he would begin to uncover the biblical warrants for this aspect of
the structure of Grace.
Conclusion
The success of the first edition ofDer Romerbrief led to Barth's appointment
as professor ofReformed Theology, a position partially funded by American








minority among the rest of the faculty. He was not well-versed in Reformed
dogmatics or even the Confessions, but Barth characteristically immersed himself
in the task of this Calvinistic endeavour "burning the midnight oil in my struggle
over it."131 The struggle would lead him to a more Covenantal approach to his own
theology based on the Reformers and the early Church theologians. Barth's future
studies of Calvin and Anselm were to change his theological direction radically.
In spite of these changes much of Barth's theology remained consistent
throughout his career. The character of the Gotteslebnis informed his theological
epistemology all the way to the last volume of his Dogmatics and beyond. The
German intellectual collapse into the Kriegstheologie impacted Barth so greatly
that he always maintained suspicions of any theological ideology connected to a
specific political expression. This misgiving, as will be seen, would lead him into
direct confrontation with the Nazi regime and an expulsion of any existential
thought in his writings that might suggest an anthropology in the guise of
Feuerbach and Schleiermacher. Yet, it would be an anthropology that would
become the iconic manifestation of grace in the late Dogmatics.
Barth's return to the written Word, as the supreme locus of his theological
objectivism, would also open him up to the tradition of the Reformers in his
research in Gottingen. The doctrine of the Covenant of grace is only implied in
his commentary on Romans. In his class preparations in Gottingen however,
Barth's interaction with Calvin, Heppe and other Federal theologies would lead to




explored in the following analysis of his theology. In the next chapter we will see




PAUL TILLICH: CHAPLAIN AND PHILOSOPHER
Tillich's Early Theological Influences
Tillich's mature theological concepts developed after a long process
of intellectual reflection, war experience and socialist commitment. In this
chapter we will be concerned with his early writings up to 1923 in order to
extract the threads of his theological and philosophical thought. Beginning
with Tillich's Lutheran tendencies, his assertion of the Protestant Principle
and the divine initiative of grace provided him with a criteria with which to
employ in his notions of the realm of the sacred and secular. How Tillich
develops his philosophy of culture from his exposure to expressionistic art
and his establishment of the concept of kairos will also be explored. Finally,
Tillich's historic meeting with Barth and the resulting issues between their
theologies will conclude the chapter. From this we can garner important insights
on the differences of their approaches to both the iconic and the idolic. Tillich's
religious upbringing as a Lutheran and the influence of his teacher Martin Kahler
led to his re-stating Luther's doctrine ofjustification.1 However, Tillich's own
1
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mediation" as a "mediation between the eternal criterion of truth as it is manifest in the picture of Jesus
as the Christ", (cited hereafter as PE).
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assessments ofLuther came from his own tendentious viewpoints in his attempts
to clarify and justify his own theology. It was a joke amongst his students that
Tillich's lectures on Luther and Calvin revealed more about his own theology than
that of the Reformers!2 Tillich rarely quoted Luther but always acknowledged that
his own religious substance "is and remains Lutheran."3 In his own description of
the Reformer's influence on German thought Tillich wrote, "Lutheranism has
worked indirectly through philosophy, as well as directly to check socialism."4
In this regard, Tillich adjudged Barth's 'dialectical theology' as both Calvinistic
and Lutheran in his "strongly transcendent idea of the Kingdom ofGod."5
Luther's prophetic criticism in Tillich's opinion, was a "struggle
against the claim of reason to be able to grasp and realize truth on its own account"
for truth 'transcends both being and spirit."6 This brings a judgement to all things
finite and in the doctrine ofjustification by faith "drives rational criticism 'to its
depth and its limit.'"7 Tillich found that the existential concept of the 'boundary-
situation' disclosed the autonomous search for finite security for both the Church
as well as the individual. Luther had stood:
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in the depth of this boundary-situation in which the divine 'Yes'
over the whole of human existence can be received; for this 'Yes'
is not founded on any human achievement, it is an unconditional
and free sovereign human judgement from above human possibilities.8
However, grace must ultimately prevail even in the nature of faith as Tillich
elaborated in an important essay from his Religiose Verwirklichung9 of 1929,
"Faith is the faith ofman. It does not come from man, but is effective in man."10
The Gestalt of grace is founded on the reality of the Word who is Jesus the Christ
both in word and event. Scripture speaks not only about this reality but as "an
expression ofthis reality" as it has been "grasped by it."
The reality of grace is the prius of all speaking and hearing about it;
being moved by the Spirit is the prius of faith, not the reverse. But
to be moved by the Spirit or to be grasped by the unconditional means
to be drawn into the reality and the life of a Gestalt of grace.11
Both the doctrine of grace and the divine initiative propounded by Tillich in
this essay reflect his dependence both on Luther and the Reformed tradition.
However, Tillich would carry this Gestalt of grace even farther in his perception
of the reality of grace being found in the immanent (secular culture and its artistic,
moral and philosophical expression) as well as the transcendent (as found in
religious symbols). His notions of grace being found in both sacred and secular
spheres would lead him into asserting the possibility of iconic depictions of grace
manifesting themselves in various modes of human apprehension.
The prophetic criticism of Luther motivated Tillich to propound one of the
8
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important keys to his theology, the 'Protestant Principle.' He wrote later in 1952:
In an early polemic between Karl Barth and myself, he accused me
of 'still fighting against the Great Inquisitor.' He is right in asserting
that this is a decisive element ofmy theological thought. What I have
called the 'Protestant Principle' is, as I believe, the main weapon
against every system of heteronomy.12
This principle was based on "Luther's fight for justification by grace and through
faith alone."13 As a self-critical principle it avoids its own self-negation by
deriving its "formative power" from the "power of the New Being that is
manifest in Jesus the Christ."14 This Christo-centric emphasis is the "bedrock"
of all Protestantism, in its sacramental foundation, principle and reality.15 The
bible is to remain as Scripture the "original document of the event which is called
'Jesus the Christ' as the sole "criterion of all Scripture and the manifestation of
the Protestant Principle."16 The "boundary situation" ofLuther's despair and sense
of dread is answered by that found in Scripture, i.e. the power of the New Being
and its restorative characteristics in the temporal existence of human reality.17
Yet Tillich would strike a markedly different Christological formulation of the
cross and the doctrine of the Atonement than Luther which would leave him
12
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open to a Barthian misinterpretation in the future. However, as George Lindbeck
has pointed out, "Tillich sometimes seems to affirm something very near to the
solus Christus. He says, for example, that the message of Christ is the 'ultimate
expression of the divine'."18 However, the 'something like' remains problematic
for interpreters ofTillich's theology. Is the 'grasping power' of the Protestant
Principle similar to the Reformed doctrine of the covenant of grace espoused in
the theology of Karl Barth?
The Influence ofSchelling on Tillich 'sTheology
As has been shown in Chapter 2, Tillich's Lutheran background was always
combined with the ever present philosophy of Schelling. Tillich's christology,
trinitarian thought and his symbolism of the cross can be seen to be under the
influence of Schelling's notions. Schelling's anthropology is explicated through
his doctrine of the "potencies." The first potency is the "real or sacramental basis
of religion", the second is the "formal and efficient cause of being" and the third
is the realm of the spirit "the final cause ... the unity of the first and second
potencies."19 A basic trinitarian outline of these potencies was adumbrated with
God as the "unconscious will", Christ as the "rational will", and the Spirit as the
unity of the other two. In Schelling's description:
The idea of the trinity passes through three moments: it must proceed
from tautousia, where only the Father is the dominating ousia-where
the Father comprehends all; it must proceed from tautousia through
18
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heteroousia, which lasts as long as there is tension until the
final reconciliation, to homoousia, which, therefore, is only the
final moment, which is totally incomprehensible apart from the
two that precede it.20
A crisis of estrangement is found in the "tension" between the first and second
potencies as a separable opposition that leads to what Tillich described as
"structures of destruction."21 This tension arises from the polarity of the first
potency, "absolute want of being" in relation to the second potency, the "absolute
fullness of being."22 There abides a "self-ishness" in tension with a "self-less"
character between pure potency and pure act. The purview of the third potency,
the Spirit, is a combination of these potencies and has a teleological referent,
the "what ought to be or what shall be."23 God is also the "principle of love"
and contains an "original power of contraction." This contraction is a "conquest
of divine egoism by divine love" and is the "process by which God becomes
personal."24 An incarnational dimension therefore becomes important for this
"contradiction in potency leads God to assert his absoluteness and become an
individual."25 The contradiction (or estrangement) is conquered by Christ as
the "true infinite" in the finite and by his deed of self-sacrifice reconciles the
existential tension.Tillich saw that Schelling has posited an event of grace:
20
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The self-comprehending contradiction is overcome negatively
by the self-destruction of selfhood in its separation from essence
(death and wrath), positively by the self-annulment of selfhood in
its communion with essence that had become individual and has
annulled itself as individual (grace).26
For Schelling, the passion ofChrist is not a purely temporal act of grace. "The
Messiah suffers from the beginning, he has been set in a condition of negative
suffering ever since he was restored to human consciousness . . . pure potency."27
Schelling went on to say that the Logos "created an intuition of the estranged
being of every natural spirit that is not free from itself and cannot sacrifice
itself."28 The power of the potency of'self-hood' is "exhausted" when it "has
killed him who has become lord of being, and in whom everything finite is
sacrificed to the infinite."29 The vicarious sacrifice of Christ destroys the "power
of darkness" and the "ideal man is restored."30 This culminates in the agency of
the Spirit of unity which asserts the Lordship of God over "beings who are
brought back from estrangement."31 This allows the "a priori inconceivable in
God" to become conceivable. In the incarnation of the Logos the freedom to be
'self-less' in human existence becomes possible again. The goal of Schelling's
Negative Philososphy is found in the search for the supreme essence in the













self, therefore the divine initiative must prevail:
The self cannot itself lay claim to the power to win this God.
God must come to meet the self with his aid . . . All we can do
(and no philosophical pride can or should keep us from doing
this) is gratefully accept that which comes to us undeservedly
and (as a gift of) grace, and which we cannot attain otherwise.32
Schelling's potencies influenced Tillich's trinitarian thought as well as
his understanding of the Gestalt of grace. A Christological notion of healing
and reconciliation also existed in Schelling's philosophy in Tillich's paraphrase,
"God affirms the will to selfhood by himself becoming an individual. 'Only the
personal can heal the personal, and God must become man in order that man may
return to God.'"33 This healing enacted by God as an act of the conquest of
estrangement resides in the paradox ofGod's being:
Contradiction in potency leads God to assert his absoluteness and
become an individual. Thereby, however, he becomes subject to
wrath and the immanent self-negation of all self-hood . . . The Cross
of Christ is the the solution of this supreme contradiction, that is, the
self-sacrifice and self-annulment of the will to selfhood, raised to the
absolute, divine will to power.34
Schelling's own quote, "The true infinite entered the finite, not to deify it, but to
sacrifice it to God in his own person, and thereby to reconcile it" was echoed later
by Tillich and may be interpreted as foundational for his Christology:
God's presence and power should not be sought in the
supranatural interference in the ordinary course of events
but in the power of the New Being to overcome the self-
as quoted in Jerome A. Stone, "Tillich and Schelling's Later Philosophy" in John J. Carey (ed), Kairos





-destructive consequences of existential estrangement
in and through the created structures of reality.35
The "supreme contradiction" of Christ, in the power of the New Being,
manifests itself in the finitude of humanity through his participation in the
estranged existence of human life. It is the symbol of the cross that, for Tillich,
will decisively reveal this corroboration with the structures of "the ultimate
negativities of existence" and give "universal significance" as an icon of the
'New Being'.36
Tillich and World War One
Tillich, unlike Barth, was a full participant in the military horrors of the
war. After the commencement of hostilities he enlisted as a chaplain and was
sent to the Western Front Tillich observed that he shared the typical nationalistic
attitude of the other enlistees:
When the German soldiers went into the First World War most
of them shared the popular belief in a nice God who would make
everything work out for the best. Actually everything worked out
for the worst, for the nation and for almost everyone in it.37
By December Tillich had been awarded the Iron Cross for his bravery in leading
outdoor worship services under Allied fire. As the war went on Tillich was not
only administering succor to the wounded but also digging graves for the ever
increasing dead. Understandably his spirits began to flag. Tillich recalled his
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enthusiasm disappeared; after a few months I became convinced that the war
would last indefinitely and ruin all Europe."38 The fighting on the Western Front
stalemated early in the war leading to protracted trench warfare and appalling
casualties. In 1916 the utter folly of this situation manifested itself in the horrific
slaughter at Verdun in which Tillich's division was engaged. Tillich wrote his
father, "Hell rages around us. It's unimaginable."39 After his division was
withdrawn from the battle Tillich had his first nervous breakdown. When one of
his best friends was killed in combat Tillich, much sleep-deprived, collapsed once
again. His depressed mood is punctuated in a letter to his friend Maria Klein
I have constantly the most immediate and very strong feeling that
I am no longer alive. Therefore, I don't take life very seriously. To
find someone, to become joyful, to recognize God, all these things
are things of life. But life itself is not dependable ground. It isn't
only that /might die any day, but rather that everyone dies, really
dies, you too, -and the suffering ofmankind—I am an utter
eschatologist. . ,40
Tillich later described all this as his "personal kairos"Ai in which he found
solace in the writings ofNietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra. Reading this work
in a French forest was an "ecstatic experience" as "he found in it an affirmation
of existence which contrasted with the death he found around him."42 Nietzsche's
concept of the "will to power" fascinated Tillich his entire life for it "designates
38










the self-affirmation of life as life, including self-preservation and growth."43
Tillich, though influenced in existential thought by Nietzsche, later came to
repudiate much of his thought and regretted his misappropriation by the Nazi
regime.44 During 1917 America entered the war and the outlook for peace
seemed worse that ever. Tillich started to read modern philosophy rigorously,
especially Husserl and Otto. But by 1918 his frayed nerves gave way once more
and he wrote his father, "Body and soul are broken and can never be entirely
repaired, but that is a small sacrifice in comparison with millions who have given
their lives."45 Tillich asked to be relieved from his military commitment but was
refused and later received the Iron Cross First Class. On November 9, 1918, the
war ended and Tillich, like so many other German soldiers, returned to a country
broken economically and on the verge of a civil war. The ravages of the conflict
would lead Tillich into a mode of theological reflection on the boundary between
despair and hope, an eschatological optimism coming in the breakthrough of a
new Kairos as he was soon to elucidate.
Tillich returned to Berlin and began his professional life as a lowly
Privadozent. His first public speech for the Berlin Kant Society was entitled
"On the Idea of a Theology of Culture." In this lecture Tillich illustrated how the
functions of faith, cult, community, and the church were related to the functions
of culture, for "Religion is the substance of culture and culture is the form of
43
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religion'"46 The 'Unconditional' is to be the iconic focus of his philosophy of
religion:
before which every particular thing and the totality of all particulars-
-before which every value and the system of values-before which
personalty and community are shattered in their own self-sufficient
being and value.47
Schelling's contribution to his thought was acknowledged as well, in the notion
of the horror that "dwells in the depths of every living creature", and the
possibility of a redemption which is "the transition of one individual existence
into the other, the wiping out of individual distinction, the mystical love achieving
union with all living things."48 Tillich recognized that Expressionist Art conveyed
this situation most precisely in the "profoundest No and Yes" and the passion of
these artists displays a religious meaning.49 For Tillich then, the sacred and the
profane must complement each other, at whatever epistemological cost. The
possibility existed that icons could be found discovered in both spheres, an
erroneous notion in the future estimation of Karl Barth.
The success of this address brought Tillich invitations to speak at various
conferences, schools, the Kant Society and small discussion groups. Tillich was
introduced into the world of modern art, especially Expressionism by the art
46
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historian Eckart von Sydow. Cezanne attracted his attention because he saw
him as one who "battled with the form that depicted self-sufficient finitude
and restored to things their real metaphysical meaning."50 In Picasso's
'Guernica' he found a "great Protestant painting, perhaps the greatest of
modern times" and that, "the radicalism of the Protestant question rather
than the Protestant answer was found in this masterpiece."51 The Protestant
Principle itselfwas to be the criteria for any evaluation of the iconic.
In 1920 Tillich joined what was the called the 'kairos circle'. This
small group of, in the words of fellow member Eduard Heimann, "naive,
optimistic, esoteric, eccentric academicians" met together to solve the problems
of the world, which was now open to new creative possibilities."52 The war had
provided the impetus for a sense of renewal, the 'kairos', "the moment of timely
action when the eternal (what ought to be) breaks into time (the prevailing
situation), resulting in the emergence of something new out of old and dying
conditions."53 In time Tillich became the leader of the circle and contributed to
their journal entitled Blatterfur den Religidsen Sozialismus. Though the group
was sympathetic to the prevailing socialism, Tillich did not immediately join the
Socialist party. Yet, the intellectual stimulation of this cadre of thinkers prompted
him to continue his writing essays on the philosophy of religion and the concept
50




Ibid., 70. See also Eduard Heimann, "Tillich's Doctrine ofReligious Socialism" in Kegley & Bretall,




of'kairos\ Living in the Weimar Republic in the early years of the twenties
brought Tillich into a period of his life described as "creative chaos" and "the
Boheme." This "boundary" lifestyle reflected his "non-bourgeois outlook."54
Tillich's own apartment was dubbed by von Sydow as the KatastrophenDiele or
Disaster Bar. Tillich's personal life was in total upheaval as well with the breakup
of his marriage, an abortion (which he came to abhor) and a robbery. His resultant
lifestyle would emphasize the erotic and the demonic, two themes that would later
figure prominently in his theology. Yet Tillich would continue to write in cafes and
produced two important essays in 1922 that solidified his philosophical theology in
a powerful way.
"Die Uberwindung des Religionsbegriffs in der Religionsphilosophie" was
to demonstrate Tillich's understanding of paradox.55 The paradox of the iconic
Unconditioned could not be resolved in his estimation, for it "poses a problem
that calls for intuition (Schauen)."56 Dealing with this dilemma indicated, for
Tillich, "my spiritual affinity in the following ideas with men like Barth and
Gogarten whose concern is the religious Word." The Unconditioned is to be
the primary phenomenon for it is "the supporting ground of every theological
judgement, and can be an absolute presupposition but never an object of











become possible "through the Unconditional." Yet the divine initiative as that
which is given must be sustained:
Objectively considered, all consciousness is related to God: but
subjectively, consciousness can be God-less. Thus there is no way
from the self to God, but there is, in terms of directedness rather
than substance, a way from God to the self.58
This "breakthrough" (durchbruch) is "grace" and can free human self-
-consciousness from the "compulsive flight from God." This is the phenomenon
of "concrete grace", over and against mysticism and predestination, which locates
"salvation in the Unconditionaf'in its "historical self-manifestation."59 Ultimately,
in a manner similar to Barth, Tillich concludes that "God and not religion is the
beginning and end, the center of all things. . . God is known only through God!"60
Tillich explicated his notion of the Unconditional even further in his article of
1922 entitled "Kairos". In a footnote in the beginning of the essay he wrote:
The unconditional is a quality, not a being. It characterizes that
which is our ultimate and, consequently, unconditional concern,
whether we call it 'God' or 'Being as such' or the 'Good as such'
or the 'True as such'. Or whether we give it any other name. It
would be a complete mistake to understand the unconditional as
a being the existence ofwhich can be discussed. He who speaks
of the 'existence of the unconditional' has thoroughly misunderstood
the meaning of the term.61
There are no "outstanding moments in history" that disclose the unconditional
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supra-historical character."62 A philosophy of history that is cognizant of the
kairos, the "right time"or the inbreaking ofGod's rule "rich in content and
significance,"63 must be concerned with the "relation of the conditioned to the
unconditional, in individual as well as social life... the finite life is either turned
toward the infinite or turned away from it toward itself."64 To be open to the
unconditional then, is to be open to the reality of its character as manifested by
Jesus the Christ. This is a "theonomous situation" because it is "open to and
directed toward the divine."65 Kairos is unique and universal for it is located in
the event of Jesus as the Christ, "it is deed and freedom, as it is also fate and
grace."66 Tillich believed that Religious Socialism represented a vision of the
kairos and the possibility of a theonomy, a theme that he would later develop in
greater detail. He wrote later that being a Socialist "may be a decision for the
Kingdom ofGod even though the socialist society is infinitely distant from the
Kingdom ofGod."67 This distinction would lead later to his concept of the
"Demonic", construed as the idolic, which is manifestation of a "power in
personal and social life that is creative and destructive at the same time."
Would Barth affirm Tillich's phenomenological notions? Their first















In this first face-to-face confrontation, Barth and Tillich shared their
particular viewpoints concerning the new concepts of dialectical theology.
Tillich had been most impressed with Barth's "powerful" Epistle to the Romans,
linking Barth's 'theology of crisis' with his own conception of 'kairos\ i.e.,
the ongoing crisis of history. Barth felt that Tillich had appeared to "vindicate
himself' concerning his theology and displayed an "anti-authoritarian
antagonism" (antiorthodoxes Ressentiment) with his "historical mythology".
Yet Barth also saw that they both could do justice to the current sense of
theological'kairos' and co-exist in peace "only on the basis that each of us is
willing to think and to expect the best of the other".68 Barth seemed gratified that
Tillich wanted to review his commentary on Romans and showed an interest in
Tillich's proposed book on the philosophy of religion which would add to "the
gradually growing bubble (which in twenty to thirty years will be pricked like
all the earlier ones by those unknowns attending kindergarten!)." These were
prophetic words to be sure, but the bubble was soon to be punctured by Tillich,
much to the surprise ofBarth.
Tillich also mentioned this meeting in a private letter to his brother-in-law
Alfred Fritz.69 Like Barth, he found that they had little to agree on:
As a 'supranatural eschatologist' Barth was to have had no interest
in history and to have found Tillich's notion of 'theonomy' dangerous.
If that were the case, Tillich countered, then Barth's own notion of
68
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'act of faith' must likewise be dangerous, a point which Tillich
implies Barth conceded.70
Tillich went on to state that a pact was made between them:
he will endeavour to rationalize his supranatural formulas and
I will endeavour to balance ( kompensieren) my rational formulas
with supranatural ones; he will proclaim the essential meaning of
the Unconditioned as a biblical theologian, and I shall do so as a
cultural theologian.
This pact was not to last for long, however. There were too many serious and
conceptually different theological approaches in their writings and personal
beliefs to allow for an irenic academic and theological relationship. The point
of real contention was the manifestation of the iconic in the realm of the secular.
Barth's 'supranaturalism' would exhibit itself in his doctrine of the Covenant in
the future. Tillich's iconic 'Gestalt of grace' would find its phenomenological
apparition in the symbol of the cross. Yet, neither Tillich nor Barth were at these
points in the decade of the early twenties. And their moment of detante was not
to last either.
The open controversy started in earnest with Tillich's article entitled
"Critical and Positive Paradox" published in the Theologische Blatter II in 1923.
Tillich sided with Barth's dialectic as expressed in his Romans commentary, in
that:
A direct, unparadoxical relationship to the unconditioned (Unbedingten)
which does not pass through the constant radical 'No' is a relationship
not to the unconditioned, but to a conditioned (Bedingten) which makes
the claim to be unconditioned, that is, to an idol.71
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This would lead to an infinite series of dialectics in an "endless row of self-
transcendings" that would never be transcendent in actuality. The critical point
would be "whether the theology of crisis still acknowledges an absoluteness that
it itself forbids, or whether it is willing to recognize the positive form (Fassung)
of paradox which is presupposed in the critical."72 Tillich writes further:
The theologian must stand under the dialectic itself. In speaking the
'No" to the conditioned, a submission to this selfsame 'Yes' and 'No'
must be conceded. It does not mean that the conviction (Uberzeugung)
of the superiority of the dialectic position under the 'Yes' and 'No'
must therefore be given up, but it is the awareness of the non-
-transcending position which is contained even in the proclamation of
the crisis; it is the comprehension (Erfassung) of the 'Yes' which is the
presupposition (Voraussetzung) of the 'No'; it is the step back from the
critical to the positive paradox.
Therefore, to stand in the unity of the paradoxical 'Yes' and 'No' is to
perceive that "only through grace does judgement become judgement. Only
where love is revealed is wrath revealed as wrath. Without its unity with grace,
judgement is merely a natural process."73 It also stands that without a paradoxical
understanding of this unity a "demonic realism" might arise that would see "the
destruction of the conditioned in nature." The "irrationality" of the world, taken
as the negative pole of the dialectic, reveals more than just the brokenness of
the world, it also reveals "the abyss in the creator God just as much as it does the
infinite majesty of God as the object ofworship." However, orthodox Christian
doctrine holds that the works of the Trinity ad extra sunt indivisa and the Son
Evangelisches Verlagswerke, 1962) 216-225.
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is an agent of creation. Therefore, the order of creation and redemption belong
together and coexist for each other. "Neither is an objective (gegenstandliches),
perceptible [anschauliches) judgement, but a paradoxical, imperceptible one."74
Tillich spoke positively with Barth that the "greatest service of the theology
of crisis" is its assault on the claim of religion in its absoluteness, and "every
word on this subject, particularly in Karl Barth's Epistle to the Romans, is the
destruction of idols."75 But no dialectical self-transcendence can transcend its
own religious position "which forms the basis for this negation." Tillich
continues by stating that the symbolic phenomena in both religion and culture
are to be considered in a "metaphysics of history, a symbolic, paradoxical
salvation history." Residing in culture are "phenomena which make visible
the source ... the revelation of grace and judgement in terms of faith." For
Tillich these manifest themselves in art, music, poetry, literature etc., revealing
the depths of the dialectic itself. Tillich went on to explicate this paradox in
christological terms for the point of history in and of revelation is the event of
the Christ who also is the man, Jesus ofNazareth. Gogarten and Barth are seen
as overlooking the "positive root of their theology of crisis, but yet are forced
to seek a position in history on which the proclamation of crisis can be based."
Tillich concluded that "in its search for a foundation for the criticism the theology
of critical paradox ends as a theology of the positive absurd." This recognition of
"an empirical fact" is now allowed into the realm of faith in which "heteronomy,






with a complimentary note regarding the theology of crisis. But he added his
own particular stance to it in the paradoxical speech of the "eternal source ,
the ground, the 'abyss' given through the 'Yes' and 'No', the eternal redemption
evident only in faith and presented in history 'in Christ with complete symbolic
power', and as eternal consummation in which the struggle between the godly
and the demonic are "transcended in the eternal unity ofGod."76 The theology
of crisis now becomes the theology of positive paradox.
Barth's reaction was both emotional and polemic. He wrote to his friend
Thurneysen, "Tillich writes against us in the Theol. Blattern . . . Perhaps I will
answer him . . .It has to do with Christology."77 In the same issue that Tillich's
article was published, Barth's response (and Tillich's counter-response) appeared.
In spite of not being sure that he understood Tillich completely, Barth challenged
him with a trenchant essay that delineated the major methodological and distinct
theological differences between them. His tone was combative and insinuated that
Tillich thought that Barth had heard as little as those "disciples of John the Baptist
of whether there was a Holy Spirit."78 Barth's underlying problem with Tillich's
critique resided in the manner of a proper methodology starting either from a
philosophy of culture or Christian theology:
We are really to a large extent ourselves non-theologians, and
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against theology is also our objection in as far as we continuously also
stand outside. Tillich can reject my protest against the presupposition
with which he wrote his article, but only on the condition that he admit
that his presupposition is the characteristically non-theological one,
against which it would not even occur to me to protest because it is
obviously possible.79
He then proceeded to question the presuppositional concept of the "positive
paradox". What is this "point on which everything depends?"Barth felt that
Tillich had glossed over its definition leaving the "real transcending {Aufltebung)
on the basis of the unconditional" as the only thing he could understand. Who
does the transcending? Barth felt that the concept of transcendence was a poor
term for the "entity beyond the 'Yes' and the 'No'." The term needed to be
more closely defined; was transcendence an intellectual act of philosophical
theologians or a "divine act"? He also felt that the concept of the Real might
be better defined as the "existential" (in the usage ofKierkegaard). So, "Why
this hide-and-seek with the frosty monster (Ungeheuer) 'the unconditioned'?"
Barth wondered if that was a term for God, and if so, how the term might be
"weatherproof'(wetterfest) in the context of the dialectic."80
These criticisms were based on Barth's fundamental distrust ofTillich's
theological method. What were the philosophical assumptions he was working
with? Could a doctrine of the Trinity proceed from Tillich's reflections? Was
the notion of the unconditioned in positive paradox not just an old concept in a
"new dress"?81 Barth asked whether Tillich was employing this terminology as
79






an uncritical scythe to be used "at will at the decisive point at any direction as
something given . . . and confident, to throw up against the clouds the house of
true gnosis?" He also admitted, that in spite of the method that Tillich used,
"strange and incomprehensible to me even at the first step", there was an
agreement in principle on the subject matter itself This subject matter was the
postulation of the dialectic itself and certainly not a shared vision of the nature of
God. Barth believed that Tillich's generalizations were like "a general steamroller
of faith and revelation . . . affecting everything and nothing as it rolls over houses,
men, and beasts as if it were self-evident everywhere." Therefore the God of
Tillich was similar to the God of Schleiermacher and Hegel, not the God of
Luther and Kierkegaard.82 The christological point was contentious as well,
" for 'us' Christ is the salvation history—Christ is the 'positive paradox'."
Barth was suspicious that Tillich had relegated Christ to salvation history, as
a mere 'presentation' (Darstellung) of complete "symbolic power" (Symbolkraft).
He also thought that divine freedom and love had been overlooked, and that
Tillich " runs the great danger of letting the justified polemic against the 'man-
god', once waged by Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, be converted into its opposite,
the polemic against the God-man." The "positive paradox" was not, therefore
sufficiently "divine" in Barth's estimation.83
Barth emphasized the character ofChalcedonian Christology as the primary
foundation for any serious theology. Tillich had, in Barth's opinion, deviated from






symbolic referent. To do this was to confuse subject with object, a sabotaging of
the 'positive paradox':
What is 'absurd' is all unreflecting, unclassical, disrespectful deviation
from the formula ofChalcedon, for to hold quietly to this confession
would still indicate, mutatis mutandis, good insight even today.84
The 'heteronomy' ofTillich's symbolical Christology seemed to threaten the
'critical historical science' which, even in its incomplete status versus theology,
must continue with great interest for theologians. But the 'autonomy' of a
theological science is to be critiqued in its ongoing attempt to find "offense"
(Argerms) in the Bible. This situation was intolerable for Barth, for he felt that
it had "emaciated" Protestant theology and he called for the historians to be
theological exegetes and work in obedience to the truth.85
Barth concluded his essay by stating that "Tillich as a theologian ... is a
riddle to me."85 Though Barth restated his amiable feelings toward him as an
individual, Tillich's corrective was "an attack on the decisive things we want to
say." There must not be a "Tower ofBabel" theology free of presuppositions
(voraussetzungslose) even under the guise of 'theonomy'. The doctrines of the
"one holy catholic church" are to be the only presuppositions of a genuine
Protestant theology. However, "The altars before which Tillich worships are
really not entirely unknown by me." Barth hoped that the "lively debate" would
help Tillich understand the "paradoxicality" of the 'positive paradox'. He then
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finished his essay with a phrase ofAugustine's, "In the church it is not significant
that I say this, you say this, but rather that the Lord says thus."87
Tillich's response took notice of the belligerent nature ofBarth's essay.
"I refrain from .... going into various expressions of Barth's in which his
temperament and zeal for battle carry him beyond the limits of an appropriate
analysis."88 Tillich continued to disagree with Barth over the terminology of God
and the unconditioned. "Not that this is a substitute expression; it is rather a key to
open for oneself and for others the closed door to the holy of holies of the name
'God'."89 Yet he agreed with Barth that there could be no "direct access" (direckte
Zugriff) to God and the notion that one could speak ofGod is forbidden.Tillich
believed that the time, the kairos he was later to explicate, called for a new manner
of proclamation as opposed to:
a way of speaking of culture and a leap into absolute contingency
which is faithless to our situation, and which above all condemns
itself by breaking community with those who in all areas of culture
struggle for the revelation of the positive paradox ...90
Tillich concluded his rebuttal with a warning to Barth that his use of the dialectic
would proceed, albeit unintentionally, to a "very undialectic supernaturalism"
with a 'No' to the world and a subsequent 'Yes' that would be "all the more
positive and undialectic."91 Barth appealed to the tenets ofReformed theology
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which might lead to "The profanization and emptying of cultural life as a whole . .
and the reduction of religious life to a subcultural level." Tillich, as a Lutheran,
believed that his tradition was "producing ever new attempts to overcome
profane autonomy through a filled, theonomous autonomy." His differences with
Schleiermacher and Hegel lay in their "attempt to obliterate paradox in favor of
dialectic identity." However, Tillich allied himselfwith them when it came to the
question of "making the reference to paradox perceptible in the forms of the
logical and ethical, of transcending profane autonomy with theonomy."
In the end, Barth thought that Tillich had not refuted him directly. "If
ever again I let myself become involved in such a discussion, I will lay down
the condition that the other man shall return me an answer and not go slipping
off so quickly into the bushes."92 Tillich had not been confrontational or even
specific in his answer to Barth, but he did have an effect on Barth's later thought.
Tillich had "forced Barth point-blank to think further about the problem of the
contingency of revelation; i.e., what it means to affirm that one piece of history
has been qualified by revelation as 'the site of the salvation history'."93
Conclusion
The differences and similarities of Barth and Tillich's theological concepts
at this juncture demonstrate that, although both sought to criticize culture and its
insidious claims to be a 'religious culture', their positions on the initialization of






on German theology, Theodor Siegfried pointed out that Barth had described his
attitude toward the world in the image of the brackets ofjudgment and grace
enclosing all existence as a "plus and minus sign with equal validity, so that no
decision is possible."94 History is closed to that which is transhistorical as grace
and judgment "enter it concretely and without permeating it actually." Even in
his acceptance of the dialectical 'No', Tillich also asserted that both reality and
history were open to the transcendent forms ofjudgment and grace.
The influence of Schelling in Tillich's thought allowed him to "speak of
a dynamic immanence of the transcendent in world and history." An openness to
the existential in life would dominate Tillich's anthropology, while Barth would
maintain a nearly non-immanental form of paradigmatic Christology that would
separate him from the mainstream of neo-orthodox thought. Tillich would find
transcendent meaning in cultural as well as religious expression allowing for a
phenomenology of the cross, whereas Barth would put "the whole of reality into
the brackets of a Yes and No" and accept "in a positivistic way the world in its
estrangement from God . . ,"95 With regard to methodology Tillich affirmed that
reason and experience could exist in the theological paradigm, while Barth would
begin with the "Word ofGod", which stands over and against all human possibilty.
The possibility versus the impossibility of human depiction of grace and the
experience ofGod lies at the heart of the Tillich-Barth debate. Where Tillich
affirms the appearance ofGod as the Unconditioned in culture, Barth denies its
Theodor Siegfried, "The Significance OfPaul Tillich's Theology For The German Situation", The
Theology ofPaul Tillich, 73.
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actuality. This Unconditioned seemed to be an idol for Barth, a mere product of
human rationality thrust into the sacred realm. Barth's return to the Bible as
primary source of revelation, marginalized all other modalities of proclamation.
His later emphasis on the Covenant of grace in the Church Dogmatics is the result
of an intense encounter with Scripture starting with the Epistle to the Romans.
Tillich, on the other hand, proceeded with the holy Writ as inferential background
to his theology, leaving him open to rephrase and postulate interpretive and
existential meanings to the symbols of the Christian faith, both biblical and
sacramental. At this moment in time however, any definition of the iconic versus
the idolic remained somewhat abstract. This was all to change with the rise of that
which both theologians perceived as demonic: the inexorable rise ofHitler and the
Third Reich. Soon the demonic was to have a face, an idol of power that would
only reflect the need of the German national psyche to restore its fortunes after the
humiliation of the Versailles Treaty.
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CHAPTER 5
COVENANT AND CONTEST: BARTH'S
THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 1922-1931
Karl Barth "left the beautiful Aargau" and joined "the Swiss on foreign
service"1 as a new resident of post-war Germany. His teaching duties would
expose him to the intricacies of Reformed theology, its concentrations on
scriptural themes, and the covenantal exposition of the followers of Calvin.
This chapter intends to examine the influences of the various Reformers and
how they impacted Barth, as well as his own development from a dialectical
theologian to a theologian of the analogia gratiae. That which Barth studied
in his time in Gottingen was to carry on through to the very end of his Church
Dogmatics; the root metaphor and iconic symbol of the Covenant of grace
and the ethical response to the initiative ofGod's gift. The change in Barth's
theology through his study of Anselm's Fides Quaerens Intellectum will also
be noted as that which substantially informs Barth's epistemology, and focuses
on the inner disposition of the believer as that which must be addressed by God




Gottingen: The Formal Doctrine of the Covenant in Exposition
The cultural and academic environment that Barth discovered in Gottingen
was both personally formidable as well as academically challenging. The war
indemnities that Weimar Germany was forced to pay in accordance with the
terms of the Versailles Treaty had crippled the economy. Inflation was rampant
and food riots were common.2 Germany's failure to keep up with the war
payments provoked the French Army to occupy the Ruhr, her richest area of
resource and industry further crippling any ability to repay the debts. These
events led to an incident that established Barth as a foreigner and a dissident
among a mostly Lutheran faculty. He had been invited to Gottingen to teach
Reformed doctrine on the basis of his reputation as lecturer and his writing
ofDer Romerbrief. Barth felt most apprehensive about the academic challenge
he faced in that "I did not even possess the Reformed confessional writings,
and I had certainly never read them."3 A Christmas greeting from eighteen
French theological students to their fellow students in Germany was vociferously
denounced by some of the faculty at Gottingen. Barth, who personally disapproved
of the French occupation of the Ruhr, took a moderate stance; but felt that a civil
response was appropriate arousing the indignation of Emmanuel Hirsch who
accused him of being a Swiss agitator and a "disturber of the peace!"4 This
incident illustrated Barth's dilemma in Gottingen; he was a foreigner teaching
2







Reformed theology in a Lutheran setting, a tradition that he was alienated from
because of his unfamiliarity with its confessional doctrines. Barth would pay a
stiff price for his political and national views in the future, but he would also
embark on a theological journey that would give rise to his understanding of
the Calvinistic tradition and the Reformed doctrine of the Covenant.
Barth's academic responsibility at the university was to teach an
"Introduction to the Reformed confession, Reformed doctrine and Reformed
church life."5 He conducted seminars on expositions of the Heidelberg Catechism
and the Epistle to the Ephesians. Barth persisted in laborious preparations for his
classes and his popularity as a lecturer increased. The founder of the university
was the renowned Albrecht Ritschl who was venerated by the Lutheran faculty but,
after reading his biography, Barth regarded him in a negative light as the
"prototype of the national-liberal German bourgeois in the age ofBismarck."6
In the summer of 1922, Barth's second year at Gottingen, he gave a seminar
on the theology of John Calvin. As he prepared for this course he wrote his friend
Thurneysen that:
Calvin is a cataract, a primeval forest, a demonic power, something
down from Himalaya, absolutely Chinese, strange, mythological; I
lack completely the means, the suction cups, even to assimilate this
phenomenon, not to speak of presenting it adequately ... I could
gladly and profitably set myself down and spend all the rest ofmy
life just with Calvin.7
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as somewhat ambiguous for it seemed to have "elevated the words of the
biblical witness to the status of a law, to understand humankind's relationship
to the Bible legalistically."8 Though Barth, in principle, supported a strong
character of biblical authority, he seemed wary ofCalvin's legalism:
In Calvin, as we see from his sermons, even the proclamation
of grace wears a moral garb. This is what we have to hear and
understand and take to heart and believe. For Calvin divine
service was a parade ground on which imperatives held sway
in every relation.9
For Barth, the solution of the problem of grace and law was to be found
in Calvin's christology. In his summary of Calvin's Institutes of 1536, Barth
wrote:
Christ is that unspoken original presupposition in terms of which
we see God apriori as the ground and goal, the one who judges
us and shows us mercy, and in terms ofwhich we see ourselves
a priori, when measured against God, as sinners, and are thus
pointed to grace.10
Christ who is united with God in his incarnation has "concluded the covenant
with us," bringing us back to God from our estranged existence.
Always in fact Christ is the covenant and the one who concludes
the covenant between God and us, the enacting of the inconceivable
and impossible thing that when enacted is also the most simple and
most natural.11
An explicit investigation into Calvin's convenantal doctrines was not to be
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of the various themes ofReformation thought. However, the lectures of the
summer semester in 1923 on the Reformed Confessions were to become the
initial focus for Barth on the doctrine of the Covenant and the history of the
dogma itself. But during that summer there was not a "quiet hour'Tor Barth as
he complained to Thurneysen:
Always it was Zwingli, Zwingli, James, Zwingli, and in between
only those hours of Buddhist submersion in which one knocks
about at something or—reads, while in the purple depths of the
subconscious the necessary regroupings take place.12
The "reading" that led to this "necessary regrouping" came in the form of a "thick
book by Gottlob Schrenck of Bielefled on Cocceius" that provided a background
on Reformation thought which for Barth "would clarify historically in some
measure the problem of the relation ofmy Gottingen existence to the rest ofmy
existence."13 Schrenk had focused on the federal theology of Cocceius as well
as giving a summary of its historical roots. Barth's own sense of covenantal
theology would develop from this initial exposure to the Reformation line from
Calvin, and the intricate debates over the Gospel and Law decrees and their
primal origins amongst later theologians.
The Background of the Reformed Doctrine of the Covenant
The Reformed doctrine of the covenant is found in the biblical terminology
of both the Old and New Testaments. Scholars delineated the covenants between
God and Adam, Abraham, Moses, the prophecy of the New Covenant in Jeremiah
12
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and its fulfillment in the mediatorial covenant of Christ. The dichotomy between
faith and works was a major issue, not only in the larger Reformation disputations
on the whole, but also at the specific covenantal point regarding the prevenience
of grace. James Torrance comments:
Divine covenants have their source in the divine initiative, in
the loving heart of God. God conceives of the covenant, God
announces it. God confirms and establishes it and carries it
through to fulfillment, and the motive is love. The form of the
covenant is the indicative of grace—the promise, 'I will be your
God and you shall be my people.'14
In spite of the strong claim of the divine initiative of God, the response of
humanity led to two distinctions; that of unilateral and bilateral. The bilateral
covenant is conditioned by the human response and remains open and unfulfilled
until there is a response. The unilateral covenant in contrast, is established (in
Christ) by its own assertion and what is required in response is gratitude and joy.
Barth began his Reformed covenantal lectures in following Leo Jud's
Catechism of 1535, reiterating the 'covenant' with Abraham that consisted of
two major articles: that God wills to be his God and the God of his descendants,
and that the seed ofAbraham show faithful obedience to God's statutes. "This is
the eternal covenant of grace that is renewed and sealed in Christ."15 In August
Lang's words "As I believe, so am I Israel" allows faith to be the initiation and
participation in God's covenant. To be obedient to the New Covenant, enacted in
Christ, is to be free "to enter into the service of Christ to our neighbor.'"6 Good
James B. Torrance, "Covenant Or Contract?" in Scottish Journal ofTheology (1970), 55.
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works alone do not merit God's grace but "God is certainly 'praised' (gelobt) and
'honored' (gepriesen) through them."17 In this way we both 'testify' to (bezeugen)
and 'practice' our faith, and reassure (vergewissern) ourselves that election is no
'illusion'.
In a later exposition on the Westminster Confession Barth not only
speaks of the "codification of triumphal Calvinism" but also of the tragedy
of the movement "being conquered by the world." He asserted that:
One must turn to the Westminster Confession not only to learn
the original intention of the Reformed movement but also the form
in which this movement as Calvinism has conquered the politically
(if not the intellectually) dominant part of the Protestant world, and
of the Christian world in general.18
The aporia lay in an incorrect emphasis on election. In Barth's view the doctrine
of double predestination espoused in the Westminster Divines allowed for the
abuse of the doctrine "for the purpose of gaining personal assurance of salvation."
This was to place the focus on human salvation which led to "the question of
human truth" becoming "decisive in an immodest and irrelevant way."19
The concept of the Covenant occurs in Chapter 7 of the confession.
The impossible distance between humanity and God is bridged by the special
"condescension" by the Creator. The Covenant of works first established with
Adam has been abrogated by the Fall. Barth parenthetically discusses the danger
17
Ibid., German text from Karl Barth, Gesamtausgabe: Die Theologie der reformierten
Bekenntnisschriften 1923 (Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1998) 143.
18




of establishing a "temporal history of salvation" that is developed 'based\auf
Grand) on the Fall which would make it impossible to "assert that the law in
and of itself is a stage (Stufe) of revelation "20 The foedus gratiae remedies this
situation with its retroactive power. "There are not, therefore, two covenants of
grace differing in substance, but one and the same under various dispensations."21
Barth found this to be "walking on the razor's edge".22 He summarized the
historical outcome of this as an ongoing problem, "The following generations
opted for the unhappy second possibility. We are plagued by this up to today."
In Barth's estimation the Westminster Confession revealed that Christian
doctrine had lost its certainty of the divine subject, "so that in spite of all
monergistic assertions (Beteuerungen) it must degenerate (herunterzusinken)
into the description of possible human relationships to this subject."23 This
allowed the eventuality of an human starting point for theology, a point that
Barth continued with all his intellectual power to resist.
The results of Barth's engagement with the Reformed tradition appeared in
the form of a lecture given in the fall of 1923. The World Alliance ofReformed
Churches invited him to speak in Emden. Barth had been prompted in part to
make a reply to his former Genevan mentor, AdolfKeller, who had stated that
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that the "old sacred inheritance" should be dealt with "untheologically" in the
current situation.24 His response to Keller emphasized that the "cultivation of
a consciousness which is more strongly Reformed in character" must proceed
with the "earnestness and rigour the way which Luther and Calvin went, the way
which leads from thought to action, and no other,"25 The strength of the Reformed
creeds resided for Barth, in their commitment to the "one object" of all religious
thought which is "God himselfand God alone, as he speaks his own word in
Scripture and in Spirit."26 This led to a restatement of the "scriptural principle"
which places the Bible as the Word ofGod, a formal principle that includes the
material principle as well. All confessions are to be subjugated to the authority of
scripture as an act of obedience to the Deus dixit in the testimonium spiritus sancti
internum. Only in this manner can Church proclamation be valid as Barth stated:
Doctrina is the word of the Christian man at crisis with the word of
God: it is penetrated by that merciless purifying and cleansing which
is witnessed to in Scriptures. It remains the word ofman. It does not
itself become the verbum divinum, but in this relation it is none the
less a legitimate and pure praedicatio verbi divini21
This provides a "relative authority" to Church dogma which would include
the doctrine of the Covenant, election and all the themes of ecclesial theology.
In this vein then, Barth could say, "So the fathers understood the answer of the
old and new covenants to the question as to the end of the vita humana,"28
24










So inspired by Calvin and the Reformed Confessions, in an epistemological
disputation with Lutheranism and Schleiermacher and enthused by the
'Scripture Principle', he went to work on his own thought in his lectures on
systematic theology.
The Gottingen Dogmatics
As result of his interactions with Catholic thought Barth began to be
attentive to the doctrine of the Incarnation. Tillich's inducement concerning
the symbolic Christ of culture also led to a recombination of "the distinction
of revelation and Christ's humanity."29 The 'Unconditioned" is a particular
person in Jesus ofNazareth as well as the Christ of faith. The Chalcedonian
christology is to be reaffirmed and with it the concept of the covenant. This
Barth discovered when a copy ofHeinrich Heppe's ReformedDogmatics
"fell into my hands." As he recalled in 1935:
I read, I studied, I reflected; and found that I was rewarded with
the discovery, that here at last I was in the atmosphere in which
the road by way of the Reformers to H. Scripture was a more
sensible and natural one to tread, than the atmosphere, now only
too familiar to me, of the theological literature determined by
Schleiermacher and Ritschl.30
This new concentration on Reformed orthodoxy proved to be a distanciation
from the 'dialectical' theologians ofBarth's era (especially Bultmann, Gogarten
and Tillich). It would exemplify itself in his new found rigor of systematic
thought and serve as an introduction to the covenantal theologian of the past,
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ecclesial as he observed:
Success can come only ifwe have previously learned to read
the Reformers as the Church's teachers and, with them, Scripture
as the document for the Church's existence and nature, and
therefrom to ask what Church science might be.31
The doctrine of the covenant that Heppe had proposed and Barth assessed
reveals the aforementioned complexity in Reformed theology. Heppe stood
on the theological shoulders ofCalvin, Ursinus, Olevianus and Cocceius in
regard to to covenantal theology. His motive for writing his dogmatics in 1861
resided in his attempt to convey a theological system that was correspondent
"to the spirit ofReformed Church doctrine."32 Yet there was also a polemical
side to Heppe's endeavors with his struggle for Reformed Unionism against
one of his Marburg colleagues, August Vilmar.33 Heppe held that the theological
basis for the German Reformed churches was not Calvinism but its confessional
statements. Philip Melanchthon was the authority that had combined Reformed
and Lutheran elements with his Augsburg Confession Variata. However, after
Luther's death a new faction appeared, the genuine 'Lutherans' who defied
Melanchthon's authority with literal interpretations of Luther's early writings.
The 'Diet of the Princes' in 1561 established the succession of the 'Genuine
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Heppe accepted Calvin's doctrine of predestination as the "material
principle" of his theological system.35 Yet, he also perceived a negative attitude
towards the Church, which needed to be tempered by an infralapsarian approach
over the supralapsarian. This may have contributed towards Heppe's assertion of
Covenantal theology in his dogmatics and a concentration on Cocceius.
The publication of Johannes Cocceius' (1603-1669) Summa doctrinae de
foedere et testamento Dei of 1648 demonstrated his grounding in biblical studies,
a hermeneutic based on the Word ofGod, as Jesus Christ revealed in Scripture,
"not in words alone, but from faith to faith under the illumination of the Holy
Spirit."36 However, merely reading the Bible was inadequate, "Many people put
Scripture in place of the Pope. They are orthodox a la mode."37 Responsible
exegesis, in Cocceius' view, should allow for every biblical text to "be interpreted
according to its context. . . and thus he put himself in opposition to the scholastics
and the Cartesians."38 The confessional creeds are subservient to Scripture and are
to be interpreted in light of the Bible itself. Theology as a discipline according to
Cocceius is "knowledge and speech . . . speech about God, from God, in the
presence of God, to His own glory."39 Barth went on to cite this passage in his first
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volume of the Church Dogmatics of 1932.40
For Cocceius, in contrast to the scholastic principle of predestination, the
biblical doctrine of the Covenant unifies Scripture and the history ofGod in
relation to humanity and is conferred in the "successive phases of the covenant
ofGod."41 He states that "Christian doctrine is wholly drawn together into one
stream with this particular point as a centre."42 The covenant itself exists in two
different aspects, the first being a pact between the Father and the Son, and the
other in the history between God and humanity. The first covenant in history is
established through Adam as a covenant ofworks or of nature. Because of the
Fall into the bondage of sin, the same covenant is re-ordered as a covenant of
grace that consists of a dual aspect as well~the Old Testament (which is the
prefiguration of Christ) and the New Testament (which is fulfilled in the event
ofChrist.)
Buoyed by Heppe and Cocceius, Barth delivered his lectures (which were
never intended for publication) on Reformed dogmatics in the summer term of
1924. Since the substance of these dogmatics has been well covered the focus
here will be on the exposition of the Reformed covenantal doctrine specifically.43
Barth was particularly challenged by the ramifications of covenantal doctrine,
even going so far as to cancel a lecture on De foedere at the last moment. He had
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felt that what he had written was "nonsense and dangerously false teaching."44
What Barth found most dangerous was the notion of a covenant with Adam based
on an ethical legality in the manner of Old Testament law. Cocceius's distinction
was in Barth's estimation "a fatal historical moment."45 This seemed to be a covert
Pelagianism and as such "was not to be recommended (empfehlenswerte) for the
homo paradisiacus as a possibility."46 Two covenants, one of nature (based on
works) prelapsinarian and the other (based on grace) postlapsinarian were serious
distortions of the Calvinist tradition in his judgement.
Barth's explication of the doctrine of the covenant(s), Gott UndMensch
1m Bunde in his Gottingen dogmatics, was placed before the doctrine of sin to
emphasize the prevenient character of grace given before the Fall. Barth's thesis
(Diktatsatz), (that his students were required to copy verbatim), adumbrated the
theological intention of this section that in the human situation, even as bearing
God's image, there was no material possibility (verwirklichende Moglichkeit) of
community with God in temporal existence. The promise of eternal communion
resides in the Covenant already given by God.47 This is in keeping with Barth's
notion of the dual possibility of grace itself as an indirect knowledge grounded in
the mystery of revelation, and as the dialectical revealing ofGod in Jesus Christ
as actual possibility. "The diacritical element in the whole concept is clearly the
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relation between revelation and concealment (Verborgenheit) even when we
consider the matter on the positive side."48 The 'positive side' exists in the
prior determination of God who covenants with humanity in the ordinance of
the Gnadenwahl, not in dual covenants but in one Covenant ofGrace with two
aspects, that of nature and of grace.
Barth would not go so far as to postulate a covenant of works (foedus
operurri) before the Fall. The primal essence of humanity as represented in the
status integritatis provided the implicit gift of grace bestowed to all creation
and creatures in existence. The reality ofGod's speech to humanity in the Deus
dixit affirms the possibility of revelation (even as mystery) to created humanity.
Barth noted, "Indeed, the reality of revelation belongs to the complete concept
of humankind."49 As the object ofGod's revelation, humanity discovers its
creatureliness and the boundary between the human and the divine. Bruce
McCormack speaks in this way of our Kreaturgrenze:
Creaturely existence is donated; it is a gift. Created out of nothing
like all creatures, [a] human being knows itself as poised on the
abyss of annihilation.50
Barth's discussion of the imago Dei (Gottes Ebenbild) follows Cocceius
in the "rectitudo which he explains as moral reciprocity with God in all a man's
parts, in soul of course as the hegemonikon and in the body and limbs as the










imago Dei substantialis which is the image of Christ. This is the primal image
lost in the Fall which can only be restored in the act ofGod in the establishment
of the Covenant. How do we know this if humanity is in a fallen state? If, as
Barth says, "We know ourselves only in the status corruptions, not in the status
integritatis; only in a disordered (,gestdrten) relationship to God and not in the
primal relation."52 Empirical knowledge or self-introspection will not lead to
any disclosure of this status corruptions, "Knowledge of sin, knowledge that we
are thieves (Schacher), is only in the kingdom of grace."53 Humanity is already
graced in the primordial relationship with God as created beings, available for
revelation and our ultimate destiny to be conformed to the image of Christ.
The doctrine of divine election as propounded by Barth underscores for
McCormack "the fact that everything which is said of humanity is said, not
of the human an sich but of the human as addressed by God."54 In this way the
Covenant of Grace performs the same function as predestination. In the possibility
of being addressed by God (in the event of grace) lies the reality of human essence
and definition. However, the Reformed characteristic of predestination is not an
"integral component" of Lutheran dogmatics in Barth's estimation.55 This claim
may be the basis for his criticism of Tillich in 1964, that the application of the










Karl Barth, "An Introductory Report" in Alexander J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology ofPaul
Tillich (London: Lutterworth Press, 1964) 13.
137
moment of revelation in Tillich's thought bore a resemblance to Barth's concern
towards the federal theologians (Cocceius, J. H. Heidegger , Burman) identifying
revelation in the successive divine acts of history.57 The covenantal concept
should be maintained as long as it does not "mean a historicizing of revelation"
or a denigration of the doctrine of predestination.58 Barth cites J. H. Heidegger's
definition of covenant to underscore the connection between predestination
and the foedere naturale:
God's covenant is the pact or convention ofGod with humankind
by which, in view of the eminent right He has and ofHis singular
goodness, God makes with humankind on fixed conditions a pact
of eternal life in heaven and seals it with sure signs and pledges.59
The Covenant is established (aufrichtet) by God, and God determines how
this love might be reciprocated, "it is God who acts (handelt) and is triumphant."60
Barth emphasizes the reciprocity of covenantal demands by asserting that grace
precedes gospel and what is required is a binding of the human subject to the
objective love from God for mankind. H. Heidegger is cited again for "it becomes
God to return the love of the creature who loves Him and ... He must give and
impart Himselfentirely to be enjoyed."61 What is established is the concept of
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{Bund kommt von binden).62 Behind the concept of the Covenant stands the figure
of Christ. For the Federal theologians the signum visibile of the 'tree of life'
illustrates the sacramental character of the covenant.63 Barth noted:
according to the intention (Absicht) of the Reformed Dogmatics
at this above the fall {oberhalb des Sitndenfalls) which is denoted
as a foedus naturae, the Covenant of God with mankind is not about
natural revelation, a religious apriori or such similar abstractions,
but throughout is treated as a positive revelation, in the middle of
the Old Testament stands the sacramental Christ prepared in
eschatological significance (Bedeutsamkeit).64
Bruce McCormack's observations seem pertinent that Barth's emphasis on the
sacramental Christ (the tree of life) has established one Covenant ofGrace
before the Fall. "The old Covenant theologians left the door open a crack to this
possibility by speaking of sacraments of the covenant of works and Barth has
pushed it wide open."65 In this the semi- Pelagiansim inherent in the foedus
operum is to be avoided. Christ is the first object of predestination as Barth later
asserted in the Church Dogmatics. If the sacramental symbol of the 'tree of life'
is a proof for Barth of the pre-existent and prevenient character of grace (in the
pre-existent Christ), could the Tillich's symbol of Christ as the "New Being" be
taken as an analogous concept?
Regarding Tillich in the Gottingen Dogmatics, Barth thought his theology












Unconditioned" as "hyperbole" in an attempt to "satisfy the linguistic refinement
of the declining West".67 In his discussion of the Deus Dixit, Barth cautioned that
it "is the revelation ofGod, not the epitome of eruptions of the unconditioned."68
He continued, "The self evidence of revelation is not that of the universal but
that of the particular ofGod, but still theparticular of God (Tillich!)." For Barth
then, revelation can never be fully associated with creation as "too much is at
stake for us to be able to say this even in faith."69 He re-echoed his earlier reply
to Tillich, "Revelation is not a leveling roller that sets everything, even everything
conditional as even an eminent theological thinker like P. Tillich seems to
think."70
The content of revelation starts, not in any correlational or numinous
experience but in the positing that God "is the source of all truths, the doer of the
acts, the giver of gifts."71 To posit otherwise, for Barth, would leave open the
opportunity to detach the "divine predicates from the divine subject" and give
to them "a being and glory of their own" making them idols of theological
fabrication. There can be no revelation that is not concealed as Barth averred,
for "It means the radical dedivinization of the world and nature and history,














capacity to receive the concealed revelation in the:
good pleasure of his own free grace . . . being himself the organ
and way and movement in this human activity, so that is no longer
without an object but has God himself as its object.73
The Gottingen Dogmatics laid the foundation for Barth's later christological
doctrine ofReconciliation and the Covenant of Grace posited as the "internal
presupposition and ground of creation."74 So also was the necessity of divine
initiative for any phenomenological understanding of revelation reiterated. The
scholastic research that Barth undertook appeared in the later Church Dogmatics
in the voluminous notes as background to his concepts. Barth was not finished
with the Federal theologians (especially Cocceius) though he believed that they
had seriously distorted the Calvinist tradition.75 In the end Barth was surprised
by his study of the Reformed tradition in Gottingen writing to Thurneysen:
after much racking ofmy brains and astonishment I have to finally
acknowledge that Orthodoxy is right on almost all points and to
hear myself saying things in lectures which neither as a student nor
as a Safenwil pastor would I ever have dreamed could really be so.76
However, the future held a change for Barth's circumstances; in July 1925 he
was informed that he had been appointed Professor of Dogmatics and New
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Munster: Ethics and Die christliche Dogmatic im Entwurf
In his teaching in Munster Barth became more involved in debates with
Catholic colleagues, especially the Jesuit Augustinian Erich Przywara, whose
writings he first encountered in 1923. Munster was a predominantly Catholic
city, a "nest of priests and rebaptizers" in Barth's opinion.77 He got on better
with his new colleagues on the faculty than with those Gottingen, though he
found the students a "rather rough crowd."78 Barth prepared his lectures
focusing on the scholastic thought ofAquinas and Anselm whom he found to
be "somehow certainly right."79 Stimulated by his study of these great medieval
scholastics, Barth went so far as to join a theological group that included both
lay and faculty Roman Catholics. In spite of profound misgivings concerning
the nature of grace, he found modern Catholicism in fact "closer to the
Reformers than is the Church of the Reformation insofar as it has actually and
finally become the new Protestantism." Barth went on to assert that, because of
the neo-Reformed interpretations of Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Troeltsch, if forced
"to make a choice between two evils, I should, in fact, prefer the Catholic."80
The Trinitarian and Christological doctrines were affirmed in the modern Roman
tradition therefore the substance of the Church remained intact. This openness
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writing a formal dogmatics, eventually published as Die christliche Dogmatik
im Entwurf in 1927.81
These Minister dogmatics did not deal with the doctrine of the Covenant in
any explicit manner. Barth did not get any farther than a theological prolegomena
that was concerned with the doctrine ofGod, the Trinity, Scripture and dogmatic
norms of the Church. Barth started first from the Word of God as an objective
reality not hidden in the believer's subjectivity. This starting point rejected both
the Catholic natural theology and the "religious self-consciousness characteristic
ofProtestant liberalism following Schleiermacher."82 The Word reveals the
nature of Trinitarian theology, the true grounding of theology as opposed to any
metaphysical or philosophical system. Yet there was still an existential element
in the human response to God's addressing Word in Christ: This meant that:
the hearing man is as much included (eingeschlossen) within
the concept of the Word of God as the speaking God. He is
'co-posited' with the Word in much the same manner as
Schleiermacher's God is co-posited in the feeling of absolute
dependence (schlechthinigen Abhdngigseitsgefuhl).83
Barth, however, was not going down the same path as Schleiermacher for, as
Thomas Torrance has observed, the knowledge of God is "not ofman's cognition
so much as recognition of God, not of knowledge so much as acknowledgment
81
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ofGod, in making himself known to him."84 This existential moment resided in
the actuality of the address of God to all humankind. The Word of God is not
grounded in the actuality of the response of humanity, but, like the Tree ofLife
(as a symbol of the sacramental presence ofChrist) is grounded in itself alone.
This is the Urgeschichte of God "the genuine, actual, primal history that is the
predicate of God's action in Jesus Christ" which cannot be "abstracted from
the fact ofChrist."85
The description of the agency of the Spirit re-emphasizes the character of
the Divine volition for Barth. We can only know our own "helplessness and
incapacity" in relation to God by "the positive knowledge we have through the
Spirit."86 Humanity can comprehend God only because God has first "grasped"
humanity.87 There is an ethical dimension implied here as well, for the believer,
hearing the address of God and in obedient response to grace received in this
encounter, and in the work of the Church, must go forth in relationship to other
humans. Barth was later to amplify this with his lectures on ethics in 1928 and
1929 as will be described. Furthermore, this faithful response to the gift ofGod
in the event of grace will ultimately stand as the iconic phenomenon in Barth's
mature theology.
In Die christliche Dogmatik, Barth made two overt references to Tillich.










involvement with the Berneuchener group. This "order" or "league" was a
fellowship ofGerman Christians, about three hundred strong, who later shared
deep concerns over the rise ofNazism and a suspicion that the "doctrinal rigidity
of the confessing church", under a Barthian influence, was lacking in religious
resolve to "unite all German Protestants against Hitler".88 Barth connected
Tillich and this movement with the "conscious lamentation {Jammer) over
idolatry, numbness, sedateness and alienation" found in the Church.89 Barth,
however, also had a lamentation concerning his own dogmatics as he felt that
the work was too dependent on Kierkegaard and his earlier Epistle to the Romans.
This project was a tentative effort at best in Barth's estimation for "this dogmatics
will probably have to go its solitary way, like my interpretations ofRomans eight
years ago in the field ofmodern biblical exegesis."90 There was not to be another
volume released and the rest of his lectures on dogmatics at Munster remain
unpublished. In addition, Barth had also become suspicious of the existential
movement and the influence ofMartin Heidegger's philosophy on Rudolph
Bultmann. Later, in his first volume of the Church Dogmatics, Barth was to
excise all existentialist implications from his theology, "I have excluded . . .
anything that might appear to find for theology a foundation, support, or
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removed from the 'Dialectical Theology' movement, as he stated to Bultmann
in 1930:
From my standpoint all of you, though your concern differs from
mine in different ways, represent a large scale return to the flesh
pots ofEgypt -[as] all of you—in a new way different from that of
the nineteenth century-are trying to understand faith as a human
possibility . . . and therefore you are once again surrendering
theology to philosophy.92
Barth also was to lecture on ethics in Munster for two semesters, "a voyage
beset with rocks" in his words.93 He had come under serious criticism by various
commentators (including his own brothers) on his apparent lack of interest in the
subject. These lectures were never published in Barth's lifetime and therefore
were inaccessible to his critics. What Barth feared in any system of theological
ethics was a preoccupation with casuistry as the premise or the ultimate result.
Grace preceded Law as he emphasized in his lectures in Gottingen but does
"not reverse the sense" in Nigel Biggar's estimation.94 Another factor in Barth's
reluctance to have his Munster ethics published resided in his dissatisfaction with
the 'orders of creation' that remained in these lectures.95 Nevertheless, these
lectures stand as precursors to his later formulations of ethics in the Church
Dogmatics though here the concept of covenant is only mentioned briefly.
Barth's understanding of the doctrine of the Covenant ofGrace takes on
a dual aspect in his Munster lectures. Life is God's gracious gift to his creatures
92
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and thereby humanity stands in the covenant of grace. As inheritors of the divine
promise of God because of the human reality of being addressed by God, "the
promise sets our conduct under necessity." The horizontal aspect of the Covenant
of grace is predicated on the vertical aspect of divine initiative, not as a necessity
to enable God's gracious response to us, but as our response to God:
We would not know the necessity of life and law if we did not
know the necessity of promise, if, in addition to bidding us live
and humbling us, the divine claim did not also summon us to
consider a truly better future, if it did not mean also goal,
fulfillment, and perfection.96
Later, Barth would assert the covenantal understanding of Law in contradistinction
to Calvin and Luther. The law should not be, as such, "unequivocally grouped with
the devil, sin, and reason, as it sometimes is in Luther" nor should it be seen in the
context ofGod's wrath. God in this encounter seeks to be 'ImmanueT, for "This
is love, and as God's love ... it must regarded as the thing which dominates
everything else."97 The incorporation of humanity into the household of God, to
hear the Shema as the declaration that establishes the covenant but "even as this
'hear' sounds forth, it tells us already that God has accepted us." Therefore,
election stands over command as Barth contended:
How can one really refute the statement ofCalvin that the law is
from the very outset 'graced with the covenant of free adoption'?
Is not the final point of the law, of the command of God that judges
us, God's promise, the promise of his covenant with us? Can one
hear it as command or place oneself under its judgement without
recognizing this final point which is also the first one? Are we really
mature, do we really know our accountability, so long as we do not
96





The Law is given as fulfilled promise for Barth and faith can only accept
that God's grace has been given before human response; the covenant has been
"satisfied in advance of the command under which I am placed and by which I
am judged."99 This is the love of eternal election, not in a synthetic achievement
of humanity but a "recognition of a synthesis already achieved. . in the prior
decision ofGod.100 Later, in the Church Dogmatics, Barth would attribute
human agency in faith and ethics as a "correspondence" of human response
to the prevenient divine action using the sacramental practice of baptism as
the supreme example of this concept. Ethics are to be derived from a
christological premise and not from temporal moral law. Barth stressed this
in his ethical lectures at the end of his career; "what would we know of the
covenant of grace, and ofman as God's partner in history, ifwe knew nothing
of Jesus Christ?"101 The Covenant, presaged in the Garden of Eden, has been
seen in its ultimate appearance in the event of Jesus and has therefore become
our history as well. Barth sums up the ontological moral condition in this manner:
The decision concerning his true human being was taken from all
eternity and also in time on Golgotha, long before he is ready
(or not ready) to recognize it and to honor it with his own decision.102
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Munster lectures, he went on to refine his understanding of the relationship
between theology and philosophy.
Barth's concern about the influence of philosophy on Church theology
came from two sources. One was his ongoing interaction with the Catholicism in
Munster especially with Erich Przywara and Barth's own lectures on Aquinas and
Anselm, and the other, the unabashed usage ofHeidegger's existential philosophy
by Rudolph Bultmann. The contention of the so-called 'Dialectical theologians'
followed the path of relating the symbols (or myths) ofChristianity to a perceived
mode of existence in the world. As we have seen, Barth was fundamentally
opposed to such a starting point as this was the error of Schleiermacher.
In a lecture given in Amsterdam in 1926 Barth dealt with how the Church
might proceed in relating to Culture. Barth observed that there seemed to be a
"sociological group that which is concerned with religion" ofwhich Tillich was
a part.103 For Tillich, the Church should be defined as "that sociological reality
in which the holy is supposed to be presented" and is caught up in a dialectical
relationship with the profane in culture.104 This description was inadequate
for Barth as it omitted "mention of God and his Word" as well as faith and
obedience.105 This was a "world-view" theology (or philosophy) that sought
a higher synthesis to solve the problem of God and culture, and of this Tillich
10T
Barth, "Church And Culture" in Theology and Church, 334.
104
Paul Tillich, "Church and Culture" in The Interpretation ofHistory, trans. E. L. Talmey (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936) 220.
105
Barth, "Church and Culture", 334.
149
was culpable.106 Barth asserted that the Church was not accountable to culture in
any limiting manner for "the Church is determined always to speak the first, the
proper, the essential word to culture."107 The "work of culture", for Barth, must
take its "place among the earthly signs by which the Church must make God's
goodness, his friendship for men, visible to itself and to the world."108 It seemed
that Barth opened a door that he was later to walk through in his notion of the
iconic appearing in secular parables. The Church must remain alert for these
signs, which "perhaps in many cultural achievements, announces that the
kingdom approaches." Barth, at this time, chose not to identify what these signs
might be, perhaps for fear that a natural theology might be seen in his theology.
It remained in the future for Barth to deal with any particular identities of what
these signs or "tokens" of revelation might be.
The essay of 1929 "Schicksal unci Idee" was Barth's exploration into the
problem of philosophy and theology over the concepts and boundaries of realism
and idealism. In what way then, could philosophy as an "academic discipline"
(Wissenschaft) assist or contend with theology whose self-stated starting point
was God alone? Barth noted:
Theology thus has God as its object, but only to the extent that,
as Thomas Aquinas once profoundly remarked, theology has
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For Barth, philosophers do well when they limit themselves to human thinking
and existence while the theologian must ponder the meaning ofgrace. Yet,
"Grace is imponderable (nicht rechnen), one cannot take it for oneself, it can
only be received." Theology can only exist "under the presupposition of God's
gracious miracle."110 After defining the limitations and points of departure for
both disciplines, Barth proceeded to explicate the need for both a 'realistic' and
an 'idealistic' approach to theology. The 'actual' resided in the affirmation that:
'God is'—what does that mean if not that God takes part in being?
Then of course the next proposition leads us to the idea that God
is himself being, the origin and perfection of everything that is.
In their classical form, as set forth by Thomas Aquinas, these
propositions combine with a third which can logically be regarded
as the consequence, namely, everything that is as such participates
in God. Everything that exists as mere creature in greatest dissimilarity
(Unahnlichkeit) to the Creator, yet by having being it exists in the
greatest similarity to the Creator.That is what is meant by analogia
entis.m
The 'analogy of being' was to become a very real point of contention in his
later theology especially in his interaction with Emil Brunner. Three years later,
Barth would go so far as to call this concept an " the invention of the Antichrist"
in the first volume of the Church Dogmatics.112 Barth was not against the function
of analogyper se, for one can not speak ofGod without it, rather, it was the blatant
misuse of the concept in modern theology that plagued him. What Barth was to
propose was an analogia fidei predicated on the fact that "faith has come to [the








Precisely when we describe both the conformity ofman to God that
takes place in faith and also the point of contact for the Word of God
posited in this conformity, not as an inborn or acquired property ofman
but only as the work of the actual grace of God, our only final word at
this point can be that God acts on man in His Word.113
In this experience of grace, no human "conceptual formulations as such" can give
access to the reality of God. "God is therefore given to us neither in the giveness
of history and nature nor in that of our own consciousness." Schicksal cannot
reveal God for "God distinguishes himself from fate by the fact that he is not so
much there as rather that he comes"114 To proceed otherwise would, in Urs von
Balthasar's words, "unmask the absolute presumption, the radical sinfulness of
human thought."115
Barth perceived that the tendency in idealist and realistic philosophy was
to equate reason with God (ratio sive Deus), or nature with God (natura sive Deus)
which leads to an intolerable situation.116 This predicament cannot be resolved by
a philosophical synthesis (of a Hegelian character) nor should theology appropriate
such a technique. Theology must appropriate the beginning point of a "form of
of thinking from rather than a thinking toward." Existential philosophy was
implicated in this critique as a "theosophy" for in Barth's judgement philosophy
had erred in this regard:
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of illusion when the course of self-reflection (be it ever so existentiell;
be it even the self-reflection of the 'I' addressed by the 'Thou'), they
think they can discover an ultimate word in their own sphere, when
they think they can really discover God in action through human self-
reflection.117
Whatever synthetic tertium might be produced in the course of theosophic
reflection is inadequate and would be an self-made idol, a deification of the
temporal order, or in the words ofLuther, a speculatio majestatis.n&
The solution to the impasse for Barth was to present a theology based
on the concept of covenantal election that would "be patient as well as incisive."
This would be a theology based on the humility of reception which would be
"always a matter ofGod's free grace.'"19 This is a "genuine theological dialectic"
if it is "open to this conception." Humanity has not found a way to God, God has
found a way to humanity. Election and predestination are the concepts that most
accurately defined this divine impetus. The character of confession again looms in
importance for Barth:
Not because I can demonstrate how fate is really idea, or idea really
fate, or how my synthesis of them is really God; but rather because
it has pleased God, as the one superior to the contradiction ofmy
existence and my thought, to step in for me as Revealer and Reconciler
so that I should confess him: and therefore because it has pleased
(,gefallen) God to confess himself to me.120
However, before Barth could commence on his Church Dogmatics, one more
facet of his theological epistemology remained to be stated, and the stimulus for
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declaration would come from another Scholastic source, Anselm of
Canterbury.
Fides Quaerens Intellectum
In 1930 Barth moved to the University at Bonn to take up the chair of
systematic theology vacated by Albrecht Ritschl's son, Otto. A rupture now
existed between the 'Dialectical' theologians and Barth's intention to eradicate
any existentialist concepts in his theology. This fracture led to the writing of a
book dealing with Anselm's proof for the existence of God. He was proud of his
efforts recalling in 1939 that, "I think that I wrote this with more loving care that
any other ofmy books and that... it has been the least read of all my books."121
In 1958 Barth noted that most commentators have:
completely failed to see that in this book on Anselm I am working
with a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding of that whole
process of thought that has impressed me more and more in Church
Dogmatics as the only one proper to theology.122
Hans Urs von Balthasar cited this work as the final turning point in Barth's
theology from dialectic to analogy. This "emancipation" from the "shackles of
philosophy" was a "conversion" of a "gradual process, indeed a struggle, that
lasted nearly ten years, ending at about 1930."123 McCormack has contended
that von Balthasar was mistaken about the timing ofBarth's "conversion"
placing it much earlier in the Munster dogmatics. The nature of von Balthasar's
error lay in not taking into account Barth's own word "deepening" as opposed to
121
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"conversion"in McCormack's estimation.124 In any case, whether the change in
Barth's thinking occurred decisively in his book on Anselm, or perhaps earlier
in Die christliche Dogmatik does not materially affect the his doctrine of the
Covenant. For this particular concept the Gottingen lectures on the Reformed
Confessions and the subsequent lectures on dogmatics are the starting point. I
contend that Barth became more open to the covenant of grace in this formative
period which eventually led him into the polemics with his Catholic colleagues
and his study of Aquinas and Anselm. The process may have been gradual but
the "deepening" started with Barth's radical concentration on the Reformers in
Gottingen.
Fides Quaerens Intelledum stands as the culmination of Barth's focus on
grace as the necessary starting point for theological and anthropological reflection.
In Anselm's scheme the Gratia Dei praeveniente is the ultimate consideration for
"myself to hold the faith of our redemption, by the prevenient grace of God."125
The "faith seeking understanding" is a gift from God and the Credo ut intelligam,
the summons to knowledge:
Faith . . . does not come about without something new encountering us
and happening to us from outside, nequaquam sine sui generis semine
et laboriosa cultura. Fides esse nequit sine conceptione. The seed to
be received is the 'Word ofGod' that is preached and heard; and that
it comes to us and that we have the reditudo volendi to receive it, is
grace.126
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The way to understand God is through faith and a humility before the task of
theology. Barth emphasized:
What is at stake here is not just the right way to seek God, but in
addition to God's presence, on which the whole grace of Christian
knowledge primarily depends, the encounter (Begegnung) with him
which can never be brought about by all our searching for God however
thorough it may be, although it is only to the man who seeks God with
a pure heart that this encounter comes.127
Scripture interpretation itself, i.e. the seeking of the "inner text" comes from
more than a mere hearing of reading of the "outward text" but "only by virtue
of special grace."128 Revelation is "hidden" and can only be "revealed" by an
prevenient act of God; this divine decision becomes a fundamental axiom to
Barth's epistemology. He specified that:
even here decision enters into it, not as to whether it is ratio
veritatis but whether it can be recognized as such. In the Credo
and in the Bible it is hidden and must reveal itself in order to
make itself known to us. It does this, however, only if and in
so far as the Truth, God himself, does it.129
McCormack summarizes Barth's reading of Anselm in terms of a Realdialektik.130
God cannot never be known as an object, a ding an sich, for "it is only God
himself who has a conception ofGod." Human cognition exists in the realm of













correct the presumptive illusions of human thought is to be found in the concept
of the Covenant ofGrace, the giftpar excellence.
Conclusion
Barth's explorations in the Doctrine ofGrace would lead to his mature
statement ofElection in the Church Dogmatics. In Gottingen, his academic task
prompted his serious study of the Reformed tradition and its Calvinistic derivation.
Barth's uncomfortable relationship with his Lutheran colleagues and Luther's
emphasis on "justification by faith" opened the door to a Pelagianism that Calvin
and other Federal theologians seriously contended with. Barth established the
connection with a covenantal Christology that would ultimately place Christ as
the first ground of election. In Minister, he embroiled himself in a debate with
modern philosophy that forced him to clarity and ultimately repudiate any
existentialism in his theology. The Word was to take supremacy over all human
deliberation on the nature ofGod, indeed it could not be dealt with in any salvic
manner without the acknowledgment of its character as gift. Inasmuch as God's
speech as revelation is gift, only the gracious gift ofGod could unlock its secrets.
No synthesis with culture and intellectualism would do, for they all stand under
God's judgement and have been found wanting.
The iconic locus of the covenant of grace Barth was to explicate later in his
Church Dogmatics II: The Doctrine ofGod. What was irrefutably idolic however,
was any synthetic approach from secular philosophy, even under the guise of a
analogia entis. The Idealistic tradition was the culprit in these matters for Barth:
"To put it concretely, here is where we face the temptation of seeking and finding
157
God in fate or God in idea."132 Modern philosophy be it idealistic, existential,
phenomenological and any theology in alliance with these movements could only
create an idol, a Begriffsgott. Barth's suspicion of Tillich on this score led to their
diastasis', what still was needed in Barth's theology was a proper focal point for
the covenant of grace and its manifestation in human existence. The situation in
Germany would lead him to refute any possibility of these occurring in an iconic
mode in modern culture. The Barmen Declaration would be the future testimonial
on this.
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CHAPTER 6
PAUL TILLICH: HISTORY AND DECISION
In 1924 Tillich went to the University ofMarburg replacing the ill Rudolph
Otto with whom he became a close friend. Here also he came into contact with
the existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger. As Tillich wrote later, "It took
years before I became fully aware of the impact of this encounter on my own
thinking."1 He also spent much of his teaching time asserting his own views
against his students' preoccupation with Barth and the dialectical movement
itself. Tillich, more than Barth at this particular time, would also become
preoccupied with his Socialist commitments which would ultimately lead to
his expulsion from Germany in 1932.
The aforementioned "pact" between Barth and Tillich would exemplify
itself in Tillich's expression as a 'theologian of culture.' To illustrate this, the
focus of this chapter will be on Tillich's thoughts on politics (most especially
Socialism), his understanding of contemporary culture and religion through
the concepts of'kairos' and the 'demonic' as well as his covenantal concepts of
theonomy and grace. The demonic idol ofHitler would force both Barth and
1
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Tillich to leave Germany and destroyed any sense of aparticular form of
culture manifesting the intrusion of grace. Tillich's early ideas on Religious
Socialism appeared in an article published for the 'Kairos' circle in 1923 titled
"Grundlinien des religidsen Sozialismus:Ein systematischer Entwurf" Four
major topics were considered: inner attitude, the goal, the opponent and the way
of religious socialism. Tillich made two distinctions regarding the "inner
attitud€\innere haltung), one of the "sacramental" defined as "a consciousness
of the presence of the divine" and the other, the "rational attitude that is
historically critical."2 These "tendencies" were to be synthesized in the
"prophetic form" of religious socialism.3 To avoid the distortion of "reflection,
rationalism, and political strategy", the prophetic attitude "must recognize that
the presence of the Unconditional is theprius of all conditioned action"4 This
prophetic view of history is the "kairos" from "whose concrete tensions the new
creation proceeds in which sacred import is realized in necessary form." For
Tillich at this time, this form was to be found in his concept of socialism.
The goal (Ziel) of religious socialism was to reveal the "creative syntheses
in which the eternal idea" is revealed. This synthesis is to be called 'theonomy'
that is the "unity of sacred form and sacred import in a concrete historical
Paul Tillich, "Basic Principles ofReligious Socialism" in James Luther Adams (ed.), Political Expectation
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situation."5 The concept of theonomy carries a covenantal aspect in Tillich's
thought and is an important facet of his theology especially in comparison with
Barth. I contend that theonomy described by Tillich as a "condition in which the
spiritual and social forms are filled with the import (Gehalt) of the Unconditional
as the foundation, meaning, and reality of all forms,"6 is analogous to Barth's
doctrine of the Covenant. In 1953 Barth wrote:
It can only be by way of analysis and emphasis that we maintain
that grace is not only the basis and essence, the ontological substance
of the original relationship between God and man which we have
described as the covenant between them willed and instituted and
controlled by God.7
This speaks to the divine initiative in the covenantal relationship, and the
historically conditioned human dimension is described by Barth as missionary
activity:
For in so far as the creature is the object of divine activity and the
recipient of the grace of God, it becomes ipso facto, not the means
of this grace, for grace works directly or not at all, but its witness
and herald and proclaimer.Thus even in the utter humility of its
spiritual existence it acquires an active function within the history
of the covenant. It has a mission to fulfill, or a commission to execute,
a mission or commission to its fellow-creatures.8
It is to this commission ofproclamation that Tillich's concept of theonomy










socialism. What Tillich was trying to achieve with his idea of theonomy was both
present and future oriented. Thus he declared in 1952 that, "I could say that in a
perfect theonomy the philosophical analysis of the structure of being-in-itself
would be united with a theological expression of the meaning of being for us."
This was an "eschatological vision" that however partially fulfilled exists as a
"mutual immanence of theology and philosophy" which sees "the event of Christ
as the entrance to the universal logos."9 Kenan Osborne has described Tillich's
concept of theonomy in this fashion:
Theonomy is both the fact of this presence of God at the ultimate in
all things as well as man's realization of this fact, and the reality of
this presence is presupposed prior to man's realization. Such a
theonomous reality can be the only genuine Naturbegriff, for according
to Tillich's principles nature cannot but be this way. This presence of
God at the very being of things is grace. Gratuitous creativity forms,
sustains, and directs the power, the facticity, the meaning and the
objective structure of every essence.10
In later years Tillich was to lose some of his theonomous optimism for an
equitable and socialist future. In a letter to his friend Eduard Heimann in 1958,
he posited the idea of a "hidden theonomy" without which the "autonomous side
of culture would sink into complete meaninglessness and the heteronomous side
into sheer willfulness."11 This is a very real analogue ofBarth's notion ofKrisis
in the Epistle to the Romans after World War One. Unlike Barth however, Tillich
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hopes for a new Kairos to transform German culture to a true theonomy during
the Weimar period. As Barth retreated from active socialist participation, Tillich
was an involved proponent for his brand of a theonomous religious socialism that
was to dominate his writings from 1923-1933.
Even in the more hopeful milieu of 1923 Tillich was aware that a theonomous
critique of contemporary existence would uncover that which opposed it; this force
of opposition he termed the "demonic." For the "demonic is the contradiction
(Erhebung) of unconditioned form, an eruption (schopferischen) of the irrational
ground of any realization of form that is individual and creative."12 Tillich would
explicate this concept further in the near future, but in this essay regarding
socialism the 'demonic' was characterized as "the ethos of the limitless rational
economy."13 Communities also can be permeated with the 'demonic' as Tillich
contended:
It becomes the task of religious socialism to combat sacramental
demonries in all social relations, for example, sacramental pride
and honor that destroy personality, and to sustain the form of
autonomous personality and of free community.14
Only this iconic concept of theonomy as "the new breakthrough of import" can
rectify and combat the'demonic' in Tillich's estimation and this is not the result
of human endeavour. "Rather, it is fate and grace."15 The demonic is the absolute
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point of idolatry for Tillich. This idolic situation in whatever form it manifests
itselfmust always be critiqued by the "Protestant Principle" as he was to state later.
The University ofDresden
In 1925 Tillich accepted a full professorship in religious studies at the
University ofDresden. He had drawn critical attention with the publication of his
first book entitled Die religiose Lage der Gegenwart which was in Tillich's own
judgement his first genuine success of "original impact.'"6 Written in a popular
style, the various expressions and distortions of contemporary European culture
were adumbrated as well as Tillich's notion of an attitude of "belief-ful realism."
In contrast to a belief-ful idealism which tends to "spiritualize its objects, to
regard them no longer as symbols of the ultimate or as deriving their meaning
from the Unconditioned,"belief-ful realism "forbids all trespassing over the
boundaries of experienceable reality." Since the Unconditioned is not known
by temporal reality "it follows that all religious ideas are symbolic.'"7
Tillich affirmed Barth's Neo-Reformed theology for it "lets the judgement
of the unconditionally transcendent God fall upon every attempt of culture or
religion to claim value before him.'"8 However, Tillich feared that this movement









disturbance of our days has ceased . . ,"19 Barth's retreat from active socialist
politics had not gone unnoticed by Tillich who felt that the Kairos and the attitude
of "belief-ful realism" had "shaken to the foundations" all the "social and
economic order of capitalism" and stood as a "negation of every kind of
romanticism and utopianism."20 Tillich concluded his work with this call for
involved socialist commitment:
One thing however must be remembered in connection with all
these observations: they can have meaning only for those who are
themselves engaged in the movement and for them they are not only
meaningful but also full of responsibility. Such men are not permitted
to stand aloof as non-participating observers, but it is demanded of
them that they think and speak about the religious situation of the
present with the unconditioned, active responsibility.21
Tillich's next essay Religionsphilosophie was critiqued by the reviewer
Emanuel Hirsch as "one of the most mature accomplishments of recent German
systematic philosophy."22 Tillich outlined his thesis from the contention that there
is "a tension between every synthesis and the Unconditioned which constitutes its
meaning or import."23 Religion is therefore paradoxical as the Unconditional can
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subject and object and stands above the temporal order. Once again the demonic
is acknowledged acting as a dialectic with the creative impulse of the divine.
Correspondingly, the icon of the theonomy of grace stands in opposition to the
pervasive influence of the demonic in all its forms. In his comparison of the
secular and the sacred spheres (Das Heilige und das Profane), Tillich claimed:
Theonomy itself uncovers and identifies (durchschaut) the paradoxical
character of the Holy and of ecstasy, the inner transcending character,
the quality of breaking through immediate forms and of interpreting
them symbolically. As against both supernaturalism and idealism it
thus achieves the insight that the state of holiness is grace, and not a
supernatural sphere, but also not a merely natural ideal demand
(.Forderung). Grace is always a paradox; it breaks through the
immediate form but has no form of its own.24
Both the demonic and the paradox of grace exist in the sphere of the Holy:
The difference, however, is this, that grace breaks through the form as
both an acknowledgment (.Anerkennung) of the form and an affirmation
of (Bejahung) the unconditional form, whereas the demonic does not
submit (beugt) to the unconditional form.25
This synthesis Tillich described as the essence of a "religion of grace, or "a
religion of paradox."26 Its sacramental character produces "a symbol that brings
to full expression the religious paradox: the symbol of the divine mediator."27
The symbolic nature of Tillich's thought would generate his notion of Christ as
24 Paul Tillich, "The Philosophy of Religion" in James Luther Adams (ed.) What Is Religion? (New York:
Harper & Row, 1969) 83-84. German text in Paul Tillich, Writings in the Philosophy ofReligion, ed. J
Clayton (Berlin: De Gruyter-Evangelische Verlagswerk, 1987) 117-170.
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the "New Being", a symbol that Barth would have great difficulty in accepting and
raised a barrier between the two that would never be broken down theologically.
At this point Tillich's christology was still a work in process though Barth had
suspicions about its direction as early as 1923 as we have seen. Grace, for Tillich,
was "the correlate of revelation in the practical sphere."28 The summation of his
philosophy of religion resided in the essence of "belief-ful" activity that would
demonstrate:
The union with the Unconditional, the apprehension (Erfassung) of its
gracious presence, which is the ecstatic fulfillment in sacramentalism
and personal obedience in theocracy, becomes in the religion of paradox
spiritual love, the synthesis of ecstasy and obedience.29
In short, the horizontal demands of a covenantal obedience are prompted by the gift
of grace that comes from beyond.
Tillich continued his explication of the demonic in his essay of 1926. Setting
this concept in the history of philosophy as a whole, he sets out Dostoevsky's
character of the "Grand Inquisitor" as the "symbol most impressive for our time"
as it is opposed to Christ:
the religion which makes itself absolute and therefore must destroy
the saint in whose name it is established—the demonic will to power
of the sacred institution.30
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embracing form, which unites in itself a formative and a form-destroying element,
and therewith affirms something contra-positive." The "metaphysical essence" of
the demonic is to be understood "through an analysis of the basic relationship to
existence" i.e. "the depth in things."31 This Tillich describes as the "abyss" which
is not "exhausted in the form of things" but rather that "Every one of our relations
in existence, however, suggests that it is directed to something, which, despite its
finiteness, shares the inexhaustibilty of existence." The concept of the "abyss" is
taken from the theosophy of Jacob Boehme (an influence on Schelling) who Tillich
felt was worth recovery for modern theology:
IfProtestant theology wants to penetrate the ontological implications
of the Christian symbols, it would do well to use the ideas of Boehme
more than those ofAristotle. In contrast to the actuspurus ofAristotle,
Boehme tried to describe in metaphysical-psychological symbols the
living God in whom the roots of every life must be sought.32
For Boehme the "Urgrund" or "abyss" in God allows the existence of the demonic;
"The Unground is that depth in God unknown by humans and not fully known even
by God: It is God as 'No-nature.'"33 This internal dialectic, or 'meonic' element
characterizes the nature of the living God in Boehme's thought. Tillich appropriated
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a "sacred void" and "the infinity ofmeaning."34 How then is the concept of the
Demonic related to grace? Tillich averred that the demonic is fulfilled and selects
as the "most prominent object" of its destruction the personality "for it is the
bearer of form in its totality and unconditioned character."35 This demonic assault
puts the personality into a state of "possession" in the "cleavage of consciousness."
The "state of grace" is the correlative conquest of the demonic "which the free,
rational, synthetic consciousness does not achieve."36 Tillich went on to explain
further:
The paradox of the possessed state is as strong as the paradox of the
state of grace: the one is as little to be explained as the other by casual
thinking by categories of rational observation of nature. The difference
is only that in the state of grace the same forces are united with the
highest form which contradict the highest form in the possessed state.
Therefore grace has a fulfilling and form-creating effect on the bearer
of the form, while demonry has the consequence of destroying the
personality through the robbing it of being and emptying it of meaning. 37
The conquest of the demonic occurs as "the divinity takes the demonic destruction
upon itself."38 Tillich saw that the Christological and Trinitarian disputes of the
early Church were attempts to "ward off' the influence of the demonic. The
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negation of every existence" allows for the possibility of a "concrete reality united
with man" that also preserves the character of the unconditioned. These concepts
lie at the very core of Tillich's christology yet to be dogmatically formulated. But
the implication of divine initiative was made clear for "Demonry breaks down only
before divinity, the possessed state before the state of grace, the destructive before
redeeming fate."39 Although the demonic exerted a strong influence in the course
of human history, its fate was sealed by the incamational appearance of the Logos
which had entered into time and revealed its "inner infinity."40 Insofar as the Kairos
reveals the Logos it also reveals the reality of grace.
In 1926 Tillich also published an article entitled "Denker der Zeit:Karl Barth"
a survey of the Barthian movement, its origins and its influence on modern German
theology.41 Tillich reiterated that the significance of the dialectical movement had
been established with the publication ofBarth's first edition ofDer Romerbrief,
a "landmark" (Markstein) in Evangelical theology.42 Kierkegaard's "strong"
influence on Barth was noted, and both the Church and the Socialist polity were
placed under judgement of the eternal over the temporal. Tillich wrote:
The established 'No', which of God over the world has been spoken,
39
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the powerful proclamation ofjudgement, the crisis, has occurred in
its utmost paradoxical form, the breaking in (eingebracht) in the trend
(.Richtung) named 'Dialectical Theology'. It alone is fulfilling itself as
the heir (Erbe) ofReformation thought. . ,43
The "majesty" ofCalvin's theological thought seemed to be the strength of Barth's
position in Tillich's estimation.44 Between God and human existence is found a
great cavity, der Hohlraum, that reminds us of our creatureliness and the infinite
transcendence of the God we cannot know. Religion itself betrays this separation
as it is an "affair {Stuck) of human history, a human possibility."45 Only faith, not
intuition, derivation, experience or knowledge, can grasp the "astonishment"
(Uberraschende) of the paradox of revelation.
It is faith, therefore a discontinuity (Sprung), a wager (Wagnis), yes,
better still an attitude (Verhalten), that is not our attitude, for it does
not originate (entspricht) in human possibility, because it rests outside
our reality (Wirklichkeit).46
This description carries the implication ofMarion's "saturated phenomenon", that
which overcomes the rational but incomplete human cognition with the reality of
the gift, which comes from without. In summary, the Barthian movement for
Tillich belongs "to the great events ofProtestant theology", an attitude he was to














Tillich further described his understanding of the relationship between faith
and grace in an article of 1928, "Uber gldubigen Realismus." Here Tillich posits a
"self-transcending realism" which carries a "universal attitude toward reality" that
has two elements; an "emphasis on the real and the transcending power of faith."48
Reality is then seen as something new and even "transparent" i.e., "theonomous."49
The ultimate power that grounds every human existence grasps us in the experience
of faith, acting as both the "crisis" ofjudgement and the healing power of grace.
"Neither crisis nor grace is in our reach, neither grace nor crisis is beyond possible
experience"50 However, only crisis unified with grace allows the judgement to be
perceived in the "religious sense." Historical realism then becomes possible in the
sphere of the self-transcendent and seeks to make contemporary that which is past
in revelation, the event of Christ. Tillich had accepted the methodology of historical
criticism and stated that "there is no way ofmeeting the 'historical Jesus' (i.e., the
product of historical criticism) because the Jesus ofwhom we have reports was from
the very beginning the 'Christ ofFaith'." Barth had taken exception to this premise
already and Tillich continued to further exacerbate the rupture between them in
suggesting that:
Self-transcending realism requires the criticism of all forms of supra-
naturalism in the sense of a theology that imagines a supra-natural
48






world beside or above a natural one, a world in which the unconditional
finds a local habitation, thus making God a transcendent object, the
creation an act at the beginning of time, the consummation a future state
of things.51
Tillich's commitment to the discourse of the academy and the secular world would
not allow a 'supra-natural' move as in the manner of Barth. This aporia would
manifest itself later in the polemic between Barth and Brunner as well as isolating
Tillich from the realm of the Barthian neo-orthodoxy. But, as yet, Tillich had not
fully explicated his christology and its relation to the gestalt of grace.
The University of Frankfurt
In March of 1929, Tillich resigned from the University of Dresden (which had
failed to receive accreditation) and accepted the post of Professor ofPhilosophy and
Sociology. The college was considered progressive, employed an extensive Jewish
faculty and was known as the "red university."52 Tillich received a large salary that
was guaranteed and not predicated on the number of students in his classes. He was
allowed to teach precisely what he wished and received a sizable housing allowance
suitable for living in either the city or suburbs surrounded by the Taunus hills. For
Tillich it was a dream come true. He was to teach courses in social education
concerning ethics, historical action and political direction as well as seminars on








course in systematic theology in his last semester there.
Tillich's tenure in Frankfurt brought both success and difficulty. His reputation
as a teacher was legendary and his personal interest in the intellectual development
of his students profound.54 Among his students was the philosopher-sociologist
Theodor Adorno who wrote his dissertation on the aesthetics ofKierkegaard under
Tillich's supervision. Along with Max Horkheimer, Adorno was to found the
Institute of Social Research ofwhat was later known as the Frankfurt School.55
Tillich's exposure to other renown faculty members especially Kurt Goldstein and
Adhemar Gelb introduced him to the burgeoning Gestalt therapy school and
provided insights into organic and inorganic biology. Adolf Lowe, Karl Mannheim
and Friedrich Pollock stimulated Tillich's understanding of economics as well.
Even though Tillich was the only theologian in the school, a singular position as a
Christian teaching philosophy in a secular University, his interactions with his
academic colleagues and openess to new forms of thought would serve him well in
the future.
Tillich's introductory address at Frankfurt, Philosophic undSchicksal, dealt
with the philosophical treatment of "fate" as "transcendent necessity in which
54
See Pauck, Tillich, 110-138 and Terence O'Keeffe, "Tillich and the Frankfurt School in Theonomy and
Autonomy, 67-87 for a description of Tillich's Frankfurt years.
55
For a detailed history of the this School, see RolfWiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History,
Theories and Political Significance, trans. M. Robertson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.)
174
[human] freedom is entangled (verflochten)."56 Similar to Barth's Schicksal unci
Idee in der Theologie of the same year,57 Tillich outlined the history of philosophy
and its attempt to postulate an idea of truth that stands outside of a human
"demonically controlled (beherrschte) existence." Greek philosophy was able to
suppress the "Power of fate" but not "eliminate" (beseitigte) it. Since certainty
could not be found in philosophical endeavour, the threat of a demonic fate forced
reflective thought to reach out for a "saving (rettendem) fate-for 'grace'."58 This
redemptive grace places a "positive valuation" on existence that "brings salvation
in time and history [and] subdues a demonic fate which denies the new in
history."59 Philosophy, in and of itself, cannot reach a point "at which either logos
or kairos alone is to be found."60 Philosophy as a human construct is constricted
by fate as Tillich asserted:
Fate obtrudes (betrifft) even into the sacred inclosure (Vorhof) of
philosophy, into the truth itself, and it stops only before the holy
of holies. It stops only before the certainty that fate is divine and
not demonic, that it is meaning-fulfilling (sinnerfiillend) and not
meaning-destroying (sinnzerstorend).61
Is Tillich guilty ofBarth's fear of the mixophilosophicotheologia (Abraham
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Calov) i.e., "the mixture of philosophy and theology which, at present, seems to
make such a tremendous impression upon many as the newest thing under the
sun?"62 One contemporary assessment stresses that the linguistic differences
between the two stems from their distinctive religious traditions:
Barth cannot locate himselfwithin either philosophical camp
[realist or idealist] on principle, but insofar as a theology makes
use of philosophy and leans towards either a realist or idealist
orientation, he finds himself with Augustine and with Zwingli
and Calvin whose 'idealism' stood in relative opposition to the
'realism' ofLuther and Melanchthon.63
This is undoubtedly correct but it might also be added that the apologetic and
kerygmatic intent ofTillich and Barth decisively altered their respective assertions
concerning the nature of grace as inherited from their respective Lutheran and
Calvinistic backgrounds. Grace is the sine qua non for Barth's theology of the
Church as Tillich's Gestalt is the prophetic dimension of grace at work in the
world. This conception was to be the basis for Tillich's articles "The Formative
Power of Protestantism" published in Religiose Verwirklichung and "Protestantism
as a Critical and Creative Principle" both published in 1929 as well. In these two
essays Tillich spells out his understanding of the "Gestalt ofGrace" in detail and
provides important insights into what Tillich was attempting to establish concerning
the prophetic import of grace itself.
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In the first essay, Tillich was seeking to provide a new 'form' for modern
Protestantism to take after the manner of a Gestaltung referring to "the total
structure of living reality."64 Tillich saw the need for a synthetic Gestalt that
unites the protest with a creative Yes.65 The "Theology ofCrisis" movement
had taken a "dangerous turn" in his estimation. "It seems as ifBarth and his
followers, in a good orthodox style, are interested only in the form of doctrine
in Protestantism." This preoccupation with doctrine had not been affected by the
'No' of the Protestant principle as "it had not passed through the fire of its own
protest."66 The new form of the self-realization of Protestantism was to be found
in a new authority that "participates in the infinite, in the unconditional, in a
trans-human authority" the "reality of grace." Tillich elaborated:
Grace-embodied, reality of grace, Gestalt of grace-all these sound
strange and dangerous for Protestants. 'Grace' is supposed to be
something intangible and unsubstantial, while 'embodiment' and
'Gestalf seem to point to something that can be grasped and touched.67
Tillich, of course, realized that this characterization of grace had become a legalism
in Catholic sacramentalism. Yet, the polemics of the Reformation were finished and
"we are able to decide in terms of principles and not of controversy" in his opinion.
Tillich named the center ofProtestant doctrine the "divine structure of reality" i.e.,
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faith. The divine initiative was stressed again by Tillich as he wrote:
Faith is the Faith ofman. It does not come from man, but is effective
in man. And in so far as faith is in a community or personality, they
are embodiments of grace. Faith is created by the hearing of the 'Word.'
The Word is said from beyond us, to us. But, if it is received, it is no
longer only transcendent. It is also immanent, creating a divine structure
of reality.68
The 'embodiment' of grace is manifested in the immanental character of its
existence in the world, "permanently actual in history—though they [the structures
of grace] do not derive from history—if in any moment of history the Word is to be
pronounced." The prophetic nature of grace itself creates faith, not just a "human
act of subjection to a report about grace." For Tillich, this distinction was critical
as the authority of faith then is grounded in the power of the unconditional and not
rooted in the objective knowledge ofmere intellectual assent. "Grace is preached
and faith is created."69 However, more than mere words about grace and faith were
to be proclaimed, as the 'divine Word' in Jesus as the Christ must be the basis of
all attestation.
Tillich was afraid that the so-called "theology of the word" would confuse
doctrine with the proclamation of the totality of the Christ-event. He explained:
Ifwe say that his total being and not merely his words (or words about
him) is the Word ofGod, we are saying that the reality of grace and not








True Christian proclamation was to not only speak about the reality of grace as
"an expression ofthis reality, not detached from their object but grasped by it."
The authority of the biblical word is grounded in the "New Testament picture of
Jesus as the Christ" which is open to a "nonsensuous intuition." Tillich's opaque
expressionist rhetoric is employed here in the statement that "we might say that a
Gestalt of grace is a possible object of'imaginative intuition.' Furthermore, the
"transcendent meaning of a finite reality is not an abstract concept but a matter
of imaginative perception."71
For Tillich, the purview of this "imaginative perception" is an engagement
of both critique and being critiqued by secular culture. The "eternal element" of
the Protestant Gestalt is to be expressed "in relation to a present situation."72 The
imaginative assertion of grace must be expressed as "daring and risk" without a
surrender of the transcendent origin and character of grace. Tillich explained:
A daring act is demanded, an act that penetrates to the deepest level
of reality, to its transcendent ground. Such an act is what in the religious
tradition is called 'faith' and what we have called a 'belief-ful' or 'self-
transcending realism.'73
The covenantal aspects of the Gestalt of grace are to be exemplified in the response
to the otherperson in ethical respect and fidelity. Barth would emphasize the








stress the social dimension of ethical behavior in the realm of politics as would be
demonstrated in the future.
Barth objected to Tillich's methodology in his first volume of the Dogmatics.
Citing Tillich's statement from "Nature and Sacrament" of a distinction in the
"human cleavage between sacramentalism, daemonism and secular exorcism"74,
Barth perceived the danger ofTillich's over-estimation of the influence of positive
grace in secular society and culture. Barth wrote that, although "God was not bound
to the historical Church", there remained a qualitative distinction between their
respective approaches. The fact remained for Barth that:
the antithesis between Church and society can be a symptom of the
divine distinction, and a pointer to its truth, not in the abstract equality
but in the concrete inequality of the two sides.75
The judgement ofGod "casts a shadow before in the event of this provisional
distinction in which man is at work." At this juncture in Barth's early theology,
God could not be confined or even found in human cultural expression in any
revelatory or redemptive fashion. He felt that Tillich was critiquing the Church
from the 'outside' and this ultimately made Tillich's theology "irrelevant." Barth
contended:
A philosophy of culture may very well reflect upon other things,
including an 'unconditioned' or a 'far side of being' discerned
elsewhere than in the command [to the Church], But it must not
imagine that in so doing it has even touched the task of theology.
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Barth wryly noted however, that "God may speak to us through Russian
Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub, or a dead dog."76 But only
the Church in its preaching and the practice of the sacraments has the special
commission to "decisively talk about God to men and for them."77 The Church's
preaching was not to be "controlled" or "guided" by anything but "the exposition
of Scripture."78 Barth associated Tillich's "sacramental situation" as an equivalency
to proclamation "that successfully reaches the depth of our own undivided, pre-
objective being" which would be, in effect, humanity "only conversing with
itself."79 In sum, Barth thought that Tillich's criticisms were a rather "naive
polemic."80 He wrote further:
One must give him credit that in what he says he has in view
proclamation of the Word of God. But, if so, are not all his
proposals mere naiveties compared to which it is perhaps much
more realistic to stick now as always to the direct proclamation
of the Bible and tradition?81
Tillich's "negations or delimitations ofman" cannot "even produce the Word of
God for him or ourselves." Both theologians were on different tracks regarding














ofwriting together with their own over-assertions concerning each other's notions,
separated them in emphasis but not in material content over the nature of grace.
Tillich further illustrated his prophetic notion of grace in an important essay
of 1929, Protestantism as a Critical and Creative Principle. Prophetic criticism
"stands beyond life" even as it "brings life into question."82 In this respect it is
quite similar to dialectical theology in that it also proclaims that which is "beyond
both being and spirit." However, dialectical theology was "limited" in that it
"overlooked the indissoluble relationship between the theological ideal and all
other ideals."83 This, in effect, had weakened its critique of other cultural domains,
"for example, the criticism that had been advanced by 'religious socialism', and
therefore to strengthen the existing fonns and powers of the secular life."84 Barth
thought just the opposite arguing that:
If there is really a prophetic view and interpretation of the opposition
which the Church needs directly or indirectly from the world, if it
is really God's diction which the Church thinks it sees in this
'contradiction', then in any circumstances what [it] has to glean from
it can only be a demand for this conscientious concentration on its own
business.85
Tillich continued on to claim that prophetic criticism finds its "fulfillment in a
sphere that stands beyond the critical situation. This is expressed in the word
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'grace'."86 This notion of grace is therefore, "the presupposition ofprophetic
• • • 95R7
criticism.
A comparison between the Gestaltung of the criticism, both in concrete
form and in the abstract, led to Tillich's own evaluation of the Kantian form of
rationalism. He considered it "inappropriate" (unangemessen) to "establish any
especially intimate (besonders) relation between this form of criticism" and that
of Protestantism. This would allow Protestantism to once again withdraw "from
the concrete decision of the Kairos and thus in actuality make a decision for the
status quo."88 This seemed to be the problem with dialectical theology with
"Brunner among others" the chief suspects. Tillich elaborated by stating that if
Kant is chosen as the "creator of criticism" then the absurd situation would arise
whereby "everything is criticized" and "then in principle nothing is criticized; and
what already is enjoys an advantage that remains unquestioned." Kantian criticism
had its origins "in a form that actually destroys all form."89 The only way that
prophetic criticism could unite with rational criticism lay in the "possibility of
appropriating (aufzunehmen) the concrete ideal."90 But this was to "presuppose
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The Gestalt of grace provides the ground of this transcendent notion which
"must belong to reality." But grace cannot be perceived as the "highest perfection"
of the rational, nor can it be seen as "something objective because it is present."
The over objectivizing of the jus divinum ofCatholicism or the "demand" of
Protestant orthodoxy regarding Scripture or 'pure doctrine', "should be
suppressed as blasphemous and culpable." Tillich judged that dialectical theology
had "demanded" that it was necessary to give up the whole notion of the form of
grace. Dialectical theology spoke of the 'Holy Spirit' but this necessarily includes
the Gestalt of grace for "This idea is unavoidable, for it is the presupposition of
any criticism uttered with ultimate power and authority (as the word of God)."
The eschatological dimension of grace Tillich defined as "anticipation" that
is "a temporal image of a perfect consummation that is coming." That which is
coming "cannot yet be appropriated" and in this agreed with Barth's eschatological
views on I Corinthians 13. Yet, Tillich thought that Barth "overlooks the fact that
the discussion of eschatological fulfillment is possible only by 'anticipation'
through the form of grace."92 Tillich went on to claim that "in every living form
a hidden form of grace ... is identical with its power to be." The Gestalt of grace
appears, not in the essence of living existence, but where the conflict between






all forms is directed."93 In this way autonomy is subdued by a theonomy of grace.
To avoid being objectified, grace in its historical manifestations must "itself
be subjected to criticism." Tillich believed that modern Protestantism had only
undertaken a negative critique in the "rejection of the Catholic objectification
of grace and of the autonomous secularization of it."94 Scripture was "viewed
as a perfect union of prophetic criticism and of religious form." However, a
literalistic interpretation of the biblical witness led to a "new objectification"
and the"symbolic character of Scripture as an anticipation of the form of grace
was not appreciated."95 For Tillich it may be presumed the biblical doctrine of
the Covenant, understood in an over-literalistic manner, would objectify grace to
a mere forensic Gestalt and lose its representative validity. Defining the symbolic
character of religious language would occupy Tillich in the future as will be
illustrated. At this juncture in his thought, Tillich was still seeking to explicate an
icon of grace that would maintain the nature of its own reality and not be weakened
by its own character as prophetic criticism. His doctrine of the Kairos attempted to
make clear the locus of the Gestalt of grace.
The supreme example of the moment of historical Kairos "is expressed in








beginning and end, meaning and purpose of history are constituted."96 Faith
affirms whether history is a history of salvation in Tillich's estimation. If so,
Christology becomes the "definition and description" of the center of history, and
is the "basis on which the interpretation of history rests."97 In the claim that Christ
is the center of history, Christianity "considers apersonal life which is completely
determined by its relation to God, the principal meaning in history."9* This
consideration of a personal life would play a definite role in Tillich's concept of
the New Being in his later systematics. Christ, as the center of history, conquers
the ambiguity of time and the meaninglessness of existence. Tillich explained:
Therefore being grasped by the center of history means being
grasped without limitations and conditions, by an absolute power.
The fate in which we are grasped by a center of history in such a
way is named 'predestination' in religious terminology; the
decision in which we grasp that which grasps us, is named 'faith'.99
Grace, Christology, divine initiative and the doctrine of election are all implied
in this statement, which are the main subjects of theology for Tillich. Like Barth,
he saw the danger of "humanistic attempts to draw Christ into the realm of
universal or highest humanity; that is, to make him a representative of human
possibilities." This was the error of Schleiermacher and the German idealist
theologians and both Barth and Tillich recognized the danger of reducing Christ
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to "arbitrariness and ambiguity."100
To avoid this peril the unconditioned meaning must be seen "not as demand
but as an existent" fulfilled in the "sacramental reality" of Christ "in which the holy
is grace and present, not only demand and future."101 The power and authority
ofChrist comes from more than just "His theoretical knowledge or from His
prophetic inspiration" but through "a faculty ofmaking people participate in His
powerful existence."102 Compare this with Tillich's later assertion in his Systematic
Theology, "By analogy, one must say that participation, not historical argument,
guarantees the reality of the event on which Christianity is based."103 The
"transforming power of the New Being in Jesus Christ"104 is the ultimate guarantor
in Tillich's schema. Modern Christology then, must concern itself with the
transforming power of the moment ofKairos as the form of grace which "gives
us an expectation of an eternal future in which meaninglessness is conquered."105
Tillich was on the way to his complete understanding of the character of Christ,
however, the full exposition of his christology still remained to be worked out in
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its ramifications in Tillich's personal life were to remain center stage.
The Socialist Decision
The rise of the National Socialists led by Adolph Hitler in the 1920s and early
thirties became the scourge of religious Germans everywhere. While neither Barth
or Tillich thought that they would face any problems from this regime at the time,
their socialist viewpoints put them on a direct collision course with the Nazi
government when it took complete power in 1933. As the economic and political
situation deteriorated Tillich and most of his colleagues joined the Social
Democratic Party, though he was never an enthusiastic or overly active member.
Tillich also became a contributor to the magazine, Neue Blatterfur den Sozialismus,
edited by August Rathmann. Tillich had a dream in 1931 that, as he told his friends,
"You will all see sheep grazing on the Potsdamer Platz one day." His prophetic
dream was to come true, for fifteen years later after the bombing ofBerlin, a
photograph was published in a New York newspaper showing that very thing.106
As the situation became worse, Tillich became so exasperated with the
ineffectiveness ofChristians to stand up to the Nazi tyranny that when asked once
by his friends, "Professor, can you tell us whether there are any Christians in the
world any more?", he shouted in reply, "No, not a single one. The only Christians





lead to his dismissal from Frankfurt and his emigrating to the United States as
a political refugee in the very near future. As it was the shared destiny for both
Barth and Tillich to be forced to leave Germany in the 1930s, a comparison of
their political thoughts and involvements is necessary to understand their respective
ideas about covenant and grace and the way it could manifest itself in the current
situation.
While Tillich railed against the rise of the Nazi Party and was having
nightmares over Germany's future, Barth seemed not to take the situation as
seriously. After Hitler became the Reich's chancellor in 1933, for example,
Barth wrote his mother that he did not believe "this signified the beginning of
great news in any particular direction." Furthermore Germany was "a body
inwardly and outwardly much too heavy to be moved or changed through such
movements."108 Barth was not totally oblivious to the chaotic situation when he
likened German politics to "sitting in a car which is driven by a man who is either
incompetent or drunk."109 Barth was critical ofNational Socialism's anti-Semitism
and its idea of a 'master race' because it threatened democracy. 110 Barth's Swiss
nationality may have been a factor that prevented him from estimating the ultimate
threat ofNazism but it never prevented him from overt dissidence against its
injustices. The Barmen Declaration had demonstrated this admirably, but by the
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time of its writing, Tillich had already left Germany.
Tillich's equivalent declaration against the National Socialists appeared in ten
theses published in a book sent to Hitler entitled Die Kirche und das Dritte Reich of
1932. It was subsequently condemned by J. Stark, a professor ofHitler's, with these
words:
The book I question affords a valuable commentary on the intellectual
level of numerous 'evangelical' theologians. Never have I seen such an
accumulation of ignorance, superficiality, presumption and malicious
enmity to the German Freedom Movement.111
The same year a disturbing incident brought Tillich into the forefront of anti-Nazi
dissidence. In July of that year fighting broke out between Nazi students, Storm
troopers, left-wing and Jewish students. Bloodshed ensued and Tillich reverted to
his World War One experience of bringing in the wounded to safety. Enraged by
the incident Tillich made a public speech in defense of the students and demanded
that the Nazi students be expelled from Frankfurt University.112 Later, Tillich
wrote this concerning Hitler:
At the time of our emigration it was not so much his tyranny and
brutality which shocked us, but the unimaginably low level of his
cultural expressions. We suddenly realized that if Hitler could be
produced by German culture, something must be wrong with this
culture.113
The "Ten Theses" were intended for the Church and expressed Tillich's fears
111







about the syncretism practiced by German Protestantism and the Nazi movement.
By "opening itself up" to National Socialism and rejecting Socialism, Tillich felt
that Protestantism was "going to betray its commission to the world." In giving up
its "consecration ofGod-given authority" Protestantism actually "promotes the
perpetuation of class conflict." Furthermore, "Protestantism must prove its
prophetic-Christian character by setting the Christianity of the cross against the
paganism of the swastika."114 Any joint suppression of Socialism and Catholicism
"will lead to future disintegration of German Protestantism."115 Such were the
stakes for religion in Tillich's mind at this time. In the writing of his next book
the die would be cast concerning his future as a professor in Germany.
Die sozialistische Entscheidung published in 1933, has been described by
one commentator as his "most creative political philosophy." Tillich was warned
by Max Horkheimer that "certain sentences in the manuscript could cost him his
life."116 In fact, two months after its publication Tillich was dismissed from the
University ofFrankfurt as a political dissident. He was, in his own words, trying
to "lay bare the anthropocentric roots and political consequences of nationalism."
Tillich's experiences of the First World War had revealed "the demonic and
destructive character of the national will to power, particularly for those who
went to war enthusiastically and with a firm belief in the justice of their national
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cause."117 Firmly convinced that war would occur again under the Hitler's regime,
Tillich issued his strongest critique yet of the Nazis branding them as "enemies of
socialism." The Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie as a group with
"the word socialism" in its name "must be brought to a real socialist decision"
as they "threaten the future of the nation and ofWestern civilization."118 With
such an indictment of the Reich government it is no wonder that Tillich's book
was condemned and burned by the Nazi authorities.
The Socialist Decision claimed that "The salvation ofEuropean societyfrom
a return to barbarism lies in the hands ofsocialism,"119 Nazism is described as a
"revolutionary form of political romanticism" that presents a distorted reading
of the mythical concepts of origin, blood, soil and nation.120 The National Socialist
movement had co-opted these concepts and imbued them with a flavour of the
sacred and deceived German Christianity into thinking that the Nazis were
protecting religion. But religious truth and personal salvation were not the issues,
"What is sacred to them is the nation, its freedom and power." It was a deception,
Tillich alleged:
The genuflection of the National Socialist party before the Protestant
churches, therefore, does not signify that a secular movement here is
117
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seeking an arena in which to place itself under the judgement of the
unconditional demand.121
Catholicism with its structure and hierarchy seemed able to withstand the
Nazi incursions, while Protestantism was more vulnerable to 'leading groups'
and its proclamation is "either accommodated {anpafit) to the demands of the
ruling groups, or else becomes so transcendent that it allows the social forces to
work unhindered, and thereby serves their interests. (Interesse}"122 The present
reality of the political and social situation could provide no adequacy or security.
Socialism, as a movement, must accept the fact that "disharmony" is the reality and
therefore "must direct its faith toward a future that stands in complete contradiction
to the present." Transcendent and immanent expectation is the revolutionary energy
needed for socialism in a dialectical manner. Tillich contended that, "Ifsocialism
expects the coming ofa harmonious world, it must reckon with a leap that can in no
way be explained in terms ofpresent reality." It would then be prophetic in its
proclamation once again in the "expectation of a new being."123 The "new being'
here was not identified in Jesus Christ explicitly as it would be in Tillich's later
theological writings.
The elements found in the 'socialist principle" were grounded in "the power
of the origin, the shattering ofthe belief in harmony, and an emphasis on the
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demand,"124 The three elements are to be combined within the concept of
"expectation"(Erwartung) providing a symbol to "the socialist principle and
the power it contains."125 In this way then, socialism stands against the autonomy
of the "self-sufficient world." In Tillich's description "expectation is tension
(<Spannung) with a forward aim (Richtung)" directing itself "towards what is not
now, but shall be, towards something unconditionally new that never has been but
is in the making."126 Conservative Christianity altered the prophetic element by
"attempting to refer humanity'sfinal expectation to the destiny of the individual
souF, a severance from historical destiny, i.e., "the transformation (Umwandlung)
of the world."127
This statement sums up Tillich's criticism of Barth's 'supranationalism' as
it separated the believers out from the world, where they could neither see the
manifestation of the unconditioned in culture, nor influence the destiny of culture
by being able to shape it in any material way. Expectation included action (Tat)
for Tillich, a realization through human activity of that "which will come to pass,
and, insofar as it will come, it is not dependent on human activity (Tun)" The
activity of human response to the that which will come is the response to the










unconditioned. Tillich finished with these powerful words:
Only expectation can triumph over the death now threatening
Western civilization through the resurgence ofthe myth oforigin.
And expectation is the symbol ofsocialism.128
Conclusion
On April 13, 1933, Tillich's name appeared on a list of intellectuals to be
'purged' along with others from the Frankfurt faculty including Horkheimer.
He was given one more chance to retain a professorship in Berlin if he would
withdraw The SocialistDecision. Tillich laughed in the official's face and soon
the book became a "symbol of courage and resistance" to Tillich's socialist friends
"contributing to their resolve to resist the Hitler absurdity."129 At the behest
ofReinhold Niebuhr and Horace Friess, Tillich was invited to New York's Union
Theological Seminary and to lecture at Columbia University. On November 4,
1933, he arrived with his family to take up residence in the United States. Indeed,
Tillich's socialism had led him to a momentous decision to flee Germany and his
most dire predictions concerning Hitler and the Third Reich were unfortunately to
become barbaric realities.130
In effect, the demonic had triumphed instead of the moment of kairos. His
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conception of a religious socialism for Germany had found itself ineffective
against the formidable evil of the Third Reich. After Tillich's emigration to the
United States and the conclusion of the Second World War his abiding passion
for socialism waned, to be replaced by a new concentration on the demonic as
symbolized by the concepts of estrangement, alienation and the abyss. There
was to be no other political stance for Tillich as he sardonically noted:
It was a mistake when the editor of Christian Century gave to my
article in the series 'HowMy Mind Changed in the Last Ten Years'
the title 'Beyond Religious Socialsim.' If the prophetic message is
true, there is nothing 'beyond religious socialism.'131
However, the prophetic message did not lead to a new kairos because it was not
controlled by the "unique and primary kairos" i.e., the logos character of the
"appearance of the Christ in history" that would exclude the "antirational."132
As Heimann has pointed out, the derivative kairoi cannot be identified by a logos
criteria "in derived form."133 Marxism, so much espoused by Tillich in his political
writings, did not provide a proper christological critique. Heimann stated:
Tillich's error in associating Marxist utopianism with its doctrine of
revolution rather than with its doctrine ofman, which, in an atheist
system, occupies the place of theology.134
A "sacred void" ofwaiting seemed to be the net result of Tillich's disappointment
with the practicality of religious socialism in post-war Germany.
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The heteronomous character of modern culture, both German and in
its most capitalistic form Anglo-American, prompted Tillich to continue his
"quest for a new theonomy."135 We have seen how this theonomy is manifested
in the existence of the 'New Being' exemplified in the Jesus as the Christ. A
trinitarian implication abided as well in that "being moved by the Spirit is the
prius of faith" and "to be moved by the Spirit or to be grasped by the unconditional
means to be drawn into the reality and the life of a Gestalt of grace."136 An
analysis of the human predicament leads to existential questions in Tillich's
understanding of the concept of correlation which would be clarified later in his
systematic theology. Therefore the demonic and heteronomic state of affairs are
to be answered in the Gestalt of grace. Tillich would later affirm the doctrine of
salvation "by divine grace alone"137 and reiterate the Christological assertion that
where "there is New Being, there is grace, and vice versa."138 Tillich's concept of
grace would continue to mature but as Alexander McKelway has pointed out, the
concern with grace in his later writings was also emphasized in "this early part of
his theology."139 Any overt biblical connection was still yet to come.
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THE EARLY DOGMATICS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CONCEPT OF THE COVENANT
The effect ofAnselm on Barth's theology as we have seen, was profound.
Fides Quaerens Intellectum provided a starting point within the reference of faith
that reinforced Barth's contention that philosophy (including phenomenology) could
not be the starting premise of theological discourse. That premise was the domain
of the revelation of the Word himself, Jesus Christ. Barth's subsequent Dogmatics
would proceed from a Trinitarian base to a christological doctrine of election. In
this chapter the primary concentration will be on the development of this doctrinal
assertion as it unfolded in the context ofBarth's growing dissatisfaction with Hitler
and the establishment of the ultimate idol; the Reichskirche. The practice of the
German nationalistic movement and its appropriation of Christian symbol and
dogma led to Barth's contributions to the Barmen declaration, a document of
covenant and ethic to only one leader, Jesus Christ.
In 1932 Barth published his first half-volume ofDie Kirchliche Dogmatik,
the title being taken advisedly for the book was "bound to the sphere of the
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Church, where alone it is possible and meaningful (,sinnvolle)."1 No philosophical
existentialism was to be followed (unlike the dogmatics of 1927) for that would be
following the line from Schleiermacher, Ritschl and Hermann leading to the "plain
destruction ofProtestant theology and the Protestant Church." The Roman Catholic
concept of the analogia entis was denied as well, being "an invention of the
Antichrist"; though the Church Fathers, Anselm and Aquinas, would be quoted
with "no sign of horror." Barth would continue to occupy himself with scholastic
doctrines such as the Trinity and the Virgin Birth with great respect for the
"mystery" of these ideas. To avoid them would be to allow "all kinds of worthless
substitutes that had led many preachers and their followers to "discover deep
religious significance in the intoxication ofNordic blood and their political
Fiihrer,"2 So also Barth distanced himself from the dialectical theology movement
insisting that his dogmatics were not of that ilk. This undertaking was from the
Church, for the Church and this was Barth's stated premise without qualification.
The first volume commenced the huge enterprise of Barth's mature theology,
as the Church Dogmatics would ultimately entail the publication of thirteen
volumes and, even at that, the project was never completed.3 To try and reduce
this imposing body ofwriting has daunted Barth's interpreters since the early
1
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nineteen-fifties. For the purposes of this work however, a more monistic approach
is appropriate; for the focus on the doctrine of the Covenant and its related topics
(election, grace, etc.), allows for a descriptive thematic procedure. To argue that
Barth's doctrine of the Covenant is the basic "root-metaphor" has been undertaken
before as Stuart McLean has contended. He purports that this understanding of the
Covenant is linked to Barth's "interpretation of reality" and is "basic" to his
theology. Covenant is the "context-giving metaphor" that shapes the "appropriate
ordering and use of other metaphors."4 McLean is explicating this in reference to
an anthropological approach to one volume ofBarth's Dogmatics (III/2); but his
method is instructive nonetheless. This is not a claim that this metaphor is the
most important in Barth's theological frame of thought; but that as a possible
saturatedphenomenon it provides a critical insight into the way Barth formulated
his iconic concepts. As such, this mode of investigation stands as an heuristic
attempt to place both Barth and Tillich in the context of a phenomenological
approach which will elucidate both the iconic and idolic in their understandings
of divine initiative and grace, pro nobis.
The Doctrine of theWord of God
Barth set out to develop his new dogmatics from the perspective of the
medieval scholasticism he had been exposed to in Gottingen, especially his study
ofAnselm and Thomas Aquinas. The task of a dogmatic Prolegomena was to be
4 Stuart D. McLean, Humanity In The Thought OfKarl Barth (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1981)6.
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the Church proclamation of the Word ofGod and the revelation of God in Triune
form. This comprised the contents of this first volume, with the topic of ethics being
deferred to the heading of the doctrine, "The Command of God."5 Barth stated his
christological emphasis from the outset:
Dogmatics presupposes that, as God in Jesus Christ is the essence (Sein)
of the Church, having promised Himself to do it, so He is the truth, not
merely in Himself, but also for us as we know Him solely by faith in
Jesus Christ.6
The obedience of faith in the listening to Jesus Christ is coupled with the
impossibility of any dogmatics outside the Church.7 But faith is not "a determination
of human action" it is the "gracious gift (Zuwendung) ofGod to man, the free
personal presence ofChrist in his activity."8 Faith comes from the Divine initiative,
from an implication of the:
grace of divine predestination, the free gift (Gabe) of the Word and Holy
Spirit, the act of calling (Berufung) the Church, which must always come
upon the theologian from the acting God in order that he may really be
what he does and what his name inculcates (entspricht).9
Following the lead of Anselm's dictum "faith seeking understanding", existential
theology, as apriori for dogmatics, is totally inadequate. For Barth, the Church must
maintain its being as an actuspurus, that is "a divine action which is self-originating
CD 1/1, xvi.
Ibid., 12.
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201
and which is to be understood only in terms of itself and not therefore in terms
of a prior anthropology." Grace is the gift of "personal address (Zuwendung)
and not a transmitted (iibertragener) material (dinghafter) connexion (.Zustand)."
Therefore, dogmatics must begin with "the present moment of the speaking and
hearing of Jesus Christ Himself, the divine creation of light in our hearts."10 As
God's creatures, 'graced' and addressed, the proclamation ofGod in Holy Scripture
is to be accepted as though "God Himself speaks."11 The enculturation of this Word
does not invalidate or marginalize its authority, as Barth understood Tillich to claim,
with his "human cleavage between sacramental daemonism and secular exorcism."12
This is the time of the regnum gratiae for Barth, an "event of divine election,
confirmed and maintained and therefore characterized as a genuine indication of the
antithesis ofjudgement and grace which . . . God Himself acts towards men."13
Therefore, all human speech of a prophetic nature "is not grace, but service (Dienst)
of grace or means of grace."14 Barth defines this proclamation as sacrament for it
attests "the event of divine revelation, reconciliation and vocation which does














Word, incarnate in Christ and witnessed to by Scripture, must not be reduced to
a mere symbology. Tillich was quoted from his Religiose Verwirklichung of 1929:
That it should be said of the Word ofGod!-- 'in the choice (!)
of this symbol lies the spiritual character of the self-impartation
(,Selbstmitteilung) of transcendent (Jenseits) being . . . But it is
false to equate the Word as a symbol of the self-impartation of
transcendent being with the word as the physical medium (.Mittel)
of the self-comprehension (Selbsterfassung) of the human spirit and
in this way to mix up God's Word and the word of Scripture or the
word of preaching.16
Barth was quite wary of such a statement because it seemed as though Tillich
had equated both Christ and Buddha as symbols "in so far as the unconditionally
transcendent can be viewed in them", for symbols convey truth upon the "inner
necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness."17 This statement further
exacerbated Barth's grave concerns over Tillich's christology calling for a
renunciation of all "special talk about God, all use of symbols whatsoever."18
We will examine Tillich's notion of symbol in the next chapter; but here it
may be said that Tillich's description of the biblical text and Church proclamation
and its uses of symbol were that of an expression of a reality, in this case grace,
which was "not detached" from its object (Jesus Christ the Word) but "grasped
by it.'"9
16
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In spite of such emphasis on the nature of grace in Tillich's writings, Barth
continued to be adamantly opposed to Tillich who "remained too incorrigible
a historian of thought" as well as:
too much an heir of liberal theological resentment against the Church . . .
too moulded and set systematically by the pseudo-eschatological
'situation'of the immediate post-war years . . . Both Ragaz and Tillich
regard their own as dynamic and mine as static . . . What am I to say to
that?20
Barth continued his thoughts on Church proclamation with his understanding
of the relationship between human hearers and the revealing God in terms of
"event." This event is based on the "authoritative (bevollmachtigten) vicariate of
Jesus Christ."21 The "invisible-visible centre" of God's revealed biblical witness
is fulfilled in the time of Jesus Christ, "this absolute event", which is the freedom
of God's grace.22 Because of the incarnation of Jesus Christ as the Word revealed,
the divine Immanuel, "God with us", the event of grace "becomes actual for us
hie et nunc as the promise received and grasped in faith because it is illic et tunc.23
Revelation itself does not "differ from the person of Jesus Christ... To say
revelation is to say 'The Word became flesh.'"24 Even to utter the phrase "God











say something which has no basis (Grund) or possibility outside
itself, which can in no sense be explained in terms ofman and
man's situation, but only as knowledge of God from God, as free
and unmerited (unverdiente) grace.25
This establishes the theological order of a Christologyfirst and only then
a move towards an anthropology. Against Tillich, the Word ofGod is more than
a mere 'symbol' because it corresponds "to the possibility which God has chosen
(gewahlt) and actualised (verwirklicht) at all events in His Church."25 It is
personalized in Jesus Christ for "From Him alone it may and will be experienced
what the Word of God is. Of ourselves we can only say how it is, i.e., how He is."27
In Tillich's view the human speech that says "how He is" is expressed in symbolic
forms, but must proceed from the "prius of the reality of grace."28 On this important
point they seem to agree, the difference lying in the value of symbolic language and
its locus. The anthropocentric starting point between them still remained markedly
different. To personalize Christ was not to posit humanity as the benchmark for,
"The doubtful {problematisch) thing is not whether God is person, but whether we
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doctrine of the Word of God in the framework (Rahmen) of an anthropology."30
The speech of God is the act of God whose "passio in history is as such actio"
for God's Word is "itself God's act."31 Yet this speech is shrouded in the mystery
ofGod but made manifest in faith without a human correspondence from our side
"even though one would be ready to go to the ultimate depths and outermost
bounds of human existence to find it." But in this search by human existence (or
terms thereof), God's Word can only be found in the divine rule of God, a "capture
(Verhaftung) ofman." Christ as the Word ofGod is the "epitome (.Inbegriff) of
God's grace" and humanity is not left to its own devices but is possessed by God.
Yet an important question appears at this point, how exactly does the possessive
Word ofGod manifest itself in human reality? How can it be identified as divine
speech and not merely human words?
Barth asserted that the "speech of God is and remains the mystery ofGod
supremely in its secularity." The demarcation of this event from other human
events is not readily apparent. Even through the Church, in its preaching and
sacramental practice, in its biblical interpretation, in its human speech and
conglomerates of human philosophies the "veil is thick." Therefore, the Word
of God is given in a "form which as such is not the Word ofGod and which as








Barth draws an important distinction between enigma and paradox here, a "twofold
indirectness of vision":
First the Word ofGod meets us in a form that is to be distinguished
from its content, and secondly the form as such is an enigma, a
concealing of the Word ofGod. The relevant concept here is that of
paradox. A paradox is a communication which is not only made by
a 66E,a, a phenomenon, but which must be understood, if it is to be
understood at all, rcapa xf|v 66£av, i.e., in antithesis to what the
phenomenon itself seems to be saying. 33
However, Barth counsels that theology makes a "more sparing use of the term"
to avoid any confusion. There can be no comparison with the self-presentation
of God in the Word, for human reason and fabrications are fallen, and therefore
the form of God's Word is found in the "form of the cosmos which stands in
contradiction to God." Yet, even in its enigmatic and concealed form, the
proclamation, in all its secularity, is in "every respect a Word of grace."34 How
might this "cosmic form" manifest itself in human existence?
Tillich is once again drawn into the fray with his insistence that the Church
and its proclamation should not start from the Bible and tradition but on a "radical
experience of the borderline situation (Grenzsituation)."35 Tillich was explicating
the existential concern regarding mortality and finitude, the instance when a
human faces the possibility of non-existence. "The human boundary-situation is








confronted by an ultimate threat."36 Tillich believed that the central Christian
doctrines, i.e., God and Christ, had been "radically questioned" and therefore
were "entirely hopeless in the widest circles and especially among the proletarian
masses."37 The apologetic concern overrides the doctrinal by taking seriously the
existential crisis in human existence. The power of the New Being "manifest in
Jesus as the Christ" opens the individual to the possibility of new life in a
"theonomous" culture and in the expressions of the "spiritual substance which in
the cultural forms is presented indirectly and unintentionally."38 Barth's response
was distinctly negative in tone:
By means of the negations or delimitations ofman which according
toTillich we can obviously carry out for ourselves we do not even
remotely produce the Word of God for him or for ourselves.39
Any search for the "receptacle"(Ge/q/?) of human experience is pointless
in Barth's estimation and that was exactly what Tillich appeared to be doing.
Human faculty must be about the task of "renunciation"( Verzichten) so that God's
Word can truly be known and this can only be "the work of the Holy Spirit."40
To remain a free act of grace, there can be no human predisposition, no possibility
of knowledge, for it is foreign to human cognition. Knowledge ofGod remains an
36










"inconceivable novum ' that can only be received as "the Word from Christ but also
the pneuma by which it is known"or it cannot be known at all. There can be no
Cartesian proof ofGod from human assurance.41 As an act of grace, the knowledge
of God is therefore an act of election and grounded entirely in its own determination.
Grace "actualizes" faith allowing the respondent to answer in the affirmative to the
command of God. Barth would later summarize this grace-event with this phrase,
"Where the actuality exists there is also the corresponding possibility."42
The "corresponding possibility" of revelation manifests itself in a threefold
manner: first in the proclamation of the Church, second in the witness of Scripture,
and third (and most importantly for Barth) in revelation. This triparte structure
becomes the "unimpaired distinction" (unzerstdrter Verschiedenheit) in the
Church's Trinitarian formulation as "Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness."43
The divine initiative of revelation is propounded by the actuality of inter-trinitarian
decision:
God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself. He reveals
Himself. Ifwe really want to understand revelation in terms of its subject,
i.e., God, then the first thing we have to realise is that this subject, God,
the revealer, is identical with His act in revelation and also identical
with its effect (Wirkungj.44
In one grand gesture Barth performed an act of "spring cleaning" of the "speculative
41 See especially Robert E. Cushman, "Barth's Attack Upon Cartesianism And The Future In Theology," in
The Journal OfReligion, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (1956) 207-223.
42 CD 11/1, 5.
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theologia naturalis" however, Tillich was not so sanguine in his opinion of Barth's
placement of the Trinity. He contended:
It was a mistake ofBarth to start his Prolegomena with what, so to speak,
are the Postlegomena, the doctrine of the Trinity. It could be said that in
his system this doctrine falls from heaven, the heaven of an unmediated
biblical and ecclesiastical authority.45
The trinitarian symbols for Tillich are dialectical for they reflect the reality of life,
"namely the movement of separation and reunion."46 And as such, they are to be
understood as a correlative to the human predicament of finitude, estrangement,
and ambiguity.47 An inversion then exists between Barth's postulation of the
Trinity first and the answer to human finitude following, as opposed to Tillich's
placement of the existential question first and the (much later) correlative answer
found in the trinitarian symbols.
Barth proceeded from the notion that the Triune God, in revealing divine
nature by gracious act, also reveals the divine nature as gracious act. Trinitarian
reflection was more than mere Church dogma; it is the principle mode ofGod's
entire self-revelation focused on the mediation ofChrist:
The true theme of the biblical witness is the . . . concept [that] God's
action in His revelation, revelation in answer to the question what God
does, and therefore [is] the predicate in our statement... the theme is









In this way, that which cannot be "unveiled" (enthiillung) becomes "unveiled"
(enthullbaren) by distinguishing "Himself from Himself, that is:
to be God in Himself and in concealment (verborgen), and yet at the
same time to be God a second time in a very different way, namely,
in manifestation, i.e., in the form (Gestalt) of something He Himself
is not.49
Thus "being for humanity in a different way" has covenantal overtones, as Barth
explains in an extended Old Testament exegetical paragraph:
for "the name ofGod is actualised, i.e., in the covenant with its
divine promise and claim, with its record deposited within the Law,
everything takes place that does take place through the name of Yahweh
. . .Yahweh is thus God a second time in a very different way in the fact
that He elects a people, makes it His people and rules it as His people.30
This assertion follows the basic triadic structure of the Church Dogmatics in
general: "Deus extra nos, Deuspro nobis, Deus in nobis."51 As to the symbol of
the Trinity itself, Barth recognized that, "It is not the form {Gestalt), but God in
the form, that reveals, speaks, comforts, works and aids."52 Like Tillich, he saw
the reality behind the symbol that allowed the veiled God to become "unveilable
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The giving of this form is always an act of grace for it comes in "God's free loving-
kindness."53 The doctrine of the Trinity, Barth wrote, "is not and does not seek to
be anything but an explanatory confirmation (.Bestatigung)" of the "revealed name
of Yahweh-Kyrios joining the Old Testament with the New."54 God's name, as
Father, Son and Spirit is the "one God in threefold repetition (Wiederholung)"
sharing "equality in essence or substance."55 God is revealed in "three modes or
ways of being (Seinsweisen)."56 In Trinitarian form God is both in se andpro nobis
for; "In all three modes ofbeing God is the one God both in Himself and in relation
to the world and man."57
The placement of this doctrine so early in his dogmatics answers the question
"Who is God?" in contrast to "what or whether is God?", for as Robert Jenson
points out, this revelation ofGod cannot be understood without "reference to his
relation to Jesus Christ."58 This christological emphasis, proceeding from the
opera trinitas ad extra sunt indivisa, was made clear in this early stage as the
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ad extra.'"59 This is demonstrated in Barth's perception of the meaning of the
doctrine of the Trinity that "the One who reveals Himself according to the witness
of Scripture can in fact be our God and how far He can in fact be our God."60 In
sum, God, in three modes therefore, is "ours in advance" (im voraus der unsrige),
"equiprimordially."61
An important question that might be asked at this juncture is whether Barth's
doctrine of the Trinity acts as a "saturated phenomenon." There can be no denying
that as a God-revealed symbol it has the characteristics of that which is deemed
"irregardable."62 Yet can the Trinity be seen as iconic in character? One way of
viewing this doctrine is not to perceive it as phenomenon at all, as it may be argued
that the concept of the Trinity is a human formulation of the three ways in which
God is revealed. Therefore, the phenomenons of saturation reside in the relation
of the triune entities intra nos, and apperceptably, extra nos. Barth would not
approve of such a phenomenological move, for in his estimation, God, in triunity,
"is identical with His act in revelation and also identical with its effect."63 The
concept of the Trinity does not proceed from a human Gestalt, but is "simply a
59
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development of the knowledge that Jesus is the Christ or the Lord."64 However, as
an icon revealing the gaze of the infinite this still must be manifested by the image
of Jesus as the Messiah. So having established the fundamental and theological
primacy of the Trinity, Barth moved on to an increasingly more christological
emphasis in his following Dogmatics, a concentration described by some as even
"christo-monist,"65 In many ways that charge could be leveled at Tillich as well,
who presented his christology of the "New Being" without conceptual regard for
the doctrine of the Trinity in his own Systematics. In any event, a hint of Barth's
future direction lay with his remarking on the "battle (.Kampf) of Jesus Christ
Himself. ... for the one eternal covenant ofGod with men sealed in time, for the
acknowledgment (Anerkennung) of the perfect self-unveiling (Selbstenthiillung) of
God."66 However, Barth had another battle on his hands — one for academic survival
against Nazism. This was a struggle of the icon of Christ as head of the Church
versus the idol of Hitler as leader of the Deutschkirche.
Barmen to Basel
The year after the publication of the first-half volume of the Dogmatics, the
situation in Germany began to take a turn for the worse. Barth wrote that his:
attitude and activities underwent a great change. This did not affect








And I owe this change to the 'Fiihrer'.67
The continuing rise ofNazism prompted Barth to "rage in my study" and make the
dire prediction, "No good will come of this." When Hitler finally took complete
control of the government on 30 January 1933, Barth, ill with influenza in his bed,
saw "my dear German people beginning to worship a false god."68 Barth believed,
after reading Hitler's Mein Kampf that the National Socialist policy was bent on
the eradication of "Christian belief and its expression."
The syncretistic tendencies of the German churches led Barth to state his
feelings in an essay entitled, "The First Commandment As An Axiom Of Theology"
in response to Gogarten (who had joined the "German Christians") and Brunner's
theology of natural revelation.69 Reiterating the impossibility of an Anknupfspunkt
as an axiom for theology in any "inherent analogy"70, Barth proceeded to contend
that combinations of "Revelation and reason", "Revelation and religious
consciousness" (Schleiermacher), "Revelation and ethos of culture" (Ritschl),
"Revelation and history of religion" (Troeltsch) and currently, "Revelation and
Creation" could only lead to the question that:
One can only ask oneself and the whole of modern theology of 'and'
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against that 'and', in view of the responsibility of theology to the first
commandment.71
In all cases that "and" would also apply to "Hitler and Christianity." A serious
issue arose whether those members of the Social Democrat Party (such as Tillich)
should maintain "private socialists convictions", or declare their affiliation in a
more public manner as formal members of the party.72 After correspondence with
Tillich on the matter, Barth declared that "Anyone who does not want me like this
cannot have me at all." Furthermore, this stance gave Barth a negative prominence
with regards to Hitler and the installation of the Reichsbischof. Barth's composition
of the tract entitled Theologische Existenz heute (a copy being sent to Hitler) was
considered the "first trumpet blast of the Confessing Church," which had grown out
of the "Pastors Emergency LesLg\ie"(Pfarrernotbund) founded by the former naval
war hero, Martin Niemoller.73
Barth's fears that the German Reformed Church was under the influence of
the "German Christians" were exacerbated when Ludwig Miiller set himself up
as the "Reich bishop at the head of the Evangelical Church."74 Predictably, Barth
was aghast that "Christians and theologians have shown themselves to be a much
weaker, more glutinous and more ambivalent group" then ever previously. On










Christian rally at the Berlin Sports Centre. In an inflammatory speech by Dr.
Reinhold Krause, calling for the eradication of the Jewish Old Testament, the
removal ofnon-German from liturgy and confession; the "Rabbi Paul" as well
as "dialectical theology from Paul to Karl Barth" came under verbal attack.75
In response, the members of the Pfarrernotbund, denounced the Church
government because of its dereliction of Christian duty.
Barth perceived that the problems of the "Gentian Christians" were
symptomatic of the much deeper issue of an "error that had devastated the
Evangelical Church for centuries."76 This was the notion that "alongside God's
revelation,. . . man also had a legitimate authority of his own over the message
and the form of the church." Barth's non-compliance over giving the Nazi salute
before his lectures (he always opened them with prayer) was numbering his days
as a professor in Bonn. Consequently, 1934 was to prove to be a decisive year for
both Barth and the Evangelical Church. In the spring of that year Barth visited Paris
giving lectures on Calvin to the Protestant Theological Faculty as well as preaching
at the Lutheran Church in the rue Blanche. While in Paris, Barth met again two men
that would become an integral part of his religious development-Pierre Maury and
Willem A. Visser't Hooft. Maury became an important catalyst for Barth's
understanding ofCovenant and Election as in the future.






with Hitler in January led to the Evangelical Church calling a Synod, first by the
laity on January 3 and 4 (before the Niemoller incident) and later on February 4
in Barmen comprising all the representatives of the denomination.77 In both
Synods Barth drafted the confessional documents, with the final draft of the
Barmen Declaration appearing at the end ofMay 1934.78 Barth's contribution
came while "The Lutheran Church slept and the Reformed Church kept awake."79
When the Lutherans took a three-hour nap Barth "revised the text of the six
statements, fortified by strong coffee and one or two Brazilian cigars." Barth
believed that the Declaration had dealt with the "problem of natural theology"
by designating Jesus Christ as the "one Word of God whom we have to trust and
obey in life and in death."80 Barth could only give allegiance to the Lordship of
Christ; and his convictions led him to refuse to give an oath of loyalty to the
Fiihrer in the proscribed form. Barth recalled that:
I did not refuse to give the official oath, but I stipulated an addition
to the effect that I could be loyal to the Ftihrer only within my
responsibilities as an Evangelical Christian.81
The result was inevitable. Barth was dismissed from his teaching position, a
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secular covenant broken; and returned to his native Switzerland, to Basel, in
July of 1935 to assume a new contract at the University as professor of theology.
Switzerland and the Doctrine of the Election
Barth continued his teaching at Basel but his fame grew abroad as well.
An important event was his journey to Geneva in June 1936 to participate in
the "Congres international de theologie calviniste", "jubilee celebrations"82 in
remembrance of the 400 years of the Reformation. The concern of this gathering
was to discuss the "problem of predestination."83 Despite being "hopelessly
bogged down in the old dilemmas", a lecture by the French theologian Pierre
Maury which was a "reconsideration of the christological significance" and the
"basis of the doctrine of election in our time" made a "profound impression"84
on Barth.
In the fall of that same year Barth traveled to visit the Reformed churches
in Hungary and Transylvania and to lecture in Debrecen and Klausenburg on the
subject of election and predestination. The content of these lectures was to be
published in the journal "Theological Existence Today"entitled "Gottes
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deserves close attention. Grace is totally free and "gracious election, predestina-
-tion, means grace in grace."85 Following Maury, Barth recognized the profound
connection of christology and election, that Jesus is election "for the understanding
of election is the chosen one Jesus Christ."86 The doctrine of election is the sharp
point (Spitze) of all dogmatics and the end of the doctrine of God", a "regulative
principle."87 This "regulative principle" applies not only to the will of the gracious
God, but to creation as well. Elective grace is the ground of both the inter-trinitarian
nature of God and is the basis of God's activity toward the created order. Barth was
later to develop this in Volume Three of his Dogmatics, "The Doctrine ofCreation"
in four parts.
Barth further reiterated his new position on election in his Gifford Lectures
given in Aberdeen in 1937-8. Using the Scots Confession of 1560 as his basic text,
Barth articulated the bond between Jesus Christ as "God's decision for man" and
"Jesus Christ as man's election for God."88 Yet Barth would not let the issue of
election become capricious, for "Grace is not arbitrariness." The character of God's
benefice toward humanity in the event of predestination was not to be seen as "that
strange abyss we call a paradox." God's mercy is an intrinsic "unfaithfulness"
85
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toward divine justice, indeed God is "just when He is merciful."89 The asymmetry
of the event of election Barth elucidates as a christological assertion:
While it would be monstrous for us to make our human capacities and
merits the ground for demanding that God must have fellowship with
man, yet it is perfectly normal that God should have fellowship with
man at that point, where He Himself as man has taken man's place and
where He therefore finds Himself again in man, thus finding again in a
human life and death, real, proper and active obedience.90
Compare this christological perception with that of Tillich who recognized that:
Only by taking suffering and death upon himself could Jesus be the
Christ, because only in this way could he participate completely in
existence and conquer every force of estrangement which tried to
dissolve his unity with God.91
Tillich, of course, was not writing about election at this particular point, but the
comparison is instructive for it shows that where Barth's Reformed studies led
him towards the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, Tillich maintained a more
symbolic and Lutheran christology ofparticipation in the Christ-event. Although,
as we have seen, Tillich perceived grace as freely given through justification by
faith through grace, he never made the same connection like Barth of Jesus being
the first intention of election. Tillich contended that "double predestination is not
a genuine religious symbol" for it is a "wrong consequence, as are all theological
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was far too rooted in "causality and determination" and, in this sense, did not really
exhibit the free character ofjustifying grace. But if taken existentially as both an
affirmation and denial of the modality ofGod's relation to humankind, then it can
purport the"highest affirmation of the divine love, not its negation."93
In an article, published in English in 1937, Barth opens up the possibility of
some form of iconic manifestation in human existence. Revelation brings newness
in the person of Jesus Christ ofwhich "There are indeed tokens of this reality,
there are witnesses and testimonies to it, but it has no analogies and is nowhere
repeated."94 The account of the words and deeds of Jesus in the New Testament
are tokens as is the virgin birth and the "miraculous token of the empty tomb."95
In fact all of Scripture itself is a token of revelation. Church proclamation and the
sacraments stand as tokens as well. The life of the believer in participation in the
work of the Holy Spirit is a another form of the token. However these tokens have
no iconic value in themselves , they only refer back to the ultimate "token" of God,
Jesus Christ. Barth does not open up a phenomenology here, he is still insistent on
the christological inferences and does not explicate how these events might become
icons for human perception.
In the course of finishing the first volume of his dogmatics (in two parts) Barth








of his volume two, The Doctrine ofGod. Neither election nor covenant play a
dominant role in the concluding volume of The Doctrine ofthe Word ofGod,
but nor are the matters ignored entirely either. Barth describes the Old Testament
Covenant in terms of its placement in the "pre-time" ofGod's revelation.The
Covenant, even in its Old Testament context, maintained its christological focus
for it is the expectation of Christ. The superfluity of all the Old Testament
Covenants provides a "genuine 'once-for-allness' and a "once-for-all times" that
is promise but never complete attainment.96 This is the true "mysteriunT given in
the mystery (Geheimnis) of the Old Testament.97 Barth cautions that Christ, as the
summation of the all the pre-existing covenants, must not be regarded as "mere sign
or symbol, a mere witness to the real togetherness (Zusammenseins) ofGod and
man."98 Unlike Tillich who saw that "Jesus as the Christ" the "bearer of the New
Being" symbolizes the unification of "essential and existential being"99, Barth
contended that Christ pointed beyond the "empty space of metaphysical ideal truth"
to an approaching history.
"Divine sign-giving" of this christological nature still remains shrouded in
mystery. Human perception of the mystery of revelation comes by the "free grace









it.'"00 A character of anthropological witness is concomitant with this revelation
for in the "existence of sign-giving" we must:
look away to the human form in which revelation had penetrated to
man Deo bene volente, i.e., to the existence ofmen who are already
convicted by God by means of sign-giving, who have therefore already
discovered that they are the children ofGod.101
The attestations of both the Old and New Testaments of preaching and sacrament
are the primary tools in which this sign-giving event occurs. But this witness is
controlled by the Word ofGod, that is Jesus Christ, who Barth later referred to
as the "controlling (regierend) sign ofall signs."102 A curious aporia arises here
for if the witness by human speech and iconic fabrication is controlled by grace
embodied in Christ, the "sign of all signs", what criteria might be used in judging
the accuracy of any depiction? If the Bible is the norm then Holy Scripture
becomes the icon, or if it is located in the ethical witness of the elect, an issue
Barth will discuss at the end of the second volume of the Dogmatics,103 then how
can any idolatry be detected? The possible answer lies in Barth's understanding of
the orbicularity of theological discussion, the circulus veritatis Dei, by which faith
and participation in the sphere of Jesus Christ "forms the household rule from which
100
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we cannot except ourselves."104
Barth moved from his polemical attitudes against all forms of anthropology
and natural theology that had dominated his theological thinking to date. He now
oriented himself towards "the doctrine of God and described in positive terms who
and what God is." In effect, as Barth admitted, he had been saying 'No' and the
time had come to say 'Yes'. Grace was to become "more urgent" than "the
message ofGod's law, wrath, accusation and judgement.'"05 The "knowability"
ofGod's grace does not follow the rules of the world, "this sphere'"06, but results
from the initiative ofGod alone. Jiingel clarifies this point and sees Barth's
meaning in this manner:
As object of the knowledge ofGod, God differentiates himself from
all other epistemological objects precisely in his being-as-object,
which cannot be defined in terms of the objectivity of other objects.107
Barth explained that, "Only because God posits (setzt) Himself as the object is man
posited as the knower of God. And so man can only have God as the self-posited
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of condescension established and signified by the Covenant. Our capacity and
freedom to even love God comes as an unearned gift." Consequently, as Barth
often re-iterates, "God is known only through God alone."
The self-communication of God takes on a primary significance for Barth
both as knowledge and encounter. "God's Word is therefore the covenant-making
turning (Zicwendung) of God Himself towards the man turned away from Him."109
Language of debt becomes prominent here, for humanity is unable to respond
adequately to God's gift of grace. Moreover, as Jungel points out, God allows this
grace, and the divine nature, to be revealed in a "sacramental" manner, "In so far
as God reiterates his own objectivity in the creaturely objectivity which is foreign
to him, God's being-as-object is sacramental reality."110 God is both revealed and
hidden at the same time. To communicate with humanity is to speak to the "basic
reality and substance of the sacramental reality . . . [which] is the existence of the
human nature of Jesus Christ."111 If the humanity of Jesus Christ is the foundational
sacramental event and description of the God of grace, what possible sign that
reveals this inbreaking of eternity into temporal reality can be manifested? Barth
describes this aporia this way:
as this first sacrament, the humanity of Jesus is at the same time the








as such. Not of and by itself, but of and by God's appointment
(.Anordung) and grace, the creature can be the temple, instrument
and sign ofGod Himself.112
Barth, however, does not give the Cross this signum as does Tillich, for he
continues on to describe that God's revelation (both unveiled (Enthiillung) and
veiled (Verhuellung) at the same time) is manifested as an association that occurs:
in such a way that God determines and creates a definite creaturely
reality subject-object relationship to be the instrument of the covenant
between Himself the Creator and man as His creature.113
This associative covenant is the sign ofGod's relatedness through grace,
an analogia relationis that is to be understood as Christ being analogans, and
humanity his analogatumU4 This analogia relationis is the basis for Jiingel's
thesis of his work on Barth's understanding of the divine character of God as
"Being-in-Act" and also resembles Marion's notion of "God Without Being."115
For both, Barth's description of God's activity in the determination ofChrist and
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giver of grace, and Christ being the manifestation of this eternal gift. God, for
Barth, cannot be delineated in terms of either Scholastic metaphysics or an
Enlightenment critique, as both begin from anthropological categories.116
The possibility of distortion in the receiving of God's gift of grace is
recognized by Barth in terms of idolatry. We receive "images" (.Bildern) and
create "counter-images" (Gegenbildernj that betray our inability to depict the
hidden God and instead project depictions of our "own glory."117 A question
arises then about the validity of any human image, icon or Bild that attempts to
describe God or the gift of divine grace. How is it possible to speak of or depict
the divine inneffabilisl Graham Ward discerns that Barth was projecting an
analogiafidei (derived from Anselm) that allows for responsible speech and
imaging of the divine gift. Barth had spoken of the acceptance of the supreme
"lordship" of God "over our bodies and souls" that could allow this speech.
"Only as we know God's lordship will our own ideas of lordship have content,
and within their limits, existence."118 This knowledge, as Ward points out,
"is conditioned by transcendental apriori which govern and constitute what
we perceive and how we understand that perception." There can be no
anthropological knowledge of the same order as the knowledge of faith, all that
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would be left in such a synthesis would be "the endless play of signifiers."119
In Marion's terms, the proper "gaze" of the subject can only be informed by
the object of its vision, a purely subjective gaze would only lead to idolatry, and in
the same way, a subjective speech could only reproduce the sound of its own voice,
a narcissistic echo that cannot receive other than itself. Barth thoughts on this
matter were often quite succinct; "In no respect then, does the force of our reference
lie in our hands.'"20 Furthermore, as Ward notes, no human word can express the
truth ofGod, only the "punctiliar intrusion" of the Word ofGod can suffice, creating
a "sacramental language" that needs to be explicated, either transubstantially or
consubstantially.121 This explication is what Barth endeavors to undertake in this
volume of the Dogmatics as a discourse of the locution uDeus dixit"I22, with the
assurance that:
in spite of our incapacity, our viewing of the unviewable God and
conceiving of the inconceivable God are made by God's own capacity
a genuine viewing and conceiving, the whole truth ofwhich is the truth
ofGod, and that in such a way that by the capacity of its object it is a
true viewing and conceiving.123
The hiddenness ofGod and human incapacity to comprehensively articulate
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the character ofGod and even the gift of grace, does not deter Barth from relating
some sort of positive imaging and speech. Barth speaks of the "approximations"
(Annaehrung) of human theological discourse, self-critical and incorrect. The task
of theology is regarded metaphorically as a "little vanity (Eitelkeit) as in the 'old
wife's stammering."124 Yet the attempt to "stammer" must be made in the
consideration ofAugustine to proclaim God in obedience and veneration: "And
woe betide us ifwe rely upon on our impotence and omit to praise Him!'"25
Ward elaborates:
The reflection is founded upon God laying claim to our 'views
and concepts'. By revelation a relationship is forged between our
viewing-image [Bild], our conceiving counter-image [Gegenbild]
and a reflection [Abbild] of the Godhead.126
The correlation between Marion and Barth seems clear; our "viewing-image
(the idolic) is confronted by the "counter-image" (the gift, or the given) and a
synthetic event occurs in the apperception of the "iconic". But can any verifiable
(in a theological sense) truth be found in any expression of event? Barth proceeds
to argue the possibility that such a synthesis can occur under the rubric of the
theologia vialorum.
An "encroachment''(Ubergriff)127 ofGod is established by call and










"necessary basis of our prayer and praise and thanksgiving. Only false gods can
be present to us in other ways."128 Therefore, to speak of this God is to always
acknowledge the definite "un-success" of our speech. Barth explains:
The point is that the authenticity of our knowledge will be delivered
from every assault and disorder, but to all eternity it will still be an
authenticity which is adapted for us men and creatures, corresponding
to the authenticity of God Himself, yet also distinct from it.129
This "theology of the pilgrims" will also bear the stamp of provisionality, analogical
correlation, and a differentiation from the pure Word ofGod. Emotive participation
in God's revelation gives us the epistemic basis to understand and speak, for we
are called to respond in thanks, joy and awe. A stance of faith and acceptance of
the divine initiative ofGod, the gift of grace itself, allows for a "teleologically
ordered"130 dialectical speech from grace, about grace and for grace. Barth's
christological notions can only break the circularity of the analogical argument:
The substantiation (Bestatigung) of our faith and therefore the
necessary confirmation (Sicherung) of our systematic deliberations
(Uberlegungen) and affirmations {Feststellungeri) in respect of the
knowledge of God must also come to us from without.131
That which comes from without is identified "under the name of Jesus Christ"
and grace is more than a "general possibility" for it is "the grace of our Lord Jesus











When we appeal to God's grace, we appeal to the grace of the
incarnation and to this man as the One in whom, because He is
the eternal Son ofGod, knowledge ofGod was, is and will be
present originally and properly; but again through whom, because
He is the eternal Son ofGod, there is promised to us our own divine
sonship, and therefore our fellowship in His knowledge of God.132
The Reality of God
"God is" and "God is He who is in His works,"133 describe Barth's direction
of theological exploration in the next chapter of his second volume II/1. John
Webster regards this particularization by Barth of the being of God as the ens
concretissimum, for "God is to be defined by reference to his own chosen path
of self-definition."134 Barth brings a focus to this issue by stating:
What God is as God, the divine individuality and characteristics,
the essentia or 'essence' ofGod, is something which we shall
encounter either at the place where God deals with us as Lord
and Saviour, or not at all.135
God's "self-movement''can never lead back to any reciprocal "self-movement"
of humanity, for God's disclosure is not "founded" on any human "foundations."
Barth elucidates further:
God's righteous demand on man, and His faithfulness in covenant
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they need only God Himself and no corresponding relation ofman.136 God's
being is an event in covenantal decision, executed in eternity in and as a "self-
contained reality. This gracious act is determinative of all human existence for:
The real person is not man but God. It is not God who is a person
by extension, but we. God exists in His act. God is His own decision.
God lives from and by Himself. God is.137
Barth tries to avoid ontological speculation on the being ofGod and pays strict
attention to that which God does and less to what God might be in theological
parlance. "God is the One who loves, and, as such the Good and the sum of all
good things."138 Bromiley has summarized '"God is' implies 'God loves'."139
God's gracious love seeks to have fellowship with creation without any "aptitude
(.Eignung) or worthiness" (Wiirdigkeit) by those who are beloved.140 Barth's
attempts to define God on other than essential or ontological grounds is echoed
by Marion in his postulation of "God without Being." In an important paragraph
he comments on Thomas Aquinas who:
Does not chain God to Being because the divine esse immeasurably
surpasses (and hardly maintains an analogia with) the ens commune
of creatures, which are characterized by the real distinction between
esse and their essence, whereas God, and He alone, absolutely merges
essence with esse: God is expressed as esse, but this esse is expressed
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not erect an idol before God, but saves his distance.141
In the same way Barth is seeking to "save the distance" of God with regard
to humanity as the "Wholly Other" who turns to us in an "overflow (Uberflufi)
which is not demanded or presupposed by any necessity" but is the pure bounty
of the divine essence.142 "God is" means "God loves" for "this act is His being,
His essence and His nature."143 This nature then is pure gift, a self-phenomenology
based on a triune ontic reality that not only gives out love (as unbounded gift)
but is love (as unbounded act). And as Barth continues on to demonstrate, this
gifted-ness comes, not by inner necessity or formal causality, but in the freedom
of this "self-attestation" to "reveal His existence within the sphere of the reality that
is distinct from Himself."144 This existence is a past and present reality because of
Jesus Christ and therefore christology is the only ground for the understanding of
the freedom ofGod.
From here Barth moves on to the contemplation of the divine perfections.
Although God's perfect being cannot be divided into discreet sections, as a
heuristic device Barth pairs three contrasting dyads that emphasize the reality of
the divine freedom; grace and holiness, mercy and righteousness, patience and










it seeks fellowship without regard to the worthiness or "opposition" (Widerstand)
of the recipient, for it is always efficacious.145 It is an act of "condescension"
(.Herablassung), an act that is a "sheer gift" (Geschenk und Gabe) in the "strictest
sense of the term."146 The unwarranted gift of grace is the true iconic expression of
the being ofGod for:
Any other idea ofGod, in which He is not yet gracious, or not yet
essentially decisively and comprehensively known as gracious, is
really, whether it is affirmed or denied, a theology of the gods
and idols of this world, not of the living and true God.147
But if this grace is, in fact, "hidden and incomprehensible" to us, what possible
icon (that is not a covert idol), could possibly allow us to gaze into the eternal?
Barth links the efficacy of grace, with its freedom as gift and its destruction
of the resistance of rejection, in his summation of the covenant as both love and
action. This reflects the character of God as merciful who in "free inclination"
grants assistance to the estranged existence of humanity, the "turning to" a need
by a sharing in sympathy towards the "distress of another" exemplified in the
covenant.148 The grace of compassion Barth describes as "not merely a gift of God,
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in the "form" and "name of Jesus Christ.'"50 The form of the covenant in Christ
reveals God's righteousness as the "One He is, the One who is bound to His own
nature, the One who is true to Himself.'"51 In contradistinction to Tillich, Barth
stated that "the unity of grace and holiness and the mercy and righteousness ofGod
has nothing to do with a 'paradox' as has often been alleged.'"52 Grace, as given in
the covenant, has its own inner clarity and rationality and this intelligibility lies
beyond the purview of the sophistries of human thought.
What of the pictorial icon? Barth concludes this volume with a short excursus
into the beauty ofGod and its manifestation. God who loves us is worthy of our love
and in that way is beautiful. However, for Barth, beauty and glory are interconnected,
and any "of the leading concepts" of the Christian knowledge of God are given
priority then it "inevitably becomes an idol.'"53 Aestheticism is as syncretistically
dangerous as any other "ism" and can lead to false questions that separate the glory
ofGod from innate beauty or any other attribute. There is only one perfect and
beautiful image of God, "the concrete form of the triune being ofGod.'"54 This is
iconically revealed in the event of the incarnation and in the beauty of Jesus Christ.












declaration of the divine loving-kindness towards men."155 This is the agency of
the face of Christ alone. No human artifice should ever try to be a representation
of this beauty and no Christian artists should endeavor to depict this. Honour can
only be given to God by following and imitating through an accommodation of
God's elective determination.156 So the question still remains, in what fashion can
this determination be iconically depicted? Does Barth's concept of the Covenant
provide the icon?
The Covenant of Grace as Foundational Icon
Barth's conclusive rendering of the doctrine of grace and election, under the
rubric of the Covenant ofGrace, occurred in 1942 with the publication of the second
half of the second volume of his Dogmatics—Die Lehre von Gott 2. Written during
the bleakest days of the Second World War, Barth remarked that the proofs for this
volume were "corrected by night in a Federal guard-room."157 In the midst of all the
turbulence and uncertainty in the world at the time, Barth was able to produce what
some scholars believe to be the greatest exposition on the doctrine of grace, election
and predestination ever written.158 We will survey these scholars later but here one
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The sustained exposition of this theme [election], with its constant
reference to Jesus Christ as the basis of election of the community
and the individual, is one of the most original, profound and moving
in the whole history of theology.159
Barth begins by claiming that the "election of grace is the sum of the
Gospel—we must put it as pointedly (zugespitzt) as that."160 It is the Gospel in
nuce.m The "movement (Zuwendung) ofGod" is described as "the institution
(.Bundesstiftung) of the covenant, the primal decision (Urentscheidung) 'in Jesus
Christ', which is the basis and the goal of all His works—that is grace."162 This
event of grace is particular and actual, for it is centered on "the one man Jesus
ofNazareth, in His covenant with this people, in His being and activity amongst
and towards this people."163 The elect are represented by this Jesus who is the
first object of election. Therefore, the "sum of the Gospel" is "grounded in the
knowledge of Jesus Christ because He is both "the electing God and the elected
man in One."164 In this sense, God elects Himself in Barth's conceptualization.
159
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Human predestination, therefore, is not the original intention of God's primal
decision but a second-order determination. Barth elucidates:
Even human nature and human history in general have no independent
signification (selbstandigen Sinn). They point to the primal history played
out within them between God and the one man, and all other men as His
people. The general (the world ofman ) exists for the sake of the
particular.165
God is not bound by the actuality of the Covenant but only by a determination
founded in freedom in which God eternally loves. All creation and human existence
are the domain ofGod's glory in which He elects to be gracious. However, this
gracious act of election also has the character of expectation and demand from
the covenant-partner in which God is Judge. "God is for His covenant-partner
both the One by whom he will be judged and also the One according to whom he
must judge himself."166 In effect, "being responsible" (Verantwortung) is the
entire meaning of human existence. There can be "no dogmatics which is not also
and necessarily ethics." As always, the Divine initiative is still maintained by Barth
in his claim that:
The Yes cannot be heard unless the No is also heard. But the No
is for the sake of the Yes and not for its own sake. In substance,
therefore,the first and last word is Yes and not No.167
Covenantal grace is the Alpha and Omega ofGod's eternal determination in Jesus








"the sum of the Gospel."
Critical Appraisals of Barth's Doctrine of Election
Otto Weber considered that Barth's treatment of the doctrine of election and
predestination as "being conscious of treading utterly new and hazardous paths"
in comparison with the Church "Fathers."168 Later, Herbert Hartwell stated that:
It is no exaggeration to say that the heart of Barth's theology beats in
this doctrine in which he radically departs from all past and present
teaching on predestination, above all from Calvin's doctrine of
predestination.169
Barth's placing of election in its "pre-eminent place" in his Dogmatics, over the
other doctrines such as providence and creation (contra Aquinas and Calvin)
"leads him to transfer the crucial point of the Heilsgeschichte from the Incarnation
. . . [to] an eternal decree of God before time." This eternal covenant of grace is
grounded in the "innertrinitarian love of God" as will be seen.170 More recently,
Colin Gunton has described Barth's doctrine of election as a "radical newness"
in both his placing the predestination as a "doctrine of God", as well as its being
misunderstood by "many critics" because of Barth's lack of clarity on the
subject.171 Barth had shifted from the decretem absolutum ofCalvin's Institutes,
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focusing on the theological grounding of the knowable God in Jesus Christ, as
opposed to the "unknown God" of Calvin.172 For Barth, God does not choose
to be an electing God, but is in all "proper and essential life" a God of election
always. "And how can we speak of the election ofGod without speaking of the
concrete life of the very being ofGod?" is no abstract question for Barth, it is a
"constituent (Bestandteil) part of the doctrine of God."173 Election itself has
"priority over all the acts ofGod" in Gunton's reading.174 He discerned that the
"heart ofBarth's radical restructuring" of the doctrine election proceeds in this
christological manner:
If the history of this man [Jesus] is the electing action of God, then
we need neither look at our own experience nor for a God different
or lying behind this story.175
The question then between Tillich's Gestalt of grace, and Barth's covenantal
grace lies between the human apperception of grace and the character of the
electing God. Tillich would later propound a "God behind God", that is a reality
of God lying behind human speech and understanding and not completely disclosed
in the historical existence of Jesus. Just exactly how antithetical or similar the
stances between Barth and Tillich still remain to be seen in the their future
theological expositions. Gunton finds two important issues in Barth's concept of
172
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election. The first is the "license" for discourse concerning the primal decision.
God appears to be the electing will itself and, in Barth's words, "not an abstraction
from or fixed and static result (Ergebnis) of it."176 The other contention concerns
"the difficult notion that God is eternal event. It is a christological question for
Gunton who writes:
How do we hold together such diverse statements that God is eternally
and essentially the one who graciously elects himself and his people
and that Jesus Christ, a man, is this eternal electing God?177
Gunton finds the answers in Barth's doctrine of revelation which is "something
that happens in history that by its very nature authenticates itself to certain
observers of that event as being unavoidably describable in sentences containing
the word'God'."178 Barth's doctrine of the Trinity is a description of the "threefold
divine event: to say what God essentially is if this kind of thing happens." This
event of the Trinity, exemplified in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus
is "election taking place."179 Election is seen by Gunton as "one of the most
characteristic acts, perhaps the characteristic, act of the triune God." The
actuality ofGod implied in the "possibility and particularly, the freedom to
become what he is not, to become man." Grace, time and election reflect the









then what God really is.
David Ford, using a narrative paradigm for an understanding of Barth's
theology, focuses on the interpretation of the biblical narratives as a "dominant
approach" that "supports his doctrine of election."180 The Old Testament stories
and sagas are, for Barth, related (as apossibility) to Jesus Christ "even more than
the traditional typological exegetes" in Ford's opinion.181 Barth's doctrine of
election, both in its categories of rejection and inclusion, are "relativized by Jesus
Christ", all other forms are imperfect. Barth was analyzing the biblical narratives
in such a manner to:
find the will ofGod making sense of the interweaving of good and
evil by creating the master pattern, Jesus' death and resurrection,
in which the relation of evil to good is finally defined.182
On the other hand, Bruce McCormack proceeds in a more cautious fashion
regarding Barth's doctrine of election. Tracing a Reformed lineage from Alexander
Schweizer, he outlines the basic exposition of Barth's doctrine as a "material
principle" but stops short of claiming that election functions in exactly this manner.
In McCormack's assessment:
It would be more accurate to say that if Barth's theology had a 'center'
on the level of doctrinal expression, that center was an ellipse with two
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foci: election and Christology.183
However, it might be argued that these "two foci" provide a bipolar material
principle. In Barth's theology it seems difficult to separate election from
Christology and vice-versa. Barth claims that "Primarily, then, electing is the
divine determination of the existence of Jesus Christ, and election (being elected)
the human."184 Jesus is both Elected and Elector, the material and particular duality
of the Covenant. Barth insisted that Lutheran dogmaticians were preoccupied with
the notion of the doctrine ofjustification by grace alone.185 For Barth, Scripture
embodied both a formal and material principle in one. Later, in the Church
Dogmatics II/2, Barth still maintained that predestination (or the doctrine of
"divine decrees") was not to be considered a "central dogma" for, as Christians,
we are commanded "to take and to understand first the living God in His electing
{Wcihleri), and in the specific relationship which He has established with man in
Jesus Christ."186 The focus, then, remains christological in character.
Here a comparison with Tillich's methodology will prove useful. In the
first volume of his Systematic Theology, Tillich speaks of a "formal criterion of
theology as that "which concerns us ultimately. Only those propositions are
183
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theological which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of
ultimate concern for us."187 He continues by asserting that "Our ultimate concern
is that which determines our being or not-being."m Like Barth, Tillich brackets
out the concerns of philosophy, history and science for they are not concerned
primarily with the object of theology (defined as "ultimate concern"). If these
disciplines express themselves symbolically or otherwise concern themselves
with an existential state of being then they can be interpreted theologically, but
only then. This is encompassed by Tillich's "Protestant Principle" elucidated in
his later writings:
It is Protestant, because it protests against the tragic-demonic self-
elevation of religion and liberates religion from itself for the other
functions of the human spirit, at the same time liberating these
functions from their self-seclusion against the manifestations of the
ultimate.189
Accordingly, the second principle regarding the existential state of being or
non-being brings us to the Ground of all being. This question of being is brought
about by the "shock of nonbeing."190 This is the point of priority where "religion,
faith, theology come to man."191 Osborne describes this as a "relational" or
"immanental theology" and, as he points out, both theologians and philosophers
187
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have been scandalized by this conflation which creates a "crypto-" theory. But,
as Tillich has expressed forcefully, there should be no conflict between philosophy
and theology, "nor is a synthesis between them possible" either.192
Tillich moves even closer to Barth with his postulation of the material norm
found in the New Being embodied by Jesus as the Christ. In the next chapter we
will look at this in more detail; but presently two important loci ofTillich need to
be explored. The first is Tillich's understanding of the sources, die Quellen, for all
theological statements. The Bible is the "basic source of systematic theology" but
not the only source "for it cannot be understood and could not have been received
had there been no preparation for it in human religion and culture."193 It stands as
a witness to the event of the New Being in the revelatory acceptance of Jesus as the
Christ by the original authors. In Tillich's exposition on historical theology, Barth
is referred to as "pneumatic-existential" interpreter as opposed to a "scientific"
commentator (such as C. H. Dodd ).194 However, Barth's interpretation "lays bare
the unbridged gap between both methods." Tillich believes that any theology which
is "dependent on predetermined results of the historical approach is bound to
something conditional, that is , with something demonic." Focusing on ultimate
concern frees the theologian from all "sacred dishonesty."








norm in theological discourse. Tillich's basic affinity with Schleiermacher has
been discussed in chapter one, but on the subject of experience Tillich deviated
from him by asserting that experience is not the source of theology; but "a medium
through which the sources 'speak' to us, through which we can receive them."195
This caveat regarding experience would also apply to "post-Christian" categories
as Tillich explains:
Christian theology is based on the unique event Jesus the Christ,
and in spite of the infinite meaning of this event it remains this
event, and, as such, the criterion of every religious experience.196
Therefore, experience is derivative of this event, for human religious feeling could
"become an independent source of systematic theology only ifman could become
an independent source of all religious experience, the Spiritual power in him."
Modern anthropological doctrine implies this unity, but Tillich takes the line of
the Reformers' notions of sin very seriously at this point, for "revelation comes
against [humanity] and to [humanity] and not from [humanity]." Like Barth, Tillich
saw the danger of a theology which posits experience as an independent source of
revelation as opposed to a dependent medium of systematic theology. And also like
Barth, the christological focus was the material norm because the "New Being in








between Barth's doctrine of the Covenant and Tillich's notion of ultimate concern
will be compared in greater detail.
The electing event of Jesus Christ was undoubtably of ultimate concern to
Karl Barth. Webster contends that election, for Barth is "arguably":
the classic instance in the Church Dogmatics of Barth working out
his conviction that the church's talk of Jesus Christ is to furnish the
ground and content of all theological doctrine.198
Furthermore, as McCormack points out, this ground is founded upon the ontic
basis of election.199 He notes Emil Brunner's dismay at Barth's notion of election
concerning the pre-temporal character of the Incarnation "torn out of the sphere
of history." Brunner contended:
The idea of the pre-existent Divine Humanity is an ad hoc artificial
theory of the theological thinker, who can only carry through his
argument that the Man Jesus is the Only Elect Human being by means
of this theory.200
Brunner also reflects on the implicit universal salvation in the double predestined
decree ofChrist as both the Elected and the Rejected One. The answer is to be
found in Barth's "objectivism" that, "in comparison with revelation, with the
objective Word of God, the subjective element, faith, is not on the same level, but
is on a much lower plane."201 This "objectivism", for Brunner, threatens the validity
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of the subjective sphere for Barth's doctrine of election for it "means that
everything has already taken place in the sphere of pre-existence."202
Bruce McCormack has pointed out an inconsistency between election for,
in and by Christ, and Barth's doctrine of the Trinity. He asks, "What is the logical
relation of God's gracious election to the triunity of God?" This is not a question of
chronology but one of logic for it is concerned with the coherence of election and
the trinity. It is an attempt to take Barth's phrase "the actual order of things"203
seriously: "It is to ask about the relation of act and being in God, of will and
essence."204 As McCormack points out, Barth did not seem to ask this and this is,
perhaps, because of the way his understanding of election developed. "Barth's
mature doctrine of election only began to emerge from 1936 on—which means
after he had completed his doctrine of the Trinity.205
The Covenant Explicated
After lengthy discussions on the place of electoral doctrine in previous
dogmatics and a reiteration of Jesus as the self-determination and self-ordination
ofGod, Barth proceeds to define his notion of the covenant in more definite terms.










"with man by giving up His Son for him, that He Himself might become man in
the fulfillment ofHis grace."206 Therefore, Jesus Christ is the electing God and
the elected man and "electing is the divine determination (Bestimmung) of the
existence of Jesus Christ, and election (being elected) the human."207 As Christ
is the "beginning of all God's ways and works" so too, his election as incarnated
human is also an election to suffering.208 Barth continues, "For this reason, the
crucified Jesus is the 'image of the invisible God.'"209 This image is the
representation of the One who has undertaken a "severe self-commitment"
(,schwerste Kompromittierung) to the "actual onslaught and grasp of evil."210
Election is a christological determination, a christological double (or dialectical)211
predestination (for Christ is both elected and judged), an election of a community,
notprima facie an election of the individual, other than Jesus Christ. As Barth
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entity.212
God's honor dwells in the covenantal community, both in Israel and the
Christian Church, as an arena for the effective visibility of the "self-presentation
(,Selbst-darstellung) of Jesus Christ and the act ofGod which took place in Him."213
Herein lies the iconic responsibility of the community to provide the proper
portrayal of the work of God in Christ. From the graced community the gift of
Christ to the world must also be presented as gift, as any other portrait would be
an idol. Barth counsels that in the Gestalt of the Church:
All that is implied in the nature and will of the electing God, all that
God has given and gives and will give, all that is in any circumstance
(Umstanden) to be expected from Him, is what the community ofGod
reveals in its final form as the Church.214
Only after the establishment of the christological point of election and the
mediating function of the community (both Israel and Christian) does Barth
proceed to the election of the individual. However, this elected individual is
not given the honor due only to Christ, this individual can only be described
in terms of a state of relatedness to God as one forgiven. Indeed, for Barth,
it is in the act of forgiveness, through the decrees ofjustification and
predestination that the elected individual is brought into the "remarkable
proximity" (imerkwiirdige Nahe) of the divine name, the "I am that I Am"
212
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ofExodus 3:14. The efficacy of the covenant defines the boundaries of singularity
and particularity for:
It is the individuality (Einzelneri) and solitude (Einsamsein) ofGod
which constitutes the elect individual, and to which he owes the
particularity of his name. Because and as God is this One, they-
-the elect— are this or that person.215
The ultimate purpose of any particularity in the elect individual is to be the "kind
of [human] for whom Jesus Christ is."216 Knowing this fact that God is love and
has loved in particularity in and through Christ, determines the individual's place
in the covenantal community. There is a responsibility on the part ofGod that calls
for a reciprocity of the elect in the midst of this covenantal community. Barth turns
to the theme of ethics and sanctification in the last chapter of this volume.
The Command of God
The obedience elicited by covenantal obligation finds its form in both grace
and law for Barth. To avoid any Pelagianism creeping into this relationship, as
a synergistic manipulation ofGod's free grace, Barth reminds us that it is still a
christological formation that gives any answer to the ethical dilemma.
The man Jesus, who fulfills the commandment of God, does not give
the answer, but by God's grace He is the answer to the ethical question
put by God's grace.217








self in Jesus Christ, then a new ethical question may be asserted: does Barth's
concept of divine ethics call the elect to embark on a journey to gaze upon the
ultimate icon of this divine gift? Or (in spite of all christological adumbrations)
does this call for obedience still retain a measure of anthropocentric effort that
can only give the concept of covenant a tinge of human self-attestation in the ways
we are called to be witnesses to this gift? How does one "endorse" this covenant by
any human behaviour at all?218 Timothy Gorringe frames the issue in this way,
"The danger of such a command ethic can be that it seems to warrant an ethical
occasionalism, and to be entirely arbitrary."219 Has Barth overstated his case for
election and its concomitant icon, when he claims that, "Jesus Christ does not
exist, therefore, without the covenant with man which was made and executed in
His name."?220 In whatperceivable fashion does this covenantal icon reflect the
eternity ofGod both in its gaze and its reception?
John Webster underscores the Barthian problematic notion of the divine
command that threatens "to undermine the reality of the human subject and agent
which it seeks to establish."221 The elect are christologically sublated in effect, for
218
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Barth asserts that the person in Christ:
exists because Jesus Christ exists. He exists as a predicate of this
subject, i.e., that which has been decided and is real for man in this
Subject is true for him.222
The issue of human freedom looms large here; if the elect are subsumed into an
onto-theological relationship with Christ, what are the limits, the barriers of an
iconic lifestyle? More importantly, are the elect the icons themselves? Barth
realizes that he is sailing close to the wind of this but stabilizes the issue by
claiming that elective grace has a teleological thrust that comes from and in the
form of the person ofChrist himself. Covenantal grace, willed and determined by
God manifests ethical involvement that leads to actions that "become the image of
God."223 Again, the elect are "the image (Bilde) of God and His action which [their]
own action reflects (abbildet) and to that extent copies {widerspiegelt) the grace of
God."224 However, there is to be no deification of the elect, making them "a second
Christ."225 There can be no "abolition" (aufgehoben) of the "infinite qualitative
difference" between God and humanity as Barth had claimed so long ago in his
Romerbriefof 1918. So in what form can this elective grace be found if not in the
ectype of the believer?










the "reality fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ."226 This cannot be found in the
Kantian imperative for "it reveals the fact that to obey it is not merely the highest
duty but also the highest good."227 However, a mere idea of the good as regulating
principle would be false and idolatrous. Barth reminds us that the elect are called
on to witness to a very specific narrative, that of Jesus Christ in his crucifixion and
Resurrection. It is the death ofChrist, as saturated phenomena perhaps, where Barth
sees the judgement of God on the idol making of humanity:
The death of Jesus Christ is this act of divine proof (Taterweis). It is
the execution (Vollzug) of the judgement... In the death of Jesus is
the confrontation between God and humanity, in the command and
the human ways and deeds, visibly and effectively, once and for all.228
The event of the death of Jesus on the cross ofGolgotha "can never be more than a
reference (Hinweis)"229, and, as such, loses its saturation as phenomenon. For Barth,
human words must not either "introduce" or "exploit" the signification of this event.
Conclusion
If the crucifixion of Jesus can only be a referent in Barth's scheme, then what
mediates its significance to us? Is the biblical text itself, the words and accounts in
scripture to be perceived as an icon? Barth would admit the iconic character










crucified and risen Christ himself. The question still remains, how exactly is the
meaning of the cross given to the elect? It is only in the agency of the divine Spirit
ofGod that this hermeneutic can exist:
If the Holy Spirit does not speak itself, so that we see, that which we
are to see in this prospect (Ausblick), then the mystery of the grace of
God cannot be disclosed (eroffnet) through this fundamental reflection
(Uberlegung), even through this final reference.230
Perhaps the task of a phenomenological interpretation should concentrate on the
giveness of the Spirit, but it is acknowledged that Barth's theology is somewhat
deficient in pneumaticalogical terms.231
An experience of the Spirit might also lead to an even greater emphasis on
the "supranatural" that troubled Tillich in his assessment ofBarth. The assertion
of a sacramental Word of God and a cerebral doctrine of the covenant leads to the
constant question regarding the absolute criteria to evaluate that which is posited
as iconic. If one can only speak in biblical terms, or in the language of the Spirit,
then only that language itself can be seen as iconic. This could (and has) lead to a
idolatry of the Bible that has damaged the Church throughout the centuries. By the
same token an over- adoration of icons, whether visual or sacramental, can become
demonic as Tillich had pointed out. But Barth still needed to reckon with the reality
of creation with all its idolatrous dangers, a creation that existed in the freedom of
Ibid., 751, translation amended.
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God to be for humanity, and humanity free to be for God. And to this Barth turned
in his subsequent volume of the dogmatics, the "Doctrine of Creation."
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CHAPTER 8
TILLICH: THE GESTALT OF GRACE IN THE
SYSTEMATICS
Paul Tillich emphatically stated that "the centre ofmy theological doctrine
of the knowledge of God is the concept of symbol."1 The implication of this claim
will be the focus of this chapter. Nothing can be said about God which is "not
symbolic" for "non-analogous non-symbolic knowledge of God has less truth than
analogous or symbolic knowledge."2 Symbolic analogy, so important for Tillich
leads to the postulation of the analogia imaginis which undergirds his christology
as "an analogy between the picture and the actual personal life from which it has
arisen" namely that of Jesus Christ.3 The analogia imaginis allowed the first
disciples to create a picture, a Bild of Jesus as the Christ of faith. This symbol
"participates in the reality of that which it stands."4 What will be demonstrated in
this section is how Tillich developed this symbolic theology, its contribution to
1
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his separation from Barth, his post-war political apathy, and the paradox of the
Incarnation leading to his striking doctrine of Jesus Christ as the bearer of the
symbol of the New Being.
Tillich's Emigration and Life in America
After a stormy transit across the Atlantic, Tillich and his family arrived in
New York harbor on November 4, 1933. Originally, Tillich had only planned
to stay in the United States for one year, but this hope was soon to be dashed in
spite of his attempts to secure a teaching position once again in Germany.
However, the warm reception he received from Reinhold Niebuhr and many
German colleagues who had previously emigrated to the United States raised
his spirits considerably. Still, lingering insecurities remained for his faculty
appointment at Union Theological Seminary was only contracted for one year.
Speaking English proved difficult for Tillich for a time; but with the tutelage of
two German-speaking students he made progress. Tillich's strong German accent
never really left him and even in later years he was found somewhat difficult to
understand.5 However, his comprehension ofEnglish was adequate and he became
quite proficient in his ability to understand and compose difficult concepts in
academic jargon. In spite ofTillich's assimilation ofAmerican culture and his
acceptance by the academic world, he always felt that he lived in "two worlds";
5
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a continuing experience of the boundary between the "Old" and the "New".6
Tillich noted his feelings of living in two dimensions in his first printed
autobiographical monograph, "On The Boundary". Prompted by his experience
of separation from Germany, he wrote of the "freedom of fate" that between "the
border of home and alien land" produced the insight of "two inner forces, two
possibilities of human existence."7 He also had a suspicion that the American
theological world had seen him as a Barthian as opposed to being a "radical
theologian" as in Germany. Tillich explained:
But agreement with the Barthian paradox, the paradox of justification,
does not mean agreement with the Barthian Supranaturalism; and
agreement with the historical and critical achievement of liberal
theology does not mean agreement with liberal dogmatics.8
Being allied with Barth in this way prompted Tillich to explain the differences
between his theology and his Swiss colleague in a journal article entitled "What
is Wrong with the 'Dialectical' Theology?" published in April 1935 in the United
States and also in Germany the next year.9 Tillich took issue with the entire
premise ofBarth's concept ofGod's 'Yes' and 'No'. Barth had separated them in
his estimation and, as Tillich had earlier stated in 1923, they should be regarded as
6
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paradoxically connected. Tillich had seen in the Epistle to the Romans that Barth
had used the phrase 'impossible possibility" with regards to the sovereign will of
God which had "given rise erroneously to the name 'Dialectic Theology'."10 Yet
this statement seemed paradoxical itself, for it is "only a constant repetition in
other words of the idea expressed in the paradox." All human possibilities of
philosophy, science, art, and history are "radically separated, for man is a sinner
and the possibility of natural sinlessness is an abstraction that can have for us
absolutely no meaning."
This meant for Barth that "liberal theology is heresy." Tillich saw that Barth
had "from first to last, preserved the sovereign prerogative of God as expressed in
the first commandment." IfBarth was to be criticized it is only possible "when it
deals with that which escapes Barth when judged by his own standard."11 Tillich,
as he had earlier stated, believed the flaw in Barth's concepts lay in his
"supernaturalism". This had caused a great rift between Bultmann, Gogarten and
Barth who had started the Dialectical movement as 'subterranean' workers; but
now had gone their separate ways.12 The problem lay with Barth's absolute
nominalism with regards to the possibility of divine activity. Tillich felt that
Barth's assertions had denied the efficacy of human knowledge, however flawed,







utter ignorance, especially when it begins to doubt its accuracy and to ask for
true knowledge." The "whole history" of religion had been reduced to "a
'Witches Sabbath' of ghostly fancies, idolatry, and superstition" in Tillich's
estimation. Barth's criticism of the religious syncretism and complete identification
with religious history and God's revelation seemed appropriate enough; but the
Church's doctrine of the Logos "is not only truer from the standpoint of dialectic
but in the end signifies much more for every unbiased contact with extra-Christian
piety than does Barth's de-divinizing of the history of religion." However, an
important anthropological question remained; "What is this human entity? Can
it be thought of only as something without the divine, without the capacity for
receiving answers from the divine and for asking questions of the divine?"13
Tillich had agreed with Barth in a repudiation of the so-called "natural
theology." He saw that Barth was "right in combating the identity in nature of God
and man and in rejecting all attempts to find a point in man where he may be able
to find and lay hold ofGod."14 Mysticism also was to be rejected as it might
"permit union with God in the depths ofman's own human nature." But note
Tillich's Augustinian caveat:
Apart from the Augustinian transcende te ipsum there is no access
to God. But this precept does contain within itself the demand to
proceed throughself beyond self (durch sich iiber sich). Therefore,
the other statement, in interori anima habitat Veritas, is more basal





rise above ourselves. This transcendentalizing act does not signify
that we possess the transcendental. The point is that we are in quest
(Frage) of it.15
Tillich also warned that this was not to reduce anthropology to the ideas
ofFeuerbach; but to provide a "solution of the anthropological question, which
is the problem of the finiteness (Endlichkeit) ofman." Though Barth might not
agree that "finiteness is not sin", guilt and despair "are to be understood as sin
in the revelation ofGod." Therefore it would be wrong ofBarth to insist that
sin would make any knowledge ofGod an impossibility. "On the contrary, in
the experience of guilt (Schuld) and despair (Verzweiflung) the question of
perplexing knowledge about God is as radically presented as it ever can be
apart from revelation."
The sense of the God-likeness (Gottsebenbildlichkeit) was affirmed by
Barth in concept, yet denied as "a personality independent of revelation", which
led Tillich to conclude that Barth's dialectic was "unintelligible" (unverstandlich).
He summarized Barth's position:
In general, Barth leaves unexplained how revelation can communicate
anything to man if there is nothing in him permitting him to raise
questions about it, impelling him towards it, and enabling him to
understand it.16
Tillich was proposing over and against Barth his "correlative' theology derived






its subsequent questions, would be answered in the symbols of the Christian faith.
Tillich took issue with Barth's ideas concerning the relation of the Kingdom
of God in regards to human endeavor. "It is a fact of church history that Barth
made an end of the naive identification of the Kingdom ofGod with ecclesiastical
activities, social programs, political reconstruction, or human progress.'"7 This
would not have been possible without Barth's insistence on the unbridgeable gulf
between the divine and the human, "But an instrument that is a mighty weapon in
warfare may be an inconvenient (ungeeignetes) tool for use in the building trade."
Barth's neglect to develop a doctrine of demons seemed to Tillich to be "one of
the weakest points in Barthian teaching, and on this ground his refusal to recognize
a theological ethics is also based."18 This seemed to be a conclusion that existence
was two-dimensional "in dead matter and the form we give to it." The reluctance
of Barthian theology to recognize this problem "does in truth forward demonic
interests."19 In contrast, the truth and reality of dialectical thinking was to be
three-dimensional.
Tillich, however, was not finished with his criticisms ofBarth's dialectical
theology. Later in 1936 he once again took issue with his "Grand Inquisitor"
reference of 1923:








my use of the word demonic to describe it represents a struggle
against the Grand Inquisitor (as portrayed in Dostoevsky's 'The
Brothers Karamazov') that is no longer necessary today.20
The current state of affairs in the Gennan Confessional Church led Tillich to
believe otherwise: "The Grand Inquisitor is now entering the Confessional
Church wearing the strong but tight fitting armour ofBarthian supranaturalism."
This "narrow position" of the Barthian school might have been a saviour of
German Protestantism; but for Tillich "it also creates a new heteronomy, an anti-
autonomous and anti-humanistic attitude that I must regard as a denial of the
Protestant principle." Barth's theology seemed more Lutheran than Calvinistic
and either way led to "an indifference to social questions".21
Similarly, Tillich's experience of Lutheranism was another boundary situation,
one that explained his understanding of grace and justification. Acknowledging his
debt to Martin Kahler as an influential teacher, Tillich wrote of his indebtedness
"for the insight he gave me into the all-controlling character of the Pauline-Lutheran
idea ofjustification." Justification, in Tillich's view, "rends" every human claim
before God and shows the "decadence of human existence" which is overcome by
the "paradoxical judgement" ofGod. Furthermore, his "Christology and Dogmatics
were determined by the interpretation of the cross of Christ as the event of history,"
which allowed him to make a connection with Barth, as well as the analysis of the
human condition by Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Liberal dogmatics, as such,
20




replaced the crucified Christ with the more assured historical Jesus, "Which
dissolves the paradox ofjustification into moral categories."22 Barth's neo-
Reformed attitude, on the other hand, seemed to discard the "scientific work
of two hundred years" by retreating into a "New Supranaturalism."
Higher biblical criticism also played an important role in Tillich's pre-
systematic theology as well. The religionsgeschichtliche Methode ofWellhausen
and Gunkel spoke to his "spirit of prophetic criticism" informing his political
attitude and being "decisive for the shaping ofmy life and thought." So also
Schweitzer and Bultmann in New Testament studies as well as Ernst Troeltsch
"who caused my final transfer of interest from all mediating-theological and
apologetic remnants in Church History and in the problem of historical criticism."
Reference was made to his early christological theses of 1911 where the question
of "how Christian doctrine might be understood, if the non-existence of the
historical Jesus should become historically probable."23
For Tillich, in direct contrast to Barth, the "foundation of the Christian belief
is not the historical Jesus, but the biblical picture ofChrist."24 Barth would later
assert that in relation to the historical Jesus, we are confronted "immediately and
directly with the being ofGod"; and that every human being must exist and have








the divine deliverance enacted in the man Jesus."25 In effect, without the history
of Jesus, we as God's creatures would have no legitimate history of our own.
However, as yet Tillich had not fully described his Christology, as there were
other theologically pressing matters in his new career.
Tillich's innate curiosity and love of travel led to an extended trip across
America in 1935 and a nostalgic return to Europe in 1936. In June of that year,
he met Barth in Switzerland, an "extremely animated friend-to-friend conversation
in which we trade insults."26 Tillich iterated that at that moment in time he felt
"closer to the early Christians than to the Reformation."27 Barth for his part
believed that Tillich's "existence in America is providential." Whether that
remark was a sincere thankfulness for Tillich's escape from Germany, or a wry
jibe the reader will have to interpret. In any event Barth and Tillich "parted as
great friends." It remains unknown whether Barth had read Tillich's journal article
by then. In any event, no more overt descriptions or deep criticisms of each of their
theologies came from either of them for many years following. The growing war
clouds and the deterioration of the European situation saw to that.
After Tillich's return to the United States, as a result of two student petitions,
he was granted full faculty status leading to tenure in 1940. Much thought went
into exactly where he fit in Union Theological Seminary's curricula. When queried
25 CD 111/2, 73.
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about his relationship to the theological studies then in existence Tillich
responded, "I am a triboro bridge: systematics, philosophy, history."28 A new
position was created for him, a chair in philosophical theology, being the first
of its kind in the United States. Tillich's academic future was now secure and a
return to the German academic scene unnecessary. He now was free to speak to
the American religious public in his own terms, as in J. Heywood Thomas' phrase
"It is ironic that the person hailed as America's greatest theologian and philosopher
is not an American."29 His boundary existence made him "essentially a European
theologian" who lived and wrote in the United States.30 His individuality located
him neither in a German theological or an American ethos; he stood apart as a
Continental figure his entire career.
The rapidly deteriorating world situation before the outbreak ofWorld War
Two led Tillich to consider the place ofProtestantism in religious affairs. The
end of the "Protestant Era" seemed a real possibility because of the "mass
disintegration" in Europe.31 The breakdown of feudal economics and early
capitalism had given way to the "amorphous masses, in which the laws ofmass
psychology operate." This malaise had led to the condition of a "meaninglessness
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disciplined elements" and "used them for their own purposes", an apt description
of the totalitarianist regimes then in place.32 The Protestant answer lay in the
doctrine ofjustification by grace alone, "which means that no individual and no
human group can claim a divine dignity for its moral achievements, for its
sacramental power, for its sanctity, or for its doctrine." The "prophetic spirit"
a form of semper reformandans, must be in the center of the Protestant ethos,
and every individual Protestant "is called upon to bear personal responsibility for
this." Even the Bible could not be called upon to "liberate" the individual from this
prophetic criticism, "for the Bible is a subject of interpretation: there is no doctrine,
no prophet, no priest, no power, which had not claimed a biblical sanction for
itself."33 Tillich feared that those who were "embarrassed by the meaninglessness
of their existence" would turn to the "opposing tendencies" such as fundamentalism
or Barthianism, to name two. But these various movements use "unintelligible
symbols which are powerless" for effective use in the present moment. Tillich
explained:
Barthianism, for example, has shown its power to save the German
church from paganization by giving theological aims to a group of
struggling ministers, but it has not been able to reintegrate the younger
generation or the masses of disintegrated proletarians or even middle-
class persons.34








The first was a reappropriation of symbols and "sacred objectivities."
A correlation of its rites and institutional life might be provided "a message
which a disintegrated world seeking reintegration will accept." Secondly,
unlike Catholicism, Protestantism had the freedom to deny any "cleavage
between a sacred and a profane sphere for the work and Kingdom ofGod.35
Third was a continued emphasis on the "principle of prophetic protest" that
would contradict "man's permanent attempts to give absolute validity to his
own thinking and acting."36 In effect the "Protestant Principle" must be invoked
again for Protestantism to save itself and continue to be effective in a world of
competing autonomous claims. This would be the outline for Tillich's theological
work up to and including his systematic writings.
Tillich again returned to Europe in 1937 to attend the Oxford Conference
on "Life and Work." He reflected later that he felt that he had made an important
contribution to the ecumenical movement by persuading the "Commission on
Socialism and Communism and their Relation to the Ecumenical Movement"
to include in their summary:
the assertion that it was entirely possible that God was speaking more
clearly through men concerned for social justice who were enemies of
the church than through those who spoke in the name of the churches








An address delivered before this conference re-emphasized aspects ofTillich's
Christological focus. He encouraged the Churches to "reflect upon the great
solutions of their past and to seek for a new solution" to be "expressed in some
powerful symbol" which would be a correlation between Christianity and the
"need of humanity of the present day in its questions and its despair."38 This
symbol was Jesus Christ, who "is the center of history"39 and therefore "human
history is ultimately to be interpreted in terms of salvation."40 In like manner,
the Resurrection, as symbol, "points to the truth that the totality of personal life,
including the human body, belongs to the ultimate meaning of existence."41 Tillich
would later expand this notion of the Resurrection in that "It expresses the eternal
root of the New Being as it is historically present in the event of Jesus the Christ."42
The historical actuality of Jesus ofNazareth, confessed by faith to be "The Christ",
takes on more importance here than in earlier writings, but there is a serious
eschatological dimension in this history for it "moves toward the New Being" as
the "end of history, namely the end of the preparatory period of history and its aim."43
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The Symbols of Grace in Tillich's later writings
During the war years Tillich was preoccupied with his teaching at Union
Theological Seminary, broadcasting sermons into Germany and working with other
German emigres in the New York area. Although maintaining his love of his native
Germany, Tillich saw himselfnow as an American though not involved in politics
at this time. He received an honorary doctorate from Yale University in recognition
of his speaking out against the Nazi regime in the early thirties as well as his
theological and philosophical work.44 In spite ofhis busy schedule he did produce
on important article that clarified his understanding of religious symbol. Published
in 1940, just before America's entry into World War Two, Tillich spoke of the
"figurative quality" of the symbol and its giving "something of a higher rank."
He explained that, for example:
Devotion to the crucifix is really directed to the crucifixion on Golgotha
and devotion to the latter is in reality intended for the redemptive action
ofGod, which is itself a symbolic expression for an experience of the
unconditioned transcendent.45
Symbols have "perceptibility" that give an excess of "surplus value", in regard to
exploitive economic symbols, or the "idea of the 'Supreme Being'" as a symbol
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power" toward that which is the ultimate reality.
Tillich goes on to classify these religious symbols in three categories. First,
"Objective" symbols are concerned with the "world of divine beings" that is, God
as the "Supreme Being."47 The danger, of course, lies in turning God into an object,
but the surplus of the symbol should "surpass every conception of a being, including
even the conception of a Supreme Being."48 The second category deals with the
"characterizations of the nature and actions ofGod." The third group are those
symbols that are the "natural and historical objects that are drawn as holy objects"
and therefore become religious symbols.49 Even personalities, such as Buddha or
Christ, would fall into this category. But in response to the charge that Tillich had
reduced Christ to a mere symbol he underscores that the "symbolic character of
Christ involves also his empirical character." Yet this "empirical aspect" cannot
be separated from "symbolic intuition."50 Christ is not a "thing-in-itself' to be
empirically scrutinized, but only understood in the experience of faith.
Lastly, the third group falls into the category of "pointing symbols." Cultic
rituals and symbols "such as the cross" fall into this grouping. Tillich thought that
an "elaboration" of this class of symbols would be "tantamount to working out a










in this category as a "transitional" symbol that carries the divine only when these
symbols "are imbued with sacral power" in the religious act "oriented to them."51
This caveat looms large in the discussion between the sacramental as symbolizing
grace (albeit only transitionally) and the more enduring symbology of grace that
abides in the disclosure of the infinite in a more permanent sense. Tillich elaborates
in a pertinent footnote:
The Calvinist criticism of the mass (as 'accursed idolatry') forces it
into the demonic and makes the eucharist a mere 'pointing' symbol:
the beginning of its disappearance.
However, a phenomenological possibility remained for Tillich in that the symbol
"freeing itself from all its demonizations and profanizations will come to life
again through the power inherent in it, is always a real possibility in abstractor52
Contextual faith is the key which cannot be determined apriori nor on the "basis
of something extraneous to it." Unfortunately, Tillich did not provide an example
of what might be construed as "extraneous."
Critical replies by both Wilbur Urban and Edwin Aubrey led Tillich to
respond and clarify some of his views. Aubrey took note of Tillich's illustration
ofGolgotha as an "esoteric allegorical" interpretation that was Alexandrian in
character. This, in his view, was the stance of the Barthians, who tended towards
"a highly individualistic treatment of symbols." He continued by asserting that,
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has already become apparent in Barthian circles." Aubrey did not think that Tillich
was guilty of this , "but that the method has its dangers."53 One danger was taking
the context of the symbol more seriously than the "emotional significance which
arouse powerful reactions in the person who experienced the sign."54 Compare this
with Marion's notion of the paradox of the phenomenon (symbolic or otherwise)
that the experience of the receiver is all important for:
The paradox not only suspends the phenomenon's subjection to the I;
it inverts it. For, far from being able to constitute this phenomenon,
the I experiences itself constituted by it.55
This reconstitution of the self in the experience of grace Tillich had earlier
recognized as the "grasping" of the "reality of grace" and the being drawn into
"the life of a Gestalt of grace."56
As the war drew to a close in the fall of 1944 and spring of 1945, Tillich
became preoccupied with the state of the world and the future destiny ofGermany.
Recriminations for Nazi war crimes and the Holocaust were in the air and many
of the refugees feared the results for the German people would be catastrophic.
Tillich was installed as the provisional chair of a council that issued a declaration
that stressed fair and democratic measures for the postwar re-construction of
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and an effort to establish a program of political unity that "all anti-Nazi forces"
could "eventually adhere."57 Unfortunately, the members of the council were
divided among themselves and the bitter divisions led to its demise in the Autumn
of 1945. Tillich's involvement with this council led to his being invited to a White
House dinner at the request ofEleanor Roosevelt and also being blacklisted for a
time by the U. S. Army for his membership in what was mistakenly identified as a
pro-German and pro-Communist organization. The net effect for Tillich was to
scare him away from the political scene.58 For him the time of the kairos had
passed leaving only a "sacred void" of human expectation.59
Tillich's concern for the circumstances of post-war society were articulated in
an essay entitled "The World Situation", published in 1945. The "self-destructive
forces" of a privileged industrial society led to the crisis in civilization; "The
disintegration and transformation of bourgeois society is the dynamic center of the
present world situation."60 Christianity must, to be prophetic and correlative in this
new situation, "develop the church toward an inclusive reality that unites different
existential interpretations" to provide a sense of "rational truth."61 Religious
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"escapism" was not an antidote but an "affirmation" of the "influences of divine
grace" and its presence in the historical situation. Christianity must continue to
relate this Gestalt of grace to the "history of divine revelation" and to its most
"central reality-Jesus Christ."62
The following year, Tillich re-emphasized the need for a theonomous culture
to express "in its creations an ultimate concern and a transcending meaning not as
something strange but as its own spiritual ground."63 But a new dimension was to
be added now that the kairos had seemingly passed, that of the "void." Indeed, for
Tillich, "Often one gets the impression that only those cultural creations have
greatness in which the experience of the void is expressed" which brings about an
experience of expectation, "of 'not yet', of a being broken from above."64 This
was not to undermine the idea of theonomy in any way, it was to be its "strongest
confirmation." Tillich saw that Barth's turn from a "theology of radical detachment
from culture" to an "equally radical attachment to the fight against a demonically
distorted cultural system" stood as an illustration.65 However, healing remained an
expression of salvation and "consequently can become a genuine symbol of the
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symbol and its impact on the social sciences of psychiatry and psychology.
The Christian church, Tillich believed, had lost some of its theonomous
symbols as well. The idea of the Church as the "mystical body ofChrist" lost
its symbolic power "when the church became a voluntary covenant of individuals
and society became the realm of social contracts for preliminary purposes." The
past had shown how the Church, after losing this symbol, had tried to "re-establish
theonomy on an autonomous foundation."66 In the same manner the idea of
"personality" being a symbol for God had led to human personality being "driven
into neurotic disintegration."67 All this was to be later explicated in Tillich's
systematic writings as he struggled to articulate that which would be a "new
theonomy ... an ultimate concern in all our concerns."68
As the new decade of the fifties approached Tillich began his preparations to
finalize his systematic theology in book form. Essays were published and his first
major contribution to the American religious scene appeared as The Protestant Era.
But before his systematics were to be published two important events occurred in
Tillich's life that influenced the final outcome. One was his trip to Germany in
1948, and the other, an article on the Incarnation that was to outline his mature
Christology and notion of the New Being.








affluence (he purchased a house in East Hampton) and the guilt he harbored about
the hardships his relatives in Germany had undergone. Tillich saw that the postwar
situation in Germany was "thoroughly tragic, a situation in which the element of
freedom is as deeply at work as is the element of fate, which is the case in every
genuine tragedy."69 The moment of kairos as authentic possibility had passed,
now to be replaced by Tillich's new interest in the existential concepts of anxiety
and dread. Even in postwar America there seemed to be a new interest in the
"fundamental question of human existence: 'What am I?'"70 Tillich would become
concerned with the psychological well-being ofhumans and the correlating answers
given by the symbols of the Christian faith. The representation of Jesus, confessed
as the Christ, as the New Being was the most important correlating symbol in this
schema. And the event of the Incarnation needed an existential understanding to
explain this possibility. This reinterpretation may have resulted from Tillich's
"unexpectedly jovial" meeting with Barth in Basel, who seemed to appear older
and "his face deeply lined. They disagreed about the Resurrection and talked of
prophets and church administrators."71 Whatever the immediate reason, Tillich's
essay appeared in 1949.
The Incarnation was an event of "universal significance, concerning the whole
69






of being, and transforming the conditions of existence generally."72 The biblical
interpretation of this event does not "imply that God as such becomes man" but
that the divine Logos appears as a human being.73 Tillich continued:
The paradox of the Incarnation is not that God becomes man, but that
a divine being who represents God and is able to reveal him in his
fulness, manifests himself in a form of existence which is in radical
contradiction to his divine, spiritual and heavenly form.74
Hegel and German classical philosophy were wrong, in Tillich's' estimation,
to "confuse the dialectical relation of fmiteness and infinity" with the doctrine
of the Incarnation. So also, Barth and his followers were wrong "in denying the
dialectical interdependence of finiteness and infinity."75 But the Barthians were
right in stressing the paradoxical character of the Incarnation.
The paradox of the Incarnation was the "manifestation of original and
essential Godmanhood within and under the conditions of existence."76 Existence,
Tillich saw, was being, in distinction to non-being, and in distinction from essential
being.77 This phenomenon was the appearance of "essential Godmanhood" in human
reality without any loss of its essential character.78 Only in the manifestation of the
72
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New Being has the unity between essence and existence been overcome. This
is the ultimate "transition from potentiality to actuality."79 Tillich re-asserted
that Barth was right in stressing the great gulf between God and humanity but
at fault for not inquiring into the dialectical interdependence between them.80
This anthropomorphism contained an "indestructible element of truth" that
Barth refused to acknowledge.
The Incarnation of the New Being, seen in this manner, represented not only
the essential unity between finiteness and infinity, but also the unity between
individuality and universality, contingency and creativity, anxiety and courage,
and from mortality to eternity.81 Tillich goes on to describe this "representation"
as the "picture" of Jesus as the Christ. As such it is the metaphorical reading of
the event of the Incarnation that is of value. Tillich elucidated:
The photographic implications of the event are, from the beginning,
reduced to unimportance by its interpretation as the appearance of the
Christ or as the Incarnation.82
It is only the "transforming power" of the picture that impacts existence.
Yet, this does not create existential thought; it is the victory over the structures of
existence by the New Being that creates the picture that transforms finitude and the










is the prius ofChristian experience." This New Being is both the beginning and
the eschatological end that orients existence. It is a correlative symbol for:
The New Being appears first as command and expectation, when
the question is asked, when man understands his existential situation
in which the contradiction and tragedy are manifests as the longing
for salvation from it.83
This departure from the Chalcedon creed seemed to many to be heretical.
George Tavard found Tillich's formulation Docetic and the notion of "eternal
Godmanhood" denigrating of the Jesus ofHistory. Yet, for Tavard, a concreteness
towards the divinity of Jesus, as opposed to a universal state of "Godmanhood"
would suffice to bring Tillich more in line with orthodox Christology.84 Others,
such as J. Heywood Thomas pressed Tillich to define the essence of the New Being
in more detail. In a lecture of 1953 he described the New Being as "a class with only
one member" that was not "genus nor species but a power."85 Thomas thought that
Tillich would have to "resort to some rather desperate dialectics in order to save his
Christology from being in the end inadequate."86
A more positive approach to Tillich's re-interpretation of the Chalcedonian
formulation lies in the horizon of the Bild of the New Being. As a saturated
phenomenon the Incarnation might be perceived under Marion's postulation of
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event of the Incarnation is an historical occurrence attested to in the New
Testament. Both Tillich and Barth are seeking to explicate the phrase "according
to the Scriptures" in the terminology of their context. However, any new account
of Scriptural events can only speak "on the basis of' and this is precisely the irony
of any theological utterance. Barth has called this the task of "what we must say on
the basis of the apostles and the prophets."87 Tillich is seeking to do just that; to
speak in a new way about a biblical event and its relevance to a modern audience.
This is the ongoing task of a theology of correlation. David Kelsey responded to
Tillich's theology in a more beneficial manner in his refusal to conclude that
Tillich "begins" his theological reflections with anthropology.88 What Kelsey seeks
are the warrants that allow Tillich to move from the biblical pictures of Christ to
the categories of the New Being that are espoused in his theology. Tillich's use
of symbol as an "expression of a revelatory event" contains "that which was
revealed."89 This symbolic correspondence provides the warrant that allows for
the phenomenological expressions of the events themselves. Kelsey elucidates:
This part ofTillich's analysis of the dynamics of revelation yields
the following warrant: If something is a genuine religious symbol,
then, in the odd discernment and experience of the holy which we
undergo in the presence of the symbol, it mediates to us a 'healing'
90
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The warrant therefore, for an existential interpretation of the Incarnation would
follow the experience of both the "transforming power of the New Being" as
well as the phenomenological transformation of the category of finitude. Regarding
this transmutation as the donation of "bedazzlemenf' (the "holy" or "ecstasy" in
Tillich's parlance) Marion writes:
Finitude is experienced (and proved) not so much through the shortage
of the given before our gaze, as above all because this gaze sometimes
no longer measures the amplitude of the donation. . . Finitude is
experienced as much through the excess as through the lack—indeed,
more through excess than through lack.91
Following Marion's terminology of "pure event" and "absolute phenomenon",
the depiction of the Incarnation that Tillich portrays mediates the horizon of the
event itself. Tillich described this process in a later writing as a "corroboration"
of the phenomenological and the ontological.92 Kelsey recognized that Tillich's
religious event "is not constituted by my act of having religious experience. There
is something else quite independent ofmy act of reception, and that is the act of
giving."93 Tillich had asserted that the Incarnation was an event "which has
happened, and is independent of any interpretation of it." It cannot be discovered
through an existential analysis of human situations or structure, it is a saturated
phenomenon for it is "unrepeatable, incomparable, a subject of report and not of
91
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analysis or deduction."94 The paradox of the Incarnation is a given, an event of
universal significance, and as such not only a suspension "of the phenomenon's
relation of subjection to the /, it actually inverts that relation."95 This is the "power
of the New Being" which forms the basis ofTillich's christology, for "Without an
understanding of'being' and 'the power ofbeing', it is impossible to speak
meaningfully of grace."96
The Symbol ofGrace
Grace is a function ofChristology in the theology ofPaul Tillich. His
adumbration of this doctrine is found in his first volume of his Systematics under
the heading "The Divine Love as Grace and Predestination."Grace is active in its
qualifying the relations between humanity and God and is "freely inaugurated by
God" and is in "no way dependent on anything the creature does or desires."
There are two basic forms of grace for Tillich, one which "characterizes God's
threefold creativity" and the other that "characterizes God's saving activity."
The first Gestalt is participatory in that it provides being to everything that is;
the second Gestalt is paradoxical for "it gives fulfillment to that which is separated
from the source of fulfillment, and it accepts that which is unacceptable." There is
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elements ofboth"; God's providential grace. This gratia praeveniens is preparatory
for the "acceptance of saving grace through the processes of nature and history."97
Tillich passes over the doctrine of predestination quickly for Double predestination
is an ontological contradiction in terms as it "establishes an eternal split within
being itself." As such it is not a "genuine religious symbol" unless it is taken in the
sense of the "existential experience" that:
God's act always precedes, and, further, that, in order to be certain
of one's fulfillment, one can and must look at God's activity alone.98
If it is seen in this manner, then predestination 'is the highest affirmation of the
divine love, not its negation." However, the logical structure of divine love can
only be discussed in reference to its "existential foundation, the appearance of Jesus
as the Christ." The Gestalt of grace is only to be interpreted in the domain of
christology. Tillich highlighted this relationship in his famous sermon collection,
"The Shaking of the Foundations":
what is demanded of you is only your being open and willing to accept
what is given to you, the New Being ... In the picture of Jesus as the
Christ... he found himself accepted in spite of his being rejected. . .
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The 'New Being': Existence and the Christ
The ultimate symbol of grace is the Messiah, the Christ who does not "save
individuals in a path leading out of historical existence; he is to transform historical
existence."100 All the negative effects of finite being, exemplified by the concept
of estrangement, are conquered by the New Being. This is the elemental paradox
ofChristianity; Jesus is the Christ.101 This paradox is elucidated in that in "one
personal life essential manhood has appeared under the conditions of existence
without being conquered by them."102 The transformation wrought by the New
Being is not only personal and communal, it is cosmic in implication. As the creator
of all history and its ultimate goal, the New Being stands as an "absolute saturated
phenomena" that transcends all limit- horizons, or boundaries, because of its (his)
universal and all-pervasive quality.
The New Being, in its historical assertion, instigates the possibility of faith by
those that participate in its power. Tillich explains:
The power which has created and preserved the community of the
New Being is not an abstract statement about its appearance; it is
the picture of him in whom it has appeared.103










the picture and the actual personal life from which it has arisen."104 This Bild was
the product of the disciples and the witness of the New Testament, for the original
producers of the picture had been grasped by its transforming power. The words
and deeds of the New Being display this transforming potency; but it is his
sacrificial death which overcomes existential estrangement. Tillich elaborates:
Only by taking suffering and death upon himself could Jesus be
the Christ, because only in this way could he participate completely
in existence and conquer every force of estrangement which tried to
dissolve his unity with God.105
The potency of the New Being manifests itself in the modal possibility residing
in the nature ofbeing itself. For Tillich then, the concept of the New Being "re¬
establishes the meaning of grace."106 "Realism" nearly represented grace in a
"magical form", while "nominalism" almost completely lost the concept. What
is required of course is a new symbol of grace that allows "being" and the "power
ofbeing" to have their full meaning.
What is needed in a correlative methodology for Tillich, are symbols that
represent the saturated nature of the phenomenon of the New Being in both his
unbroken relationship with God and the "re-established unity between God and
man."107 A static notion of essence is replaced by a dynamism that opens up new










Schleiermacher's description of Jesus as the Urbild, Tillich's concept of the New
Being is not "unmoved by existence" because of its participation and ultimate
conquest of existence.108
The symbols that most represent the New Being in his subjection to existence
and conquest of it are the "Cross of the Christ" and the "Resurrection of the Christ",
respectively. Their interdependence leads Tillich to recognize that, in regards to the
scriptural witness of the picture of Christ:
One could say that in the minds of the disciples and of the writers
of the New Testament the Cross is both an event and a symbol and
that the Resurrection is both a symbol and an event.109
Both, however, are symbols "based on fact."110 Any hermeneutical attempt to
disambiguate these symbols must avoid the distortions of literalism. Tillich states:
Their power must be re-established by a reinterpretation which unites
cosmic and existential qualities and makes it evident that a symbol is
based on things and events and participates in the power of that which
it symbolizes.111
Note Tillich's caveat that the New Being is not dependent on any symbols in which
it is manifested; "It has the power to be free from every form in which it appears.'"12












the Bild of the New Being. These semantic symbols speak of that which arises
from "ultimate negativity and from that which leads from ultimate negativity."
This Tillich describes as condemnation or eternal death, which is the loss of
"the inner telos of one's being", the exclusion from the Kingdom ofGod and
eternal life. "Salvation is reclaiming for the old (the estranged) and transferring
to the New Being."113 There can be no "saving power apart from him" for the
New Being is "the ultimate criterion of every healing and saving process."114
The efficacy of this salvation is "dependent on man's participation in it."115
Yet the "objective reality" of the New Being precedes any humanly subjective
participation in it.116 Tillich discerns the difference between the Lutheran emphasis
on Justification by Faith and the "pietistic and methodistic" stress on Regeneration.
Noting the "pitfall" ofMelanchton's placing the reception of the Holy Spirit after
the act of faith, Tillich asserts:
Faith, justifying faith, is not a human act, although it happens in man;
faith is the work of the divine Spirit, the power which creates the New
Being, in the Christ, in individuals, in the church.117
Tillich comes down on the side ofRegeneration, which is only possible through












is in no way dependent on man"; it is an act in which God accepts those who are
unacceptable. "Accepting that one is accepted is the paradox of salvation without
which there would be no salvation only despair."118 The work of Sanctification
by the New Being was to be discussed in the third volume ofTillich's Systematics,
Tillich concluded his formal christology in this, his second volume, with this
summary:
the Christ is not an isolated event which happened 'once upon a time';
it is the power of the New Being preparing his decisive manifestation
in Jesus as the Christ in all preceding history and actualizing himself
as the Christ in all subsequent history.119
Tillich continued to deal with the concept of grace in the last volume of
his Systematics. The "Spiritual Presence" of the New Being in the "Spiritual
Community" produces a theonomous state in which the moral imperative is grace.
The "transcendent union" between the believer and the New Being manifests itself
in the community as grace and establishes its own morality.120 Grace, under the
aegis of the Divine Spirit, functions as an absolute phenomenon as it "cannot be
produced but is given."121 The Lutheran doctrine of "Justification by faith" should
be, in Tillich's's opinion, replaced by a more explicit formula "Justification by
grace through faith." And, most importantly:










the cause. Faith is the receiving act, and this act is itself a gift
of grace."122
Here Tillich draws very near to Barth and the Reformed understanding of faith
as the apriori work ofGod, enacted by the agency of Christ. Barth had written
in 1953 that faith comes, "not in any impertinent way" but:
in a freedom which can only be given to man, which has nothing
whatever to do with his own capacity, which rests only on the fact
that by the revelation ofHis grace, by the word ofHis promise,
God has put it in a position to do it, to postulate grace.123
The reality of Love is the "motivating power" in Tillich's theonomous
understanding ofmorality. It is 'unambiguous" for it is grace in a threefold form;
"Spirit, love, and grace are one and the same reality in different aspects." Where
there is the power of the new Being grace abides. Tillich continues, "Spirit is the
creative power; love is its creation; grace is the effective presence of love in man."
The free gift of this grace is reiterated for it is "not the product of any good will
on the part of him who receives it but that it is given gratuitously, without merit
on his side."124 In spite ofTillich's affinity with the Reformed tradition concerning
the doctrine of free and unmerited grace his basic ontological concept remained
unchanged. There could not be a return to any condemnatory elective decree:
The doctrine of the ambiguity of all human goodness and of the
dependence of salvation on the divine grace alone either leads us
back to the doctrine of double predestination or leads us forward
122
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to the doctrine of universal essentialization.125
The symbol that can only lead to an understanding of this essentialization,
defined as the "elevation of the positive into Eternal Life as a matter of universal
participation",126 is the Cross ofChrist. For Tillich, "the ultimate concern of the
Christian" is not the historical Jesus, empirically validated as such, but "the Christ
Jesus who is manifest as the crucified." The crucifixion is the most revealing event
of Jesus' humanity:
Jesus could not have been the Christ without sacrificing himself
as Jesus to himself as the Christ. Any acceptance of Jesus as the
Christ which is not the acceptance of Jesus as the crucified is a
form of idolatry.127
Tillich further clarified his final thoughts on phenomenology, Christology and
the symbol of the Cross in a seminar conducted in 1963. Answering the queries of
students, Tillich sought to explain his ideas in terminology often challenged by the
questioners. The phenomenological method had raised the issue between human
freedom and determinism in such a way as to render these ideas as "not usable."128
This method had allowed for an understanding ofmore than just causality but gave
a description of "acts of freedom." This clarified for Tillich the basic answer to the
"religious problem ofbeing grasped." This is derived from both the New Testament
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notion that we can produce the presence of the Divine Spirit (as religious symbol
for ultimate concern). "We cannot produce, but we are not unfree to receive or
accept."129 And acceptance is the "necessary message of grace."130
Tillich's radical ideas ofChrist as a symbol ultimately represented by the
form of the Cross brought much criticism and consternation from both students
and other theologians alike. His adoptionist stance was inculcated with the
statement that "in the moment Christ, or Jesus, went the way of the cross, he
could become the Christ, and not before."131 Kenneth Hamilton, one of the most
vociferous critics ofTillich, found that his "theonomous metaphysics" prevented
an acceptance of the unity of "whom the New Testament knows as the Lord Jesus
Christ."132 He sees that such an existential interpretation as espoused by Tillich
allowed "sins and sinners" to "vanish in such a gospel, which limits the kind of
Christ it will accept by the kind of salvation it desires." Others, including George
Tavard and Arthur C. Cochrane, believed that Tillich's system did not need the
revelation ofGod in Jesus Christ."133 Also McKelway (with Barth's implicit













found the "lack of consistent focus on the revelation ofGod in Jesus Christ"
disconcerting.134 The separation of the Logos from the historical Jesus seemed
too arbitrary and denigrates the biblical witness. McKelway lamented that if the
"saving Word of God" in Jesus Christ had been "allowed to confront us in all its
objectivity and truth as a reality" and that was not to "be adjusted to our
experience", there would have been no "distortion of Christ's being."135
Tillich attempted to refute his critics both directly and indirectly. In a
response to Catholic criticisms of his christology, he stressed that the historical-
-critical approach, be it positive or skeptical, could never "deliver a biographical
picture of the man Jesus as the basis for faith."136 Only faith can provide the
guarantee that the historical character of event ofChrist provides a sufficient
explanation to the transformation of estranged existence that one experiences.
This led to Tillich's second response that the statement 'This man Jesus was
also God' must not be answered directly (as the ancients had tried to do) but
be replaced by the question "What does Jesus, who was called the Christ, mean
for us?'"37 Restatements of orthodox Christo-centric doctrines such as this led
the Protestant theologian Nels Ferre to regard Tillich as "the most dangerous
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defect in favour of Tillich!138 Yet in a candid assessment of both Barth and
Tillich, he wrote:
It seems likely that he and Barth will leave behind well-fashioned,
theological positions to represent our day; and yet Tillich, in many
senses, is beyond our day-the voice of the theological ages.139
Such were both the criticisms and the compliments for Tillich after the release
of his Systematic Theology. Accolades and wealth were to follow.
The Later Years
In 1955, Tillich retired from Union Theological Seminary only to resume
teaching at Harvard University Divinity School. His archives were later established
in Andover and he later wryly lamented that Harvard "had made him famous."140
The price of this new-found fame led to his giving lectures all over the United States
and Europe. World travel became a reality; visits to Greece, Japan, Egypt, Israel and
Switzerland were all made. The travel led to a meeting with Karl Barth in December
of 1963. Barth invited Tillich once again to his home in Basel and wrote in a letter to
him:
Where shall we begin when we sit down together again? With the
infirmities of age which obviously afflict us both? Or with the Ground
ofBeing which unconditionally affects us both? Or with the difficulties
you have with my books and I have with yours??141
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Barth later wrote of their last meeting together, "I warned him that now might
be the time to get himself straight. But he didn't seem to want to do that very
much."142 His last letter to Tillich summed up their relationship:
It is for me a very special phenomenon that we understand one another
so well and cordially at the human level, but materially—and don't try
to offer me a synthesis, in so doing you would only strengthen me in my
opinion!—we can only contradict and oppose one another from the very
foundation up.143
In a similar way, Tillich enjoyed Barth's company, but he too voiced his
continued opposition to Barth's theological approach. Yet a strong, if not grudging,
respect for Barth's work continued to be held by Tillich, as Langdon Gilkey recalls
(using Tillich's German inflected English):
Venn you're fighting against a tyrant, zen Barth is ze best man to
have on your side. He drives a sharp wedge between heaven and
earth, between the gospel and culture. And zat is good venn culture
becomes demonic and claims ze authority and power of heaven. With
Barth's sharp diastasis (separation), he gives to us ze power to resist ze
tyrant who then represents Kultur, has in fact swallowed Kultur whole,
and there is zen in Kultur itself no place to stand. Zat is why Barth's
theology had such power in these days. It gave power to all those who
wanted to resist Hitler and found in German culture no place from
which to resist. Barth's message was appropriate for zat Kairos-more
appropriate zen mine. I respect and have always respected Barth, not
only for the originality and power of his theology but also for the clarity
of his insight into the idolatry ofHitler and his courage for declaring it.144
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and yet also with great vulnerability' and continued:
But, I was right about the relation of culture to theology, even a theology
of resistance against culture, and Barth was wrong, even about his own
'revelation theology' which isfull of culture. And I resisted for the right
reason, justice for the Jews rather than the freedom of their evangelische
pulpit. And I left on an earlier train!145
However, in his final estimation it was Barth who "became the man, and the savior
ofEuropean Protestantism."146 And, on his return to the United States, Tillich
announced that "Barth and I are friends again!"147
After receiving honorary doctorates from Harvard, Glasgow and the University
ofBerlin, the last most meaningful to him, Tillich's final professional move was to
the Divinity School of the University of Chicago until his death in 1965. Tillich's
anxiety over death was the fear of being eternally forgotten. In a sermon in the
Eternal Now he wrote:
Is there anything that can keep us from being forgotten? That we were
known from eternity and will be remembered in eternity is the only
certainty that can save us from the horror ofbeing forgotten forever.
We cannot be forgotten because we are known eternally beyond past
and future.148
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Conclusion: The Cross of Christ as Saturated Phenomenon
Tillich's phenomenological approach to ontology has seen by reviewers as
both positive and negative in about equal measure. As we have seen, much of the
criticism of his Christology is based on both his repudiation of the absolute need
for historical verification of the events of Jesus ofNazareth, as well as a perceived
reduction of the character of Christ to a mere symbol. More pertinent to our
analysis of Tillich's phenomenology of the Cross are those criticisms of his basic
thesis of an ontological interpretation of this symbol centered on the overcoming of
finite existence in the event of the crucifixion.
Tillich had asserted, over against the biblical interpretation of a pre-existent
Christ, that in fact, "in the moment Christ, or Jesus, went the way of the cross, he
could become the Christ, and not before."149 The power of the New Being is not
entirely contained in the pre-existent Logos of John's Gospel, as specified by a
"high" Christology because "it removes the paradox for the sake of a supranatural
miracle."150 The Protestant Principle "according to which God is near to the lowest
as well as to the highest" calls for a Tow Christology' which, in effect, is a "truly
high Christology."151 This is an appropriate view as the human Jesus is involved
in the ambiguity of finite existence made possible by the "eternal unity ofGod and
149





man within the divine life."152
It has been noted how this principle of participation influenced Tillich's view
of the Incarnation. But this also raised the issue that, if "Jesus, as the symbol of the
cross, retained the principle of self-denial and self-criticism"153, how can finite
estrangement be overcome by such self-abnegation? Indeed, as William Rowe
pointed out, if the symbol of the Cross radically criticizes "all idolatrous self-
elevation"154 and, as Tillich admits, becomes itself in Christian history an idol
of the holy, what gives this symbol its ultimate and unique referentiality?
The stress on the phenomenological plenitude of the symbol of the Cross
and its corporate modality is adumbrated by Tillich in its nature as manifestation.
The result of the Cross as saturated phenomenon is the actualization of "God's
participation in the suffering of the world."155 Robert Scharlemann regards the
symbol of the Cross in its phenomenological redundance as being for Tillich:
above critical reflection because it is grasped by radical reflection,
and its presence cannot be removed by doubt because the response
it elicits is that of a radically doubting response.156
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provides an "obedience which is not fixed upon the historically given Jesus."157
The gaze of the human on the symbol of the Cross gives both a glimpse of eternal
reality in the guise of "ultimate concern." God's "ultimate concern" for humanity
is shown by Christ's gaze from the Cross to humankind. "The true object of
that concern can only be a paradoxical something—it has to be christological
rather than only theological or only ontological "I58 This is Tillich's "distinctive
contribution to systematic theological thought" in Scharlemann's estimation.
In a more critical manner, Adrian Thatcher discerns a serious problem with
Tillich's paradoxical notion of conquest of the New Being over existential
estrangement. This paradox implies a negation of the negative even in eternity for
"the Divine life is the eternal conquest of the negative; this is its blessedness."159
This leads to problems with Jesus' "essential manhood" and the possibility of his
being an actual human being.160 There seems no possible way for Thatcher to see
how this essence could remain undistorted in the existence of Jesus as the Christ.
He contends that:
The main difficulty with Tillich's position is that Jesus first has to
exist before he is able to conquer estrangement, and as existence is
already a transition from essence, it is not possible for Jesus to retain












This criticism has serious implications for the symbol of the Cross as an explicit
symbol of grace without distortion. The sacrifice of Jesus to Jesus would negate
the "individuation pole ... in order that the new being might be made manifest."162
Yet as Thatcher points out, this would also negate any sense of individual salvation
and reaffirmation in the participation in divine grace. 163 The symbol of grace in the
Cross ofChrist would not have any salvific reality for it would not reflect the gaze of
the eternal, but ultimately negate all that which is human. The phenomenon would
only present a limited horizon, limited in finitude and human appropriation,
unsaturated in character. Thatcher attempts to rectify Tillich's Christology by a
redefinition of actual existence and the abandonment ofTillich's "dialectical
mould" by invoking the presence of the "Divine Spirit" as the mediator of the
"new being as it is manifest in Jesus Christ."164 Another option remains open by
phenomenologically asserting that the symbol of the Cross itself is ontologically
distorted, perhaps negating the negation of Jesus to himself and thereby restoring
the participatory nature of gracepro nobis. Tillich saw this possibility as the basic
preeminence of this Christian symbol over other religious symbols; "The basic
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In contrast, Richard Grigg provides a helpful insight into Tillich's
"phenomenon of empowerment" as a "crucial component" of his "post-theistic
thinking "166 He argues that:
Reference to empowerment as a 'phenomenon' is meant to emphasize
its being a matter ofhuman consciousness and not of causal processes
external to consciousness.167
This empowerment results in Christian theology derived from the grace of God;
but it is also a phenomenon working in the context of human consciousness.168
Grigg notes Thatcher's criticism ofTillich concerning the Christological problem
of the actualization of a true humanity that conquers finitude; but remains distorted
by the very reality of the life of Jesus in the malaise of existence. He writes that:
it could be said that while Tillich's analysis of existence
concentrates on the result of actualization in the structure
of being, his analysis of life concentrates on the movement
of actualization.169
The symbol of the Cross may be seen as just that very premise, in all its
distortion and reflection of evil, and that its negation of Jesus acts as the catalyst
for the possibility of any resulting human actualization, empowerment or salvation.
Its phenomenological saturation is bi-polar in character, for on the one hand it
reflects the idolatrous gaze that only sees it as a sign of defeat; but on the other it
166









reveals the gaze of the crucified Christ, who in the moment of his agony
pronounces eternal pardon, "Father, forgive them; for they do not know what
they are doing."170 In this act, the New Being shows his unity with the God of
grace, a unity of participation that invites others to share in this reconciliation.
Grigg raises the important issue of the phenomenological and correlative
task and the appropriate manner with which Tillich intended to accomplish his
apologetics. In Grigg's judgement this "hermeneutical correlation" is more than
a cultural philosophical analysis versus the Christian message rather:
it understands the philosophical questions as articulations of the
structure of being that is the condition of possibility for one's
experiencing anything at all, and understands the Christian
symbols as providing a perspective on the depth of that structure.171
This observation coincides with the assertion of the phenomenological possibility
that restructures the 'I' of transcendental thought. In effect, the "hermeneutical
correlation" method reflects the "mutual dependence" of both the apologetic and
the phenomenological modes of consideration. The phenomenon of the Cross seen
in this way, provides a multi-valency by appearing as both call and stability. Grigg's
analysis of the symbol of empowerment follows a path of a description of the Cross
as saturated phenomenon providing "an indirect account of the particular awareness








Both Scharlemann and Grigg provide an understanding of the basic nature
ofTillich's symbol of the Cross that is determinative for a phenomenological
explication of its saturated characteristics. As paradox it shows the gaze of the
infinite in both its reflection of doubt as ontological distortion and its restructuring
of the transcendent thought and a renewed awareness of being. Tillich sought to
remain consistent with his stated phenomenological task to unite a "an intuitive-
descriptive element with an existential-critical element."173 To conclude, Tillich
believes the paradox of the Cross is the ultimate symbol that alone can provide
salvation to those willing to be shaped by its offer of a new reality. This 'shaping'
comes on the divine initiative ofGod for there is "nothing" in humanity which
"enables God to accept" us. Indeed, humanity must accept that it is accepted by God
-we must "accept acceptance."174 As icon, the shape of the paradoxical Cross invites
and manifests such acceptance. The final judgement of the paradox of the cross will
be assessed in comparison with Marion's doctrine of the Eucharist in the concluding
chapter.





THE COVENANT: CREATION AND RECONCILIATION
With some trepidation Barth moved into this next phase in his dogmatics.
For all his descriptions of the aseity ofGod and the infinite gap between deity
and humanity Barth now proceeded to assert the fundamental goodness and value
of creation. "Creation as such is not rejection, but election and acceptance."1
The great benefit of creation was the honor given by God to created beings and
the sharing of the divine Being in the temporal context of life itself. Covenant is
related to creation as its presupposition, creation related to covenant as the basis
of its history. The creations of the creatures themselves will be highlighted by
Barth's claims of the music ofMozart representing (in some way) a parable of
grace, which, as such, carries the possibility of being a saturated phenomenon.
In this chapter we will also see Barth's continuing assertive Christology for the
humanity of Christ is the only paradigm for true creaturely existence as those
summoned by the grace ofGod. The manifestation of this christo-anthropology
is the focus ofBarth's discursive writings of his Doctrine ofReconciliation.
1 CD III/1, 331.
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The doctrine of the sacraments fills out the conclusion of this section, for it is
here where Barth finally speaks of the iconic symbolism ofBaptism, by extensio
the Eucharist. This will lead to the final question of this essay, has Barth provided
a proper iconic phenomenon to exhibit the gift of grace?
Conflict and Creation
Barth continued his resistance to the Nazi regime from Switzerland during
the years of the Second World War. He felt compelled as a Swiss citizen and as
a Christian to give an unconditional opposition to Hitler. Barth believed that the
Christian Church had been wrong to "speak so thoughtlessly in nationalistic and
militaristic terms during earlier wars" and should not now keep silent in the current
conflict. Barth proclaimed to the churches:
They really should not object that the people of the democratic states
are fighting against God; they should tell them that for God's sake we
may be human and must defend ourselves against the onslaught of
manifest inhumanity with the power of despair.2
The paci fistic attitude of the Swiss state irritated Barth somewhat for he felt that,
"They left every door and every gateway open for Goebbels' propaganda to come
steaming in, but wanted to stop us putting forward the real arguments against it."3
This was "the blot" on the reputation of Switzerland in his opinion. Therefore,
Barth continued his open support for the Allied effort against Germany by both his






speeches, radio broadcasts and lectures were considered politically undesirable
by the Swiss authorities because he had called the government to stop exploiting
the economically weak, to have more socialist representatives in the government,
to lift the restrictions regarding freedom of the press and freedom of speech, to
curtail the right of sanctuary and to cease the trade between Switzerland and the
Axis powers.4 For this Barth was nearly banned from speaking publicly at all;
but many supported his views and protected him from any penal action.
As copies of Barth's The Doctrine ofElection were being smuggled into
Germany, his work on the dogmatics continued unabated in the summer of
1942. Barth was attempting to flesh out his notion of the covenant with a new
concentration on the doctrine of creation. Confidence in this project was not easy
in coming, for he felt that he doubted he would have "turned to this particular
material" if he could have trusted others to undertake the task.5 As it was Barth
had "no confidence in their presuppositions" which were not:
the reception and answer of the divine self-witness, that is, only in
faith in Jesus Christ, i.e., in the knowledge of the unity of Creator
and creature actualised in Him.6
What emerged from this faith in Christ was the fact that "the omnipotence and
righteousness of the Creator is that ofHis mercy." This assertion was irrefutable








How can that be otherwise when He is the Mediator between God
and man , the Executor of the eternal covenant which God in His
love concludes between Himself and man?7
The entire purpose and meaning of creation is the modality of the covenant
enacted in Jesus Christ. Creation, as God's first work, has in view, "the institution,
preservation and execution of the covenant of grace, for partnership in which He has
predestined and called man."8 Creation is the history that has "fashioned the world
as a sphere for man "to participate in grace" and become, as the elect, a being of
gratitude for this gift of grace and a correspondent of it.9 On this basis then could
Barth refer to creation as the "external basis of the covenant."10
This move from the covenant and its implied ethics to the doctrine of the
creation drew criticism for Barth. After his arguments with Brunner and others
concerning the possibility of a natural theology, this emphasis on a good creation
appeared to be contradictory. But how could creation be viewed otherwise if it is
the theatre ofGod's grace signified by the Covenant? If creation existed separately
apart from the living God then a form of "double bookkeeping" would be required.
Busch summarizes this problem this way:
the steps in this entire path [are]: first the interpretation of the covenant










this covenant, and ultimately without any reference at all to God ...11
The formal presupposition of the creation then, is the covenant. The material
presupposition of the covenant is creation.12 As Busch points out, this is in accord
with Barth's understanding ofGod's elective love that exists prior to the existence
of humanity, for it is not "brought by humans, which would provide God reason to
love them."13 This is the only actuality that can be legitimately appropriated, as
Webster states it, "The creation is truly 'real' as a function of the encounter which
God inaugurates with humanity; its reality is not antecedent to the event of that
encounter."14 Barth asserts this reality as a work of God's love:
He wills and posits the creature neither out of caprice nor
necessity,but because He has loved it from eternity, because
He wills to demonstrate His love for it, and because He wills,
not to limit His glory by its existence and being, but to reveal
and manifest it in His own co-existence with it.15
However, both creation and covenant are the way and goal of the "free love of
God."16 The meaning of creation is the "irruption (Einbruch) and revelation of
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in Genesis chapters one and two, the manifestation of light is "the symbol of the
revelation of grace" that represents the knowledge ofGod.18 Being created in the
"image ofGod", both male and female, humanity finds itself, not as equal with
God or even existing in a separate reality, but as a tertium comparationis, i.e.,
the analogy between God and humanity, an analogy of "free differentiation
(Unterscheidung) and relation."19 Following the Old Testament injunction
against the fashioning of any icons to resemble God, Barth proceeds to define
the iconic nature ofChrist as an abolishment of this need for, ifwe have seen
Him "we have seen the Father" as "the invisible God Himself has become visible
in Him." Furthermore, "In Him we have the image in face of which the question of
the original is fully answered."20 Yet, for those who have not been privileged to see
Jesus ofNazareth in the flesh, how does that facial image manifest itself as a
phenomenon in the here and now? For Barth, the correspondence of the divine
relationship between the "self-encounter" of the triune God is mirrored in the
covenantal relationship with humanity and further exemplified in the encounter
between man and woman as I and Thou. He specified that:
The relationship between the summoning (anrufende) I in God's
being and the summoned divine Thou is reflected both in the
relationship ofGod to the man whom He has created, and also in








female, in human existence itself.21
G. C. Berkouwer has detected the "inner tension" in Barth's perceptions of
humanity and its relation to his christology. He states:
Barth builds his anthropology on Jesus as archetype, Urbild, and
on God's grace which preserves man's 'essence'; on the other hand
the argument often stresses rather the creaturely dependence of the
whole man on God, his Creator.22
However, humanity participates in the nature of Jesus as the Christ, not the other
way around. The gift of grace is a giveness that transforms the human character
towards conformity with Christ, a destined act ofmetamorphosis as it were.
Since the covenant is the "internal basis of creation"; Barth describes the
"act of creation as such is the revelation of the glory of God by which He gives to
the creature meaning and necessity."23 The creature reveals the free love of the
triune God as it is:
made visible outside His own being, His hidden glory revealed. And
this is creation to the extent that it makes the creature the exponent,
sign and witness of the divine meaning and necessity, and it is given
to it to be the bearer ofGod's intention, plan and order.24
Does this not turn the creature into its own icon of the grace of God, a solipsistic
reflection of a "new creation", both male and female, that now stands as its own
21
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neo-divine image?25 Barth certainly does caution the creature to be "grateful"
(dankbar) for this gift; but is also reminded that all creation is destined to serve
God and that is the purpose of its historical existence.26 The tertium comparationis
and the freedom given to humanity has "nothing to do with man's divine likeness
(the analogia entis) or the foolhardy assumption of divine responsibilities."27
Barth affirms the actuality and realism of the covenantal doctrine of creation
over against any nihilistic or idealistic claims of existence as mere "appearances,
illusions and dreams."28 Reality and existence are in fact essential for a "higher
Judge" has intervened:
between our consciousness and our supposed intrinsic and extrinsic
being, and decided that our consciousness does not deceive us, that
our being is no imaginary being.29
For Barth this transcendental objectivism gives us a security in our "noetic-
ontological X " and allows us to posit existence and the fact of our own existential
being.30 This assurance comes in the act of faith; for ifwe purport the existence of
25
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a loving Creator, then we also are real. This validates, within the sphere of faith,
both an epistemology and a phenomenology that gives:
no other choice but the decisive recognition, without any shadow of
ambiguity, of the reality of the created world and ourselves, and the
life founded on this recognition.31
As the gracious God is, in the divine determination of the "I AM ", so too the
creature also is an "I am" who is free then to respond with "Thou art" for that
"which accompanies me is."32 We learn of the alien God in hidden transcendence
and also of our impossible alliance in covenantal relationship. All this is, of
course, christologically based for the created world is to be understood "in light
of the divine mercy revealed in Jesus Christ" fulfilled in time, for this world is
the "arena, instrument and object" of this actuality and, as such, is the "best of all
possible worlds."33
The Creature: The Form of Humanity
After the conclusion ofWorld War Two, Barth returned to Germany on an
extended lecture and preaching tour and a protracted time of teaching in Bonn.
Among the ruins ofEurope and the difficulty ofmany Germans, theologians,
clerics and philosophers alike to come to grips with issues of national guilt and
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with anthropological issues. The task continued to be christological in disposition
for "the man Jesus is Himself the revealing Word ofGod, He is the source (Quelle)
of our knowledge of the nature ofman as created by God."34 Humanity is not the
sum total of the created order but is "the point in the cosmos where, in spite of its
very different nature, its relationship with God is illuminated."35 Therefore, any
cosmology, biblical or otherwise, is replaced by a christocentric anthropology as
"God's covenant with man is disclosed, the cosmos is shown to be embraced by
the same covenant."36
The enhypostasia of Jesus is the archetypal form for true humanity. Barth
elucidates Christ's relation to God, the office of salvation, the disclosure ofGod's
sovereignty, and as more than the instrument ofGod, the actuality of salvation
provides the prototype for true human being. Therefore, "we cannot speak
appropriately about man generally and as such until we learn that the essence of
man as seen in Jesus, is to be for God."37 In Barth's christocentric absolutism for
the study of the human essence, both scientific and philosophical anthropologies
are found wanting (but not entirely inadequate). The idealism of Fichte and the
existential philosophy of Jaspers, and even the theistic doctrine of the human
purported by Brunner, do not provide a clear understanding of the human search
34








for transcendence that is critical for Barth's anthropological concepts. "It is always
in this act of self-transcendence that the human exists properly and concretely."38
This is demonstrated in the tension between finite existence and an orientation
to the future, a relationship to "another being which transcends himself and his
natural and ethical life."39 Therefore, a "theonomous self-understanding" would
exhibit an attitude of accepting God's divine initiative as gift by and through
revelation."40
In the extended paragraph "Real Man" Barth continues his human definition
coming only from the initiative of God and manifested in the election of Christ.
In the subsequent election ofmen and women in the will of God, true ontology is
established based on four broad themes. The first is the human status as one
"summoned by the Word ofGod."41 The one summoned in the elective act of grace
is also the one who listens and responds. Barth explains that:
The history of a being begins, continues and is completed when
something other than itself and transcending its own nature
encounters (begegnetj it, approaches it and determines its being
in the nature proper to it, so that it is compelled (genotigt) and
enabled (befahigt) to transcend itself in response and relation to
this new factor.42











the event of the covenant of grace in the existence of the man Jesus, and the
engagement of humanity in relation to the primal history of the transcendent
Christ. This is a summary of the work of grace which elicits the third theme
for Barth, the issue of gratitude.
The summoned and responsive human is to be "precisely defined as a being
in gratitude (Dankbarkeit)."43 This ontological status is important for our
understanding of the iconic in the thought of Barth, for it defines the parameters
of not only human acceptance of the gift of grace, freely bestowed in the divine
economy, but also the nature and form of the response and its implications and
depictions in temporal existence. If the elect are called to recognize the benefit
(Wohltat) of divine graciousness as well as the "obligation (Verpflichtung) towards
the benefactor", in what form does this recognition take place? Barth notes that if
this gratitude was to be manifested by a "certain attitude" that fully "discharged
the obligation of thanksgiving" then both benefit and gratitude would "simply
have been the two sides of a transaction based on mutual self-interest."44 True
thanksgiving, eucharista derived from charis, provides an "intersubjectivity"
in the "history of the God-man relationship and constitutes the being ofman."45








transactional terms for there can be no adequate reciprocity by the recipient.
Grace seen in the terms of Jean-Luc Marion is a paradox, for "the gift, reduced
to giveness, decides to give itself as unsolvable debt given to an enemy"46 for
without grace humanity is just that in relation to God. Barth contends that "To
see this acceptance as such is to see real man in his own action, not merely as the
object but as the subject of the history in which his being consists."47 Furthermore,
to be a being of gratitude is also to be a being with the "character of responsibility
( Verantwortung). "48
To be responsible for Barth is to offer oneself "as the response to the Word
ofGod, and conducting, shaping and expressing [oneself] as the answer to it."49
Yet, how can we direct, form and articulate that which is infinite and eternal with
such humanly finite means? Where should our gaze be directed towards this end?
For Barth, "The Yes in which man answers the divine Yes, man's knowledge of
God and obedience to Him, can never have more than the force and reach of an
echo."50 Yet the mandate still is in force in that the graced human has been
granted the freedom to accept the subjective status as a creature and child of God
and still
46
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"bears irrefutably the character of a partner with the divine subject. . ,"51 This
covenantal partnership is the next topic that Barth will turn to.
The image of this partnership is borne as a "sign here below ofwhat [the
partner] really is seen from above, from God."52 Indeed, our humanity has a real
part to play in the mystery of the Christian experience of faith. Human nature
reflects the incarnational nature of Jesus as "His divinity . . . corresponds exactly
this form ofHis humanity—His being as it is directed to His fellows."53 This is
in complete accord with the basic trinitarian nature ofGod who is eternal love
itself. The Gift is the copy of the Giver to be exemplified in the response of the
gifted. This response, grounded in a christological prototype, has a "parabolic
determination"54 that brings authentic human essence into encounter with the other.
As Christ is in "encounter" so are we.55 An ethics of encounter implies a human
action that "carries with it the twofold correspondence that the other has summoned
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and assistance is to be performed with "gladness."57 McLean notes, 'Humanity,
as the image ofGod, is a 'sign' pointing to man's fulfillment in the covenant
relationship to God."58 Might this be an anthropological marque iconique that
could lead to a false veneration of the human? Barth seems to tread close to this
possibility in his elucidation of the divine image, "Man generally, the man with
the fellow-man, had indeed a part in the divine likeness of the man Jesus, the man
for the fellow man."59 As Johnson points out this divine likeness is one in which
"human 'relationality' reflects the divine 'relationality'."60 The iconic point of
grace and giveness would seem to lie in human referential activity for Barth.
Time is also perceived as gift in Barth's deliberations. "To say 'man' or
'time' is to say God. It is God who gives him time."61 Time has a gestalt that
comes in the "form of prevenient grace."62 But time is not iconic in character for
it is not eternity. Barth describes eternity as not timeless as it is "the simultaneity
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love; "Amabar, amor, and therefore, amabor,"63 This is the assured hope of the
'elect and the object of their witness, incomplete and distorted by finitude and sin,
but still blessed by the gracious God.
God's providential care in establishing the created order as theatrum gloriae
Dei, has the element of "mirroring" about it. Barth asks, "What recognizable
(erkennbare) character is proper to creaturely occurrence in relation to what it
has to accompany under God's providence?" God's activity in the history of the
covenant is imaged in the history of the creature. However, "The mirror can
confront it only as a reflector."64 The "phenomenon of gods and their worship,
of sacrifices, prayers and the like" are not to be identified with the original in
creaturely existence, yet there still remain echoes of the acts ofGod.65 These
echoes can only occur in the purview of God for there can be no idea of a
creatura corredemptrix. The creature must only recognize that it occurs "from
within outwards, from the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ to all other
occurrence, from God's grace to the world."66 Barth does not proceed at this
point to focus on the cross as symbol of grace in the worldpar excellence; but











proclaimer of the grace ofGod."67 In the covenant of grace "the creature is not the
means but only the witness and sign, the liturgical assistant as it were to God, who
is the only effective Minister."68
The immanental presence of God, the "Divine Accompanying", means, for
Barth, that God, "affirms and approves and recognizes and respects the autonomous
actuality and therefore the autonomous activity of the creature as such."69 However,
a continued awareness of the "qualitative distinction between divine and creaturely
potency . . . must be brought into play and relentlessly kept in play at this juncture."70
The theological concept of concursua must be approached warily here for God's will
is not phenomenologically limited by any notion of "giveness" or determination of
the creature.71 The human creature is not subsumed into the divinity of God in any
formal sense; but there abides a divine respect for the activity of the creature in
freedom for response and praise. There still is a sense of the divine gubernatio that
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activity, for "the effect I produce is no longer mine."73 Now, in Barth's thinking,
there is an opening for a wider theology of culture that brings serious implications
to that which the creature might venerate as icon, be it a concept or image. As the
theology of the cross has been deferred until the next volume, so also are Barth's
understandings of the secular parables and lights.
A prominent secular witness to the grace of God appears in Barth's extended
paragraph on the topic of theodicy and that which he specifies as the "alien factor"
das Nichtige14 Barth asks:
Why is it possible to hold that Mozart had a place in theology, especially
in the doctrine of creation and also in eschatology, although he was not a
father of the Church . . ,?75
The tragedy of the Lisbon earthquake and the issue ofGod's justice was answered
for Barth in Mozart's "peace of God which far transcends all the critical or
speculative reason that praises and reproves." Mozart seemed to possess a special
affinity with the "light of creation" for he heard creation, "Unresentfully and
impartially, [as] he did not produce merely his own music but that of creation, its
twofold and yet harmonious praise ofGod." Barth went so far as to claim that:
the golden sounds and melodies ofMozart's music have from early
times spoken to me not as Gospel but as parables of the realm ofGod's
73 .
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free grace revealed in the Gospel.. ,76
Because ofMozart one can not charge creation with the "slander" that has a
"share in chaos because it includes a Yes and a No, as though oriented to God on
the one side and nothingness on the other."77 Does not Mozart have an iconic
status in Barth's thought? Has Barth, in his listening to the genius of this man and
his music, been brought to that which gives a glimpse (or sound) of the eternal?
Barth seems to be saturated by this aural phenomena. As Jean-Luc Marion asserts,
the icon becomes the "gaze ofGod" in the "disfiguration ofChrist" and "allows the
trace of the invisible to appear, which envisages us."78 Barth also notes that Christ
has overcome das Nichtige in kenotic fashion by letting "Himself be injured and
humiliated in making the assault and repulse of das Nichtige His own concern
than leave His creature alone in this affliction."79
Nevertheless, it is hard to discern just howMozart's music can give this
christological insight at any more than at an emotive level. Gorringe contends
that Barth allows a mediating that is quite "independent of the Word" but also
acknowledges that Barth in his "austerity" never overdeveloped this notion.80
We shall see that other artistic icons will be underscored in some ofBarth's later
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The increasing demands and invitations for international lectures, as well as
Barth's teaching responsibilities, led to the Dogmatics becoming increasingly
"jealous of competition from any other undertakings."81 In spite of the scope and
size of the volumes he did not want to create any 'Barthian" school or have the
writings be considered "static concepts" but to be viewed as "dynamic", a way,
"not a house."82
In 1951 Barth published his last volume of The Doctrine ofCreation focusing
on the topics of ethics and freedom. Once again Barth distanced himself from any
existentialist philosophy (although admitting learning from Kierkegaard) for "after
all negation is no supreme art nor the overthrow of all kinds of false idols a
superlative task."83 Barth was seeking a more affirmative tone and found that being
dubbed "orthodox" was not an unhappy sobriquet. More displeasure was apparent
in his chiding the "Neo-Calvinists in the Netherlands" for accusing him ofbeing a
"monist" and disparaging his appreciation ofMozart.
The problem of "special ethics", i.e., the ethical obedience required by the
covenant, occupied Barth once again. In postulating the Word of God as the
standard of all ethical behavior he saw that the covenantal encounter between God








the grace ofGod in Jesus Christ and it is "also the ontic basis ofman's creaturely
being."84 To see Christ, is to not only say "Behold your God!" but to also exclaim
Ecce homo\85 When we gaze at Christ we see the real ontic reality that is humanity
in the mirror of God's grace addressed to us in Jesus Christ. What is reflected to us
is the brokenness and guilt of the human condition caused by sin and yet a glimpse
of the eternal in the gaze ofGod reflected in the grace of Christ. The reality that
is revealed is that "This being is indeed a sinner a pardoned sinner, and a child of
God in hope."86 And this also enables the pardoned human to be responsible
before God in freedom.
Barth proceeds to expound on both Christian duty and responsibility in
relationship, as covenant keeping and witness. Starting with the Holy Day, Sabbath
keeping is to remind us that God's decision of grace is not posited, affirmed,
expressed, helped or justified by any other than God alone. This leads to confession
as an event of human self-renunciation and prayer as an activity of obedience. Barth
describes prayer as an act "in the form of what we might call an application" wholly
directed toward God.87 The difference between the two activities is that, "Confession










praise ofGod in His ears alone."88 Barth is mindful that prayer itself is "a grace,
a gift from God"89 and, as such, petitionary prayer is covenantal in form for it
presents the human as beneficiary ofGod's grace and not initiator. Prayer is also
an act ofworship, as he explains:
What is meant by worship? It obviously means turning to God as such,
quietness before His deity and its majesty, contemplation of its height
and profundity, the expression of full, humbly marveling and joyfully
yet also terrifyingly surprised submission to Him.90
What perspective does the act of prayer give to the petitioner in Barth's
schema? Marion states this sense of perspective is in the guise of a paradox that
"attests to the visible, while at the same time opposing itself' even to the character
of a miracle.91 Barth sees that, in that act of prayer, the immutability of God is not
threatened in any way, for God does not "lose face"; this being a "miserable
anthropomorphism."92 Barth contends that:
Any vacillation or questioning is the horrible confusion of God with
that immovable idol. The worshiper of the idol must not be surprised
if he calls upon it in vain.93
Faith that God does indeed hear and act is the necessary prerequisite for authentic













prayer and veneration here.
Tillich's notion of prayer is closer to what Marion is seeking to describe.
Prayer is a powerful "revelatory situation" for Tillich, as it "fulfills its meaning,
namely, to reunite the creature with its creative ground" and display the "marks
of revelation-mystery, miracle, and ecstasy."94 Like Barth, Tillich also perceived
the need for faith:
Every serious prayer contains power, not because of the intensity of
desire expressed in it, but because the faith of the person has in God's
directing activity-a faith which transforms the existential situation.95
Barth's focus on the actuality of prayer leads it away from the contemplative, while
Tillich's concept allows for a more mystical approach.
The horizontal dimension of covenantal ethics is also demonstrated in the
relationship between man and woman in the institution ofmarriage. The essential
quality of this notion of special ethics is the "differentiation" in all human
relationships.96 Marriage displays an iconic nature for:
Marriage shows itself to be the ideal and archetypal form of human
fellowship in the fact that the light of the very different fellowship
between God and man falls almost directly upon it from the closest
possible proximity, thus making its special reflector, image and likeness.97





96 CD III/4, 117.
97
Ibid., 197. On the difficult issue of Barth's relationship with Charlotte von Kirschbaum see Busch, Barth,
185-6 and Gorringe, Against Hegemony, 201-2.
329
covenant-partner, and the firmness with which the later remains united to Him."98
In the same fashion, the relationship between parents and their children and
community relationships should also display the convenantal love ofGod. This
manifests itself in a respect and preservation of human existence, for life itself is
a gift. Barth counsels:
That we should spontaneously perceive and affirm the reception of life
as a divine loan in its character as a favour shown, a possession entrusted
and an opportunity offered to us, is obviously what is expected of us as
those who possess it, who are alive.99
For Barth, the only possible response for the gift of life is one ofjoy. The
Christian is to acknowledge that Christ died for all humanity, men and women alike,
and therefore are to be "for others":
The whole credibility of the Christian service of witness as a human act
depends on whether the work of active human love precedes and follows
it, accompanying and sustaining it as the commentary and illustration of
an eloquent parable.100
The active life of love evinced by the elect has an iconic character about it because
it follows the example of Christ's love for the world and therefore is the measure of
all human endeavor. This attitude and understanding gives meaning in vocation and
honour to both God and the elect in turn.






The Doctrine of Reconciliation
The circumstances in Barth's life , both politically and theologically,
have a definite influence on this last volume (in four parts) of the Dogmatics.
The Swiss press had become vociferous in their criticisms ofBarth for his
moderate stance on communism. In the spirit of reconciliation he advocated a
view that anti-communism in its most virulent forms stood as reminder of the
"Hitler in us."Although no proponent of communism (he remained a socialist),
Barth tried to take an ecumenical stance ofbeing/or communists (as human beings
loved by God) and against any form of government (be it communist, socialist or
democratic) whose ideologies and "pernicious propaganda prevents people on either
side from seeing anything but the splinter in the other person's eye."101 Barth also
disapproved of the installation of a new stained-glassed window in the cathedral in
Basle by taking the Calvinist view of the second commandment by not making an
image in connection with Christian worship "even if it should be the most perceptive
work of the most gifted artist."102 This seems to be somewhat contradictory in his
thought given his appreciation ofMozart, Botticelli and Grunewald whose print of
the Isenheim altarpiece hung above Barth's desk.103 In any event the Basle
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Similarly, the program of'demythologizing' of the New Testament as
propounded by RudolfBultmann evinced Barth's gravest suspicions of "running
into the dead end of a theological anthropology"; a "talk of God" which was no
more than a "talk ofman in a rather elevated tone." The first volume of the Doctrine
ofReconciliation therefore, was written with attention to the "rampaging Bultmann
controversy."104 Barth had originally thought to call this volume the Doctrine of the
Covenant but decided against it and was to see the work as the "form of a paraphrase
of TmmanueT, which was at the same time a prospectus of the whole of the doctrine
of reconciliation."105 This was the heart of all theology for Barth as it concentrated on
the knowledge of Jesus Christ and "If one is on the right track here, the whole thing
cannot be completely wrong."106
The "circumference" of the Church's dogmatics revolves around the doctrine
of creation (redemption) and the doctrine of the last things (consummation).
"But the covenant fulfilled in the atonement is its centre."107 For the atonement to
manifest its iconic character, symbolized by the cross, as a saturated phenomenon
we follow Marion's dictum taken from Cyril of Alexandria:
A paradox of the face, which finds itself fulfilled in this 'strange
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the divine glory (6o£a) within the strictures of the human.108
This paradox is to be seen in and on the cross ofChrist, yet Barth has serious
objections to "all representations of the crucified Christ as such. There is no going
back behind Easter morning."109 What is intended here is to discern whether Barth
had an adequate theology of the cross, using Marion's phenomenology. If Barth
does (and does not acknowledge it) then he and Tillich stand close to Marion's
project. If there is, in fact, an underdeveloped notion of the cross then Barth's
criticism ofTillich's christology is unwarranted. It remains in the conclusion to
ask whether Marion's ultimate symbol of the cross, manifested in the moment of
the Eucharist, is adequate in its intention as well. The question to be asked of Barth
is whether his doctrine of the resurrection is overly assertive and depreciative of the
paradox of the cross and the disfigurement of Jesus upon it. Does the cross stand as
the ectype of the crucified Christ and in what fashion might that be represented in
the realm of the phenomenological?110
The answer to this query may reside in Barth's understanding of the cross and
its relationship to the covenant. From the outset in this, the fourth volume of his
dogmatics, the doctrine of the covenant is explicated in terms of the "presupposition
of reconciliation." In fact, the original fellowship between God and humanity,
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which is described as the covenant.111 This work of grace, as the primary thing
to say about God and humanity, is "something which we can see only as it makes
itself to be seen, only as it fulfills itself—which is what happened in Jesus Christ—
and therefore reveals itself as true and actual."112 How does it reveal itself in the
"form which it manifestly assumed in Jesus Christ?"113 In what way does the
covenant, as invisible icon, mirror the cross as a visible icon, and give the gaze
of eternity and not just a human self-reflection?
The human form that Christ assumed is that of a servant in humility. This is
the true iconic feature of Barth's christology and is the verity of true divinity. Barth
explains:
What marks out God above all false gods is that they are not capable
and ready for this. In their otherworldliness and supernaturalness and
otherness, etc., the gods are a reflection (Spiegelbilder) of the human
pride which will not unbend, which will not stoop to that which is
beneath it. God is not proud. In His high majesty He is humble. It is
this high humility that He speaks and acts as the God who reconciles the
world to Himself. It is under this aspect first that we must consider the
history of the atonement.114
The kenotic obedience of Christ is the "presentation" of this humility that "stands
in the greatest possible contradiction to the being ofGod.'"15 The grace of God is
manifested in the "astonishing form" of the obedient Servant, "the way of the Son
111










into the far country", a matter of the mystery of the deity of God and "His presence
in the world."116 For Barth, the event and history of the Incarnation is in no way a
diminution ofGod. God, in Christ, is under the contradiction that is the plight of
fallen humanity; but is not in contradiction amidst the inner-trinitarian relationships
for any reconciliation would then be impossible.117 God is and acts as Christ is and
acts, because "In Him there is not paradox, no antimony, no division, no
inconsistency, not even the possibility of it."118 In Christ therefore, God is honored
by the "concealment" (verbirgt) of divine glory. "This concealment, and therefore
His condescension as such, is the image and reflection in which we see Him as He
is."119 Barth caveats, that:
There is no lowliness which is divine in itself and as such. There is
therefore no general principle of the cross in which we have to do
with God (in principle). The cross of the New Testament is not a
kind of symbol of an outlook which is negatively orientated, which
speculates a la baisse.120
What, then, is Barth's view of the cross and can it, in Marion's words, be an image
that remains "bound under a ruled relation to a prototype without having to obey














The mimetic, for Barth, was a "going back" to the event of the cross,
a re-crucifixion, and so "all theologies or pieties or exercises or aesthetics which
centre on the cross—must be repudiated at once."122 If a theology returns to the
No of the cross and cannot move to the Yes of the Resurrection. There can be
no cyclical return to the cross, no myth of "eternal recurrence" not even in the
name ofKierkegaard or Luther. Barth asserts that we can only begin with the
completed act of reconciliation founded on the eternal election of the covenant.
In the present we are called to take up "our little cross" and to "receive in our name
as the obedient Son of the Father the grace of everlasting life."123 Marion's mimetic
tutcoc; is found in the faithful reception of Christ by the elect as it is attested in the
Word in Barth's schema. It is our cross of obedience that functions as the saturated
phenomenon, an anthropological notion that seems to stand in some sort of
contradistinction to the rest ofBarth's theology. Be that as is it may, just how does
the cross function in Barth's christological scheme?
The cry of dereliction at Golgotha, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken
me?" (Mk. 15:34), exhibits the solidarity of Jesus with the finitude of humanity
in that "He cries with man in this need."124 By his death on the cross, Jesus
accomplished that which humanity could not accomplish for itself; that of true
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reconciliation with God. Barth elucidates:
In this suffering and dying of God Himself in His Son, there took
place the reconciliation with God, the conversion to Him, of the
world which is out of harmony with Him, contradicting and opposing
Him.125
Sin was "killed on the cross" when Jesus Christ made himself the "bearer and
Representative of sin".126 Barth entitled this section, "The Judge Judged in Our
Place" so the agony of Jesus is the "No of God in and with which He again takes up
and asserts in man's space and time the Yes to man which He has determined and
pronounced in eternity."127 Barth notes that the accounts of the Last Supper provide
the "meaning and the purpose of the act" of the shedding of blood on the cross, that
in the "offering ofHis life to the powers of death we have the constancy, the
maintenance or the restitution of the covenant between God and man."128 But
Barth is not interested in describing any sacramental efficacy here, and the fact that
his dogmatics were never finished and his ecclesiology left incomplete, has been a
disappointment to those seeking to find a finished doctrine of the Eucharist in his
theology. We will return to this aporia later in the chapter. At this juncture Barth
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Ifwe have to do with such a beyond, then in no case or form
can it be on the basis of an independent human judgement or
an invention or intuition reached in this way.129
The visible sign of eternal love is found in the empty tomb depicted in the
resurrection accounts. The act ofGod was mediated to the disciples without any
"component of human will and action" as a "mediated perception" (Vermittelt
Erkenntnis).m God's gift, that which is given, is the bestowal of life to the
obedient Servant, the Son of God. Barth underscores the fact that:
as very God and very man He is worthy of the divine gift of new life
from the dead does not alter in the slightest the fact that He did not
take this new life but that it was given to Him.131
In the positing of covenantal grace, the "event ofEaster in its indissoluble connexion
(unldslichen Beziehung) with the event of the cross is an event which has its own
content and form." It is the resurrected Christ that also bears the marks of the
wounds of crucifixion that image the saturated phenomenon of grace. Barth will
not allow a "general principle" of the cross to overshadow in any way the triumph
of the resurrection:
Because the resurrection has taken place just as surely as the
crucifixion, the cross of Jesus Christ is to us light and not darkness,








something better by the fact that we take up our cross.132
It remains to be seen whether Marion or Tillich are guilty of such a move, and
whether they have overlooked the phenomenon of the resurrection in their emphasis
on the saturated visibility of the cross. The question abides however, ofjust how the
empty tomb can reflect the gaze of eternity to the believer hie et nunc without the
mediation of the written word of the testimony of the original disciples.
In what manner does the autonomous human create a false icon that reflects
only that which is projected on it without the return of eternity? It is by "ignoring
the grace of God and renouncing his responsibility to Him, man chooses himself,
and in so doing even in this—decisive-respect he chooses that which is not."133 In
this way, not unlike the Israelites fashioning the golden calf during the Exodus, the
covenant is disparaged and the pride of humanity asserts itself over the grace of God.
Yet, for Barth, the cry of dereliction on the cross reminds the world of its depravity
and apostasy and the "depth of the most utter helplessness of the true human
condition submitted to by Jesus. Does the image of the open tomb give such veracity
of finitude by its saturated phenomenalism? Can it overcome the self-assertion of
human pride by its vacuity? This seems to be unanswered by Barth, or perhaps even
considered an impertinent question. If the cross were viewed separately from the
resurrection then the notion of human death as the final answer might result. Barth
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asserts:
In this light, as the Word of the cross understood in the light of the
resurrection of the Crucified, the one Word of God is certainly the
word ofjudgement on all the arrogant pretension with which man
would judge and justify himself.134
Barth feared that if the cross and resurrection were separated conceptually then
there might result (as in Bultmann, and by implication, Tillich) in a bifurcation
between an historical event (the crucifixion) and a mythological event (the
resurrection), leading to a "kind of parthenogenesis of faith without any external
cause."135
The ultimate icon that gives meaning to the redemptive work of God on behalf
of fallen humanity is, of course, Jesus Christ who:
lives as the risen One, as the bearer of the right which God has given to
man, as the recipient of His grace, completing the justification ofman
by His receiving of it.136
Therefore, any theologia gloriae, for Barth, can have no meaning without a theologia
crucis. But an "abstract" theologia crucis is devoid ofmeaning as well unless it is
"the magnifying of the One who in His resurrection is the recipient of our right and
life."137 Yet, Barth has still not completely explicated how this is manifested in
temporal existence as a specific phenomenon. There is the spiritual claim that the










takes place among men in the form of a human activity."138
The elect are called, in obedience, to acknowledge the "living " Jesus Christ
in the form attested in "Holy Scripture and proclaimed by the community." But
exactly how does the living Christ present himself to the believer as Lord? Not
in a "featureless" way according to Barth, which would be at the "mercy of every
possible conception and interpretation." Yet, to ask what are the distinctives of
this form is to ask a "secondary question" for the "sphere is a wide one" leading
to various possibilities in the "subjective fulfillment proffered" to the believer.139
Barth continues to describe the gestalt of Jesus Christ in terms of saturation:
for all His singularity and unity His form is inexhaustibly rich, so
that it is not merely legitimate but obligatory that believers should
continually see and understand it in new lights and aspects.140
Does not the "multiformity" of Christ allow for iconic presentations in the fashion
described by both Marion and Tillich? Barth shies away from this iconic freedom,
however, for the authentic form cannot only be found in the "witness of Scripture
and the proclamation of the Church." Existential faith ( Bultmann) and the re-
enactment ofGolgotha in the Roman Catholic mass (Urs von Balthasar) must not
attempt to repeat the "being and activity of Jesus Christ."141










more secluded in his academic and theological life working like "Jerome in his
cell."142 Commentators critiqued his supposed universalism to which Barth replied,
"I don't believe in universalism, but I do believe in Jesus Christ, the reconciler of
all."143 In this new volume he sought to complete the true theologia gloriae, based
on a theologia crucis, following the pattern (exinanitio, exaltatio) of the Son
journeying in "far country" (IV/1) and now returning in glory to his eternal home.144
Barth employs a christological typology145 in his exegesis of the parable of the
Prodigal Son, for it is the elder brother that brings Jesus to the cross. The abasement
of the cross shows that Jesus, as the Servant ofGod, has in all humility addressed:
the Word ofGod to men, but in the glory of God He Himself is the
answer to the otherwise insoluble question of human existence and
the human situation.146
In the participation of human existence as the Christ, the "free act ofGod" is to be
characterized and described as God assuming the "being as man into His being as
God."147 The connection between the human nature ofGod, in Christ, is not found
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The grace of God manifested and effective in Him is the grace of this
impartation (.Mitteilung). As He is, it takes place that the divine essence
in all its distinctiveness (Eigentiimlichkeit) is gifted to the human, and
the human in all its distinctiveness receives the divine.148
The gift that Jesus, as the crucified and resurrected Christ, bestows on humanity is
difficult to depict in the "plastic arts" for Barth. In comparison with the biographer
of Jesus who can be corroborated with the biblical texts themselves, the artist is
"quite intolerable." To "freeze" the movement of God is to "take it out of its
movement." The picture ofChrist is "far too static as a supposed portrayal of the
corporeality of Jesus Christ in a given moment." What neither the biographer or
artist can produce is the "vertical movement in which Jesus Christ is "actual" in
the incarnational event.149 Therefore, "this cannot prevent us from saying that
the history of plastic representation ofChrist is that of an attempt on the most
intractable (ungeeignetsten) subject imaginable."150
Does this "intractability " of the subjectivity ofChrist allow for no depiction
whatsoever? As those gifted by God in the "infinite kenosis"151 of divine love is not
something given by the saturation of the phenomenon and its ectypal relationship to
the prototype? Marion allows for such a possibility in the "law of giveness",
148
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its plenitude and its appearance. "Every painting participates in a resurrection,
every painting imitates Christ, by bringing the unseen to light."152 The distinction
between idol and icon is a function of that which is desired; for the idol remains
"proportionate to the expectation of the desire" whereas the icon "exceeds the
scope of expectation."153 But Marion's iconography implies more than a "plastic
art" for the saturated phenomenon of grace, manifests itself both pictorially and
conceptually. Barth, by denying the efficacy of the visible and aural icon, and
despite his love ofMozart and Grunewald as parables of grace, does not allow for
the concept of grace, as saturated phenomenon to have its full due, its complete
plenitude. Similarly, Marion asks:
does invisibility indicate, in the case of the possible original, the pure
and simple denial [denegation\ of its reality? In other words, does the
fact that the original remains invisible suffice to disqualify every
possible original?154
Barth, it appears, would answer 'yes', Tillich and Marion, 'no'. Marion goes so far
as to assert that to avoid the paradox of Christ offering the "visible image of the
Father" is to go to the point of irreverence:
If every image offered of the invisible God is a caricatural usurpation,
it would be necessary therefore to condemn Jesus Christ to death for










Marion continues to call for a release of the icon from the "logic of the image",
an escape from the "tyranny of the image." Can the icon release itself, or is this
only possible by an anthropocentric effort? The resolution of this aporia is vital
to the concern of a phenomenology of grace, as opposed to an epistemology of
human knowledge that privileges the transcendent self over the divine generosity
that allows human thought itself.
Barth locates the action of Jesus Christ not in a "phenomenon, or a complex
of phenomena, but in a history."156 This history and its dynamic "is the reality,
the mysterium, the sacrament of the being of Jesus Christ."157 The possibility of
the knowledge of this history, as the history of salvation, is conveyed in the power
of the Holy Spirit where takes place "the self-revelation of Jesus Christ as the One
He is."158 But, in the same way, could not the Spirit provide the spiritual knowledge
or insight that allows an iconic presentation of God's grace its efficacy?
In Barth's lengthy excursus on Jesus as the "Royal Man" and "The Direction
of the Son" a theology of the cross appears, as a human move away from the
self-centered I and towards the "hidden being" ofChrist. The possibility of the
recognition of his hidden being does not lie within human capacity for there is:
no organ or ability to see it... It can be a reality, not in the actualisation
of a potentiality that we ourselves possess, but only as it is given us in







Human existence itself does not give one a "continuous demonstration of the
being of Jesus Christ" but there are "proofs" (Erweise) of his love.160 Even in
the examination of the concealment ofChrist there can be no indirect or analogical
disclosure. Vision and knowledge of Jesus Christ, for Barth, must be the result of a
"penetration (durchbrechung) and removal (Beiseitigung) of this hiddenness."161
The secret of the cross is the also the secret of the "incarnation in all its fulness."162
But, as Barth rightly asks, "how can the unknown become for us the known reality,
reality in truth?"163
It is not in any disclosure of the phenomenon of the cross that Barth finds his
answer, it is to be discovered in the New Testament witness to the resurrection.
In this event, the closure (in death) of the Crucified is overturned by the disclosure
[erschliefieri) (in new life) of the Resurrected. 164 The judgement of Golgotha
gives that which is darkness, the power of the resurrection gives that light which
is an illumination that produces joy. It is in the ministry of the Holy Spirit as the














obedience and as a divine instructor that both admonish and shows the way of
Christ to the elect. The work of the Spirit is the actualisation of the cross and
resurrection in the life of the believer, the present gift of the divine initiative.
The cross remains the "sign of the provisional character" of the Christian life
as a "tree marked for felling."165
What of the witness of the Church? Does its activity provide any iconic
manifestions of grace? Barth provides a cautionary notion of the truth of the
Church and the brokenness of its institutions and traditions.
The real result of the divine operation, the human action which
takes place in the true Church as occasioned and fashioned by God,
will never try to be anything in itself, but only the operation, the
divine ofwork of sanctification, the upbuilding of Christianity by
the Holy Spirit of Jesus the Lord, by which it is inaugurated and
controlled and supported.166
This, of course, is the iconic nature of the Church, in its obedient response to
the prompting of the Holy Spirit. Yet the triumph of Jesus Christ, in the divine
"occasioning and fashioning" of the Church's human action, overrides the
idolic tendencies of the Church by an "omnipotent act of the special divine
mercy addressed to it."167 In this manner the Church provides a "provisional
representation" (vorlciufigen Darstellung) of the work of God in Jesus Christ.168










is intent, then, on securing the possibility and necessity-even
saving necessity~of a human history in which God acts continually
to allow the Church to act in a way that represents the sanctification
of all human beings in Jesus Christ.169
As Barth approached his seventieth year, he confessed that "if I ever get to
heaven, I shall first ask after Mozart, and only then after Augustine and Thomas,
Luther and Calvin and Schleiermacher."170 Barth's continued love ofMozart's
music had not led him to "identify salvation history with any part of the history of
art." Yet, as a parable of "the kingdom revealed in the gospel of God's free grace"
and not as Gospel itself, Mozart informed his theology in such a way that the
pictures of both Mozart and ofCalvin were side by side and at the same level in
Barth's study.171 This notion of the "parables of the kingdom of heaven" were to
inform much of his discourse in the next volume of the Dogmatics. Barth admitted
that there was a Wendung172 occurring in his theology; he had moved from a focus
on the deity of God to a better understanding of the humanity ofGod in Jesus Christ.
in his lecture of 1956, "The Humanity OfGod" he allowed for a more theocratic
possibility in culture:
Finally, it also remains true that God, as Creator and Lord ofman, is
always free to produce even in human activity and its results, in spite
169 John Yocum, EcclesialMediation in Karl Barth (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) 117. He also asserts that
Barth, in his relinquishment of the possibility of divine-human cooperation, gives up the rationale for the








of the problems involved, parables ofHis own eternal good will
and actions.173
Barth was expressing in nuce the idea of a theonomous culture grounded in
the encounter between God and humanity, "a dialogue and history." The iconic
referent is dependent upon Holy Scripture, "according to which the covenant is
in full effect and which Jesus Christ witnesses to Himself "I74 Barth remained
cautious however about the existentialism ofBultmann (and presumably Tillich
as well) because he was concerned whether it was merely "a repristination of the
theology of the believing individual who reflects on himself in solitude (this time
on his reality and unreality) and explicates himself.'"75 With same concern he also
asserted that there is "no theological visual art. Since it is an event, the humanity
of God does not permit itself to be fixed in an image." The "fundamental form" of
the event was "prayer and the sermon.'"76
The Parables of Grace
In his next half- volume of the Dogmatics Barth takes up the issue of the
iconic points of revelation in the histoiy of humanity. God has spoken to the people
of the covenant, both to Israel and to Christianity, in the words of grace; "Grace
means that God expresses Himself before man, declaring Himself as the truth in his
17-3
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existence."177 This truth is the witness of Jesus Christ and also the witness of
the Church in Holy Scripture. Jesus can only be depicted as event™ for "He
Himself lives only in the form which He has in the picture." Webster regards
this form of self-communication as a "Presence" which is a "function of
'identity.'"179 This 'present form' is depicted by the reality of the resurrection;
for "If there is any Christian and theological axiom, it is that Jesus Christ is risen,
that He is truly risen."180
Here at last, Barth opens up the possibility that there are "other lights
which are quite clear and other revelations which are quite real."181 However,
they are always to be measured against the existence and reality of Jesus Christ,
for if they are found wanting:
Such projects [become] irrelevant and unfruitful enterprises
because the one Word ofGod {Christ} wholly escapes every
conceivable synthesis envisaged in them.182
Barth cites examples of the idols of the Old Testament, the mistakes of the
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Lord's table and the pulpit, and even baptismal immersion tanks.183 These
words (and signs) can have prophetic genuineness when they are:
in the closest material and substantial conformity and agreement
with the one Word ofGod Himself and therefore with that ofHis
one Prophet Jesus Christ.184
The formal aspects of these other words can only have validity in their being
"commissioned, moved and empowered" to give witness to Jesus Christ.
Moreover, only Christ can have "ordained" and "acknowledged" the reflection
of the "grace of its real presence." Jesus' speaking in parables in the New
Testament accounts are analogous to these words. In the parables the:
narrative is no mere metaphor but a disclosing yet also concealing
revelation, self-representation and self-offering of the kingdom and
the life, and therefore His own self-revelation.185
These parables have provided the "prototype of the order" by which these other
words might be determined in exact correspondence, in service and "enjoying its
power and authority."186 But what of words not spoken in Holy Scripture or the
confession of the Church? What of the secular parable, that which is found "in the












there are no "concrete phenomena" that are not "doubtful and contestable."188
Only the "prophecy of the Lord Jesus Christ" can allow the words that are extra
muros ecclesiae to have any valid attestation. However, as John McDowell has
pointed out, the avoidance of the "treatment of these matters" appears to be
"logically suspect."He continues by claiming that:
A theology that does not discuss the phenomena of witnesses to the
divine Word ... is a docetic one that floats free of the contextuality
of one's hearing of that Word.189
This view raises the seriousness of Barth's claims to separate human agency and
divine initiative, as well as any possible human fabrication of visible analogies to
the import of grace. Barth's attitude concerning Mozart seems to belie this very
point.190
Barth continues on to provide the formal criteria of the evaluation of secular
parables in the witness of Scripture to Christ and a correspondence to the Church's
mission. The covenant, as witness to the elective determination of God, is the form
of events (or theatre) in which the actualization of reconciliation occurs.191 Barth
observes:
As the divine work of reconciliation does not negate the divine work
of creation, nor deprive it of meaning, so it does not take from it its
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creaturely esse and creaturely nosse. 192
George Hunsinger has detected in Barth's thinking the same pattern of the
categories of Tillich of autonomy, heteronomy and theonomy.193 All autonomous
or heteronomous lights must be compared and evaluated in regards to the
theonomous criteria of Jesus Christ as a pattern of coinherence.194 Hunsinger
explains:
In a theonomous situation, it might be said, a single truth is manifest
in a variety of distinctive forms without either the center losing itself
in the periphery or the periphery losing itself in the center.195
Barth has dangled the reality that these other lights from the outer sphere are
phenomena that provide learning; "However alien their forms, is not their language
that of true words, the language of 'parables of the kingdom of heaven'?196 Might
not Barth be guilty of an inconsistency with regard to the ecclesial (or cultural)
icons as parables ofthe sacredl If secular parables are "distinctive as free
communications of Jesus Christ,"197 how much more so are ecclesial or pictorial
icons? Barth seems to leave no room for this possibility here. Inasmuch as he has















it would not be until the very last volume that this doctrine will appear.
A taste ofBarth's impending doctrine of the sacraments occurs towards
the end of volume IV/3.1. The witness of the victorious Christ is always to be
understood in conjunction with the suffering Jesus as the "One who is smitten
and afflicted by God, and it is in this way alone that He is the true Witness."198
It is in this form as the "Afflicted ofGethsemane and Golgotha" that Christ exists
as the "divinely crowned Victor." Therefore, living Christianity has its hymns and
prayers and "above all" its administration of baptism and the Lord's Supper
"experienced and seen and understood and expounded and proclaimed" as the
presence of the Crucified. Barth notes:
Even in the most questionable feature of the Roman mass, namely,
its character as a representation of the sacrifice of Golgotha, we must
acknowledge that it does at least make this clear. And Evangelical
preaching must never lag behind in this respect.199
This form of the True Witness comes as a saturated phenomenon in its strangeness
and the resultant shock of the opposition to what we call "natural feelings and
desires and thoughts and beliefs and dreams." Barth continued to underscore that
it is:
most unfortunate . . . that we do not willingly look to Him in this form
[which] is so obscured by the preoccupation of so much Christian art
with this subject, and especially by the inane misuse of the symbol of
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But what of the parables of grace? Could not the icon of the cross (or the Isenheim
altar, Mozart's Requiem Mass, etc.) give such a phenomenon? Barth's incipient
Calvinism seems to be at work here and he takes nearly a Tillichian view of
where God encounters the human subject:
It means that we must be ready to be told by Him that we shall find
Him precisely where we do not think we should look for Him, namely,
in direct confrontation with and at the very heart of our own reality,
which, whether we like it or not, reduces itself with the crumbling and
tottering of all our previous genuine or illusory possibilities and
achievements to the one painful point where each of us is stripped and
naked, where each is suffering and perishing, where each is engaged in
futile complaint and accusation, where each is alone.201
Barth continues in this existentialist vein in counseling that, in the encounter with
the "man ofGethsemane and Golgotha" both in distance and proximity, there is:
a direct connexion between the utter lostness ofman and his utter
salvation as presented and brought home to him in the reflection of
His form as this man.202
Tillich related Martin Luther's experience of utter despair (Anfechtung) "as
the frightful threat of complete meaninglessness."203 At this boundary moment
the utter despair and estrangement of the human condition of finitude and mortality
brings the faith that in this "state of being [is] grasped by the power of being-









the eternal God-man unity within existential estrangement."205 Barth will not go
as far as this, leaving the iconic encounter with God relegated to the individual
sphere of personal experience close to "das Gefiihl schlechthiniger Abhdngigkeit"
of Schleiermacher.206 The encounter with God is mediated conceptually by the
Word ofGod in Jesus Christ, but experientially in the subjective inner emotion of
the believer. That which is overtly iconic becomes experientially iconic through
the witness of the Spirit in the life of the elect. What of that which is idolic? Barth
asserts that the "miraculous work of God" against any human concept, in all
autonomy and freedom of grace, brings the confrontation by Jesus Christ over
the "falsehood of sinful man."207
The idolic attitude towards the True Witness does not "hear the sigh of this
One judged in our place."208 There is a "domestication" of the meaning of the
cross, perhaps, in "such a way that the Word ofHis cross is changed into a word
of the dramatic mortification which takes place and is fulfilled in man" in the
"overcoming of the inward tension of his existence." Barth certainly may have
in mind Paul Tillich here, though other viewpoints are under critical scrutiny as
well. Barth cautions:
Do we not see in them all the pictures of the crucifixion which
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their theme, carried for adornment by our ecclesiastical dignitaries
and Christian ladies . . . [making] the great mystery of God little,
and then supposedly great in its littleness?209
Can Marion's concept of the iconic, depicted in both the conceptual and visible
icon, fall under this condemnation? Is the "mystery made little" by allowing
any gaze towards the icon to have the possibility of the returned gaze giving
(or opening) a window to the eternal promise? Marion argues forcefully that the
gift gives both itself and abandon; "Poverty coincides with overabundance in the
divine because God admits-what is shown by the Spirit-the distance of a Son."210
Barth speaks of the bridging of the gap between the mystery ofGod and the life
of humanity as vision and telos:
It is the point where God has no longer to speak nor man to hear
from a distance. It is the point where God no longer has to give nor
man to receive, where their conversation and history are both ended,
where reconciliation, covenant, grace and the Jesus Christ active in
and testifying to them may all be dispensed with even as ciphers,
concepts and symbols, where prayer is ultimately superfluous even
as a monologue.211
The Word of the cross is the form of this witness and testimony "behind and
above which man cannot have recourse to any other" for this is the "only means
of deliverance in the grace of God as the Lord of life and death."212 It is the










Christians are also called, as partners in the covenant, to participate in the
"shadow of the cross." Participating in the affliction (Bedrangnis) of the Crucified,
not in any atoning manner, the believer suffers "in reflection of and analogy to the
suffering of the one man of Gethsemane and Golgotha."213 The Christian, for the
sake ofChrist, "bears the stamp (Vorbild) of the Crucified, in His reflection and
image, in analogy to His great passion."214 In effect, the believer is the visible
icon of the crucified One, for in the action, speech, attitude and conduct of the
elect, there is brought before the world "a phenomenon which corresponds and
therefore points to the self-witness of Jesus Christ."215 Barth relates the secular
parable of an African boy who has played with a:
faithfully carved wooden lion— it might have been an excellent
dogmatics! and was dreadfully frightened one day when he saw
a real living and roaring lion approaching.216
The Christian, as a witness, must never make the mistake of presenting a "wooden
lion" instead of the real Gospel. In sum, McDowell notes that:
these human voices, with all their inherent fragileness, are freely
chosen and summoned to serve this task, although neither Christ is
bound to them in some mechanistic sacramental fashion nor can
these actions contribute to Christ's Priestly and Kingly works.217
213 • •
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Barth insists that the Church, as the community of the elect, can only speak
in 'wooden lion' language, the speech of the secular.218 Indeed, the words of
sacramental institution are secular words but, as he contends, why should it be
"impossible for God as the Lord ofHis creation and especially ofHis people to
do this, to dispose of human speech in this sense?"219 Mutatis mutandis, why is
it not possible for the Lord of Creation to dispose of other forms of human
iconography in this sense? This seems to be both Tillich's and Marion's point
exactly. If God sanctifies "profane language" can not profane images, pictures,
musical compositions inter alia, be sanctified as well? Even more so if the Church,
as the body ofChrist, is the "earthly-historical form of existence, of Jesus Christ, it
is His likeness,"220 why should not its products— speech, icons and sacred paraments
be part of this likeness as well? What of the signs and symbols of the sacraments
themselves? It is to this Barth turns in the last volume of his Dogmatics. The
sacrament of the Baptism and the Lord's Supper are not "empty signs" but are
"full ofmeaning and power" in his estimation. How do they, over any other
ecclcsial signum, convey these potentialities?
218
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Conclusion: The Sacraments as Iconic Signs
After the completion of IV/3, Barth continued to lecture on various
theological topics and theologians in the years, 1958-59. Tillich came under
Barth's scrutiny once again, described as "a charming man, though his theology
is quite impossible."221 Barth felt that Tillich thought he had been "asleep since
1920" and in a seminar that focused on Tillich's method of correlation, was "not
a good business" but he tried to interpret Tillich "for the best and defend him
against the students, who want to snap around him like hunting dogs."222 Later,
in the winter of 1959-60, Barth began to lecture on the doctrine ofBaptism.
The last volume of the Dogmatics contains the content of these lectures as an
incomplete project; the treatment of the Lord's Supper , "as its conclusion and
crown"223, was never finished. However, Barth left a clue on how to proceed;
"Thus intelligent readers may deduce from the fragment how I would finally have
presented the doctrine of the Lord's Supper."224 This deduction will be important
for this essay, for it is at this very communion table where Marion's ultimate iconic
moment occurs.
Barth re-elucidates that the "foundation for the Christian life" is a "form of the
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Jesus Christ and the baptism of the Holy Spirit.225 This spiritual baptism is
"more than a reference (.Hinweis) and indication (Anzeige) through image and
symbol" it is the "effective, causative, even creative action on man and in man."226
As such, as divine gift it"demands" gratitude.227 New life is bestowed and new
communal and ethical possibilities result. Following the example of Jesus' baptism
in the Jordan, and obeying the injunction to go forth and baptize the world (Matt.
28:19), the believer in correspondence with the mission ofChrist, undergoes the rite
in the presence of the church community. Barth clarifies further:
Baptism takes place in the active recognition of the grace of God
which justifies, sanctifies and calls. It is not itself, however, the
bearer (Gnadentrager), means (Gnadenmittel), or instrument of grace.
Baptism responds to a mystery, the sacrament of the history of Jesus
Christ, of his resurrection, of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. It is
not itself, however, a mystery or sacrament.228
What does Barth mean when he says that Baptism is not a sacrament? In the first
place, there is not enough New Testament teaching to allow Baptism the status
ofmystery or sacrament in his estimation.229 Secondly, Barth was fearful of both
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361
which actually purveys grace. As an ecclesial mandate in these traditions, the
implication was on the response of humanity, in the act of baptismal obedience
or as in the case of infant baptism the parental response, as a work that did not
adequately reflect that divine initiative of saving grace. Baptism, in the first order,
is to point to Christ, not the ethical agency of the respondent. Barth asserted that
Christian baptism:
as a human, creaturely action, is directed to seek its divine, creative
fulfillment in that which it cannot be or achieve or bring about or
mediate of itself, but which it can only seek and intend and hasten
towards.230
Baptism stands as a "strangely competitive duplication (konkurrierenden
Duplikat) of the history of Jesus Christ, ofHis resurrection, of the outpouring
of the Holy Spirit."231 Does this "competitive duplication" carry an implication
of distance, the iconic emphasis ofwithdrawal and hiddenness that absorbs the
gaze of the finite and, in some way returns the gaze of the infinite, the glimpse
of eternal grace in Marion's supposition? If Barth has abandoned a notion of the
'sacramental' in any affective sense, as Jesus Christ is the only valid sacrament,
is there anything other than the internal witness of the Spirit and the external
obedience of the elect that gives any sense of the iconic? Yocum contends that
Barth, in his denigration of the sacraments:
breaks with elements of his theology of proclamation, of
knowledge ofGod, and of the nature of the Church. This




break involves no little cost to the coherence and breadth of his
account of the Christian life and the manner of God's presence in
the Church.232
This may overstate the case; but the issue is clear. In Barth's effort to maintain the
infinite and qualitative distinction between God and the initiative of grace, there
seems to be a real dilemma as to the visible or experience ofGod in human history.
Is it just a matter of emphasis, that which William Stacey Johnson discerns as the
"symbolic continuity" or "continuity of attestation" or is the rupture greater than
that?233 Is Barth's thinking really "a kind ofGnosticism" as in T. F. Torrance's
estimation?234 John Webster also highlights the charge of "dualism" ofBarth
on this possibility of the iconic manifestation in the sacrament by "denying any
capacity to creaturely action to participate in God, and disallowing that a sacrament
can reflect the sacrament without replacing it."235 Can Marion's understanding of
the Eucharist as the "saturated phenomenon" par excellence redress this imbalance
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION: THREE ICONS OF GRACE
The iconic points in both Barth and Tillich's thought have been reached in
markedly different ways. Barth's christological assertions and his subsequent
doctrine of the Covenant ofElection led him to locate the iconic, not in an
ecclesial sacramentalism or even a proclamation of the Word, but in the obedient
response and witness of the elect. Barth seemed to have not moved very far from
Schleiermacher after all. The dynamic of the covenant itself, God's interaction
with human beings and their response to the gift of grace, is the iconic moment
that reflects the given. The elect articulate both in language and in ethical
obedience this gift in the peculiarity of their existence. Barth had written in
CD 1/1, "It is given in its own peculiar way, as Jesus Christ is given, as God in
His revelation gives Himself to faith."1 However, the phenomenology ofMarion
suggests something quite different for it is not the faith of the elect community
or even the proclamation of the Word that is the definite iconic point; it is the
Eucharist, "a multiform, inevitable, and instructive naivete ... a decisive moment
1 CD l/l, 12.
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of theological thought."2 The "Eucharistic site of theology" gives that which
preserves the distance of the invisible and yet, paradoxically manifests the
"silent immediacy of abandoned flesh "3 It exists as a current phenomenon
which:
makes an appeal, in the name of a past event, to God, in order that
he recall an engagement (a covenant) that determines the instant
presently given to the believing community.4
Marion's L 'idole et la distance shows his merging of that which is both
veiled and unveiled, near and far. The manifestation of the empty tomb may
function as that which he describes as God's self-giving "within the distance
that he keeps, and where he keeps us."5 Paradoxically, distance is what allows
closeness, "poverty coincides with superabundance, abandonment translates into
glory."6 Robyn Horner summarizes, "What this means for the disciples is that
manifestation only ever coincides with disappearance. Disclosure is only ever
offered subject to a distance that forbids recuperation."7 But, as Marion asks,
"what language might be suitable to distance" and therefore to articulate such
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Following Denys, Marion claims that "The distance ofGod is experienced first
in the figure of the Christ: there, it finds its insurpassable foundation and its
definitive authority."9 It is the cross of Jesus, by his agony and disfigurement,
that gives the eternal donation and the qualitative distanciation first. Therefore,
it might be warranted to posit that the symbol of the open tomb is historically of
a second order for faith, for at the cross the Centurion proclaimed "Vere homo hie
Filius Dei eraF (Mark 15: 39). This warrant is the very point between Tillich and
Barth and their respective theologies of the cross as has been demonstrated.
Marion's eucharistic hermeneutic as the point of all theology leaves Barth in
a precarious position in comparison. Barth's ultimate denial of the sacrament of
baptism is to be applied to his understanding of the Lord's Supper as he had stated
in CD IV/4. Barth's fears about Roman Catholic transubstantiation and Lutheran
consubstantiation lie at the heart of his denigrations of sacramental efficacy.10
Proclamation and sacrament can never be "identical with God"as they exist as
signs and "instruments in the hand ofGod."11 Barth specifies further:
The given-ness of these signs does not mean that God has manifested
Himself as it were to become a bit of the world. It does not mean that
He has passed into the hands or been put at the disposal ofmen
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This leads Barth into a direct confrontation with Marion who sees the efficacy
of the Eucharist as mediated by the bishop, the "theologian par excellence."13
Barth understandably (from his Reformed perspective) is suspicious of such
a move for it might create what he calls a "sacral human lordship", an idolic
postulation. Jesus Christ stands as the sacrament of the world without any
human mediation. Yet an iconic referent in the Eucharist abides nonetheless,
for "the sacrament has been instituted by Christ as a sign of the res sacra,
namely, the divine grace in Christ."14 What is shown in the words of
institution is an indication of the event, "This is my body (which is given for
you).15 Barth reiterates that the "death of Jesus Christ on Golgotha" is the
"one mysterium, the one sacrament, and the one existential fact before and
beside and after which there is no room for any other of the same rank."16
In effect, the sacraments are not the means of any mediatorial grace but stand
as ethical responses to this grace in human action. Sacramental action is the:
answering, attesting, and proclaiming of the one act and revelation
of salvation that has taken place in the one Mediator between God
and man [1 Tim. 2:5], who himself directly actualizes and presents
and activates and declares himself in the power of his Holy Spirit.17
13
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It appears that, for Barth, there is only the direct mediation of Christ in the act
of election infused into the subjective existence and response of the believer.
The manifestation of the saturated phenomenon of grace can only be found in
the ethical obedience of the community of faith—this is the ultimate icon for
Barth. Grace is not therefore to be seen in the disfigurement of Jesus on the cross,
for even that stands as incomplete sign and phenomenon. Inferentially there is the
dependency of the elect in their response that is related to the primal event of the
cross and most especially the resurrection. We cannot dismiss the efficacy of the
Church completely, as some have accused Barth of doing, but the aporia remains
that, in sum, he has not accepted that which is given in the icon of grace and
allowed it to be freely manifested in his theology.18
Jiirgen Moltmann has written that the '"theologian of the cross' is led by the
visible nature of God in the cross.19 The phenomenology ofMarion is an attempt
to flesh this statement out using a philosophical approach to explicate it. It seems
probable that Barth would not have approved of such a procedure given his anti-
philosophical proclivities. Paul Tillich, on the other hand, provides a more balanced
theology of the cross, but is his concept adequate in its visible sacramentality and
18 •
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disclosure of the eternal?
In Tillich's early writings, as we have seen, the "sacramental" exists in a
dialectic with the "theocratic" symbolized by the demonic and the divine. The
sacramental, in its extreme forms, becomes "no longer able to intuit the Holy
undifferentiatedly in everything real, but instead considers particular realities
and forms as bearers of the holy import."As Tillich points out, the sacramental
is only significant insofar as the "presence of the unconditioned import of
meaning is experienced."20 The sacrament, as saturated phenomenon, must be
reduced by the theocratic, the "bearer of antidemonic criticism." Autonomy,
or even magisterial hegemony, must be replaced by a mediated theonomy,
proceeding from a "sacred bearer, a mediator of revelation."21 Here Tillich
differs from Barth's concept of the covenant as gift and obedient response,
for the theonomic unconditional demand in tension with the conditioned
"demonically dominated reality" manifests itself in the form of a dialectic.
This tension "gives rise on the one hand to the phenomena of religious despair
and on the other to the breakthrough to the religion of grace as a synthesis of
theocratic and sacramental tendencies."22 The "theocratically exclusive symbol"
is bound to the symbol ofChrist.23 In this symbolic phenomenology "the holy
20








is manifest in its power to overcome the demonic at special places, ultimately
at one place, in Jesus as the Christ."24 Both the visible and the invisible, the
proximity and the distance remain. Human existence "is determined not only
by the omnipresence of the divine but also by our separation from it."25 Regarding
the Gestalt of grace, Tillich contends that the divine "appears through the humanity
of the Christ, through the historical weakness of the church, through the finite
material of the sacrament."26 The Bild of Jesus as the Christ appears as gift, as
saturated phenomenon, that can "grasp us before any conceptual interpretation."
Tillich underscored this by later writing, "An encountered reality can impress itself
upon a subject through indirect means of giving signs of itself as a centered
subjectivity."27 Yet, like Barth, Tillich never fully explicated a theological doctrine
of the sacraments for he too was suspicious of any Catholic sacramentology
("bloody sacrifices") creeping into Protestantism. But an overt connection with the
event of the cross was still signified in the sacramental phenomenon:
The sacramental acts through which the Spirit of the New Being in
Christ is mediated must refer to the historical and doctrinal symbols
in which revelatory experiences leading to the central revelation have
been expressed, for example, the crucifixion of the Christ or eternal life.28
The paradox of grace symbolized by the cross and resurrection are the ultimate
24




Tillich, "The Formative Power OfProtestantism" in PE, 212. Author's italics.




iconic references for Tillich, not the Eucharist. Existential estrangement has been
overcome in the corroborating symbol of the cross by Christ's participation in the
finite. The ambiguity of existence has been conquered in the symbol of the
resurrection. That which is the iconic has defeated the idolic, or the demonic.
The paradox of grace is manifested in the inseparability of these two symbols and
the saturation of the phenomenon of the event of Jesus Christ disclosed in all its
sublimity. The biblical is given its due, over the criticisms ofBarth, perhaps not in
Tillich's professional theology, but in that which he proclaimed.
In the face of the Crucified all the 'more' and all the 'less', all
progress and all approximation, are meaningless. Therefore, we
can say ofHim alone: He is the new reality; He is the end; He is
the Messiah. To the Crucified alone we can say: 'Thou art the
Christ'.29
Where Tillich ultimately attempts to lead us is to the confession of the
centurion before the cross, "Truly this man was the Son ofGod" (Mark 15:39).
So also Marion, who notes that the centurion saw the same phenomenon, "the
same sinister yet visible spectacle" as those who perceived Jesus as a false Messiah.
Yet the centurion beheld there on the cross "the visible trace of the invisible God"
in which:
the transition turns not on an illusion but on a hermeneutic of all vision
... to the point of paradox; indeed the distance between the invisible
sense and effectively visible spectacle is never so ruptured as it is here,
where it is a matter of crossing from this exhausted corpse to the glory
of the living God.30
29
Tillich, "He Who Is The Christ" in the Shaking ofthe Foundations, ibid., 150.
■30
Marion, The Crossing ofthe Visible, ibid., 72-73.
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The "irremediable mark of the invisible in the visible thus takes the shape of the
Cross", as this is the tutio<; of the icon of the invisible God privileged, for Marion,
in the sacramental moment of the Eucharist. Here both Barth and Tillich differ,
for in their respective backgrounds, Reformed and Lutheran, the sacrament takes
on a lower order of saturation by its human mediation in the guise of the minister
or bishop. However, for all three theologians, Jesus Christ is the sacrament of the
world, it is only in the mediation of this truth that the differences abide.
In a real sense, each of them informs and corrects the other. Barth's covenantal
icon, displayed in its biblical referent and manifested in the obedience of the elect,
keeps the issue of the real presence ofChrist in the finite world and not merely
above the world. Marion's eucharistic hermeneutic allows an accentuation on the
distance of the sacramental icon that cannot be manipulated by human distortion,
only venerated. Tillich, in this essay, seems to provide a valuable combination of
both, for in the event of the crucifixion of Jesus, confessed as the Christ, the visible
and invisible, the veiled and the unveiled, the icon over the idol, are brought into
the existential reality of humanity providing the source of all courage. Grace
abounds in the theology of these three understood as unearned gift, given by the
God of all love. Let us leave it to Karl Barth to proclaim the last words of gift:
What are we, and what do we have
on this whole earth,
which has not been given to us,
Father, by you?31
31
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